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Abstract 
 
This thesis applies traditional and innovative models of education economics to new data 
from regional Cambodia to calculate the education premium, rate of return on education, and 
the impact on personal equity for an average graduate.  
Building on the traditional Mincer model, where log wages are a function of education, 
experience, and experience squared, the thesis addresses nine issues that complicate the field 
of education economics, and briefly reviews the evidence from around the world and 
specifically for Cambodia. The most comprehensive work done on Cambodian education was 
found to have included an error of interpretation, which caused a substantial underestimation 
of the annualised university premium. Until now the best available estimate for the 
annualized university premium in Cambodia was 11-12% but the correct interpretation of the 
results shows that the annualised premium is actually 27-29%.  
A survey was conducted in regional Cambodia in 2012, collecting primary data from 530 
respondents. This data was used in a series of models, starting with the basic Mincer model 
and expanding to include non-linear education premiums, and for the first time including 
control variables for ability and socio-economic status. A series of non-standard education 
models were also used, using different functional forms and statistical techniques. One of 
those models included heterogeneous experience premiums, and the analysis of that model 
led to two conclusions: (i) the standard Mincer assumption of independent education and 
experience premiums is false; and (ii) the omission of heterogeneous experience premiums 
causes university premiums to be exaggerated; and also a speculation that (iii) the omission 
of heterogeneous experience premiums explains the apparent convexity of the education 
premium.   
Some of the key results of the preferred model include an average education premium of 
6.6% and an annualised university premium of 20.6%, though the conventional reporting 
framework for annualised university premiums is challenged and a more accurate estimate of 
15.9% is presented.  
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The education premium is not the same thing as the education rate of return, and the above 
premiums are used to calculate (for the first time) the rate of return on education in 
Cambodia. The rate of return on an average year of education with base case assumptions is 
10.3% for men and 9.9% for women, and for university education is 14.1% for men and 
13.5% for women. A comprehensive range of sensitivity analysis shows that these estimates 
are robust in most instances, though the results depend crucially on assumptions about when 
people enter the workforce.   
The above information is used to calculate the personal equity (present value of future 
income) of Cambodians, and the marginal impact of education on personal equity. The use of 
personal equity finance is explored as a way to fund education. Using contract parameters 
similar to the Human Capital Project, investing in personal equity in Cambodia has a 9.8% 
rate of return for the investor, and a net benefit of around $11,000 (men) or $8000 (women) 
for the student.  
Finally, building on the idea of personal equity as a financial asset, the idea of a personal 
equity market is explored, and a proposal made for how such a market could be created by 
the Australian government without impacting on education policy or the government’s 
financial risk profile. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Ten years ago, I went to Cambodia to volunteer as a lecturer at Chea Sim University of 
Kamchaymear. The experience was transformative. The university was well hidden from 
civilisation − requiring a 14-hour journey to travel the 300km from Phnom Penh, housing two 
computers for their 2000 staff and students, and having electricity for just two hours each 
day. Despite these hardships, many of the students who were lucky enough to access that 
regional university have gone on to start their own businesses or find well-paying jobs. Many 
of them are now part of the new Cambodian middle class, and they owe a large part of their 
success to their education.  
The situation in Cambodia presented challenges and opportunities. The university sector was 
expanding quickly, but there was little reliable information about education, university was 
unaffordable for many, and the government lacked the resources to address either issue. My 
preferred funding solution was the introduction of personal equity finance, which is an 
uncommon and unconventional idea that offers the promise of private funding for education, 
without the need for collateral or high interest rates. Though at the time I had no intention of 
actually doing the work myself.   
Life can change quickly. Encouraged by fellow economists Jason Potts and Joseph Clark (the 
same people who later encouraged me to start this PhD), in 2007 I formed the Human Capital 
Project (HCP) as a non-profit organisation that would offer personal equity finance in 
Cambodia. The idea was kept intentionally simple. With donor support, HCP pays the tuition 
fees for poor rural Cambodians so that they can attend university. When they graduate, if the 
students can find decent jobs then they contribute 10% of their income back to HCP for a 
fixed number of years, and that money is used to finance future generations of poor students. 
Several years later, it was my experience with the Human Capital Project that was the 
inspiration for this thesis.  
Some of the research agendas that were inspired by HCP ended up going in unexpected 
directions, and evolved in ways that didn’t fit this thesis. Studying the comparative advantage 
of social business, theories about emergent institutions without government, and the 
economics of reputation have not made it into this document, but hopefully those projects 
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will continue in another context. In the end, this thesis has focused on the financial return on 
education in regional Cambodia − calculating a new and improved education premium, 
publishing the first ever rate of return, and estimating the value and potential of Cambodia’s 
personal equity.  
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the main issues addressed in this thesis. In 
section 1.1, the Human Capital Project is described in more detail to help explain the 
motivation for this thesis and establish the context for what follows. The project itself is still 
too young to provide much helpful information, but it does provide a template that can be 
used for later considerations. The following two sections provide a quick overview of the two 
big themes in the thesis, with section 1.2 providing a brief introduction to the economics of 
education (Chapters 2-7) and then section 1.3 previewing the innovative and unusual idea of 
personal equity finance (Chapters 8-9).  
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1.1 – Human Capital Project   
 
Starting in 2007, the Human Capital Project (HCP) was one of the first personal equity 
finance providers in the world, and is the only personal equity finance provider in Asia. 
While personal equity was first discussed in 1945 and an early approximation of personal 
equity was first tried by Cassius Clay (later called Muhammad Ali) in 1960, it has only been 
in the 21st century that personal equity contracts have become available, and even now there 
are still only a handful of providers.  
The basic idea of personal equity is that a finance provider (such as HCP) provides some 
money to a recipient (in the case of HCP, the recipients are university student) in exchange 
for a percentage share of that recipient’s future income. Every year, representatives of HCP 
have to stress to applicants that personal equity finance is not charity (since the student has a 
future obligation) and it is not debt (because the future obligation is not fixed); the idea of 
personal equity is still relatively new and exotic for most people, and it often takes a while for 
the idea to be fully understood.  
To be more precise, HCP provides enough funding to pay the tuition costs for poor 
Cambodians to attend the University of Management and Economics (UME) in Battambang, 
Kampong Cham, or Sihanoukville (also called Kampong Som). In exchange, the student 
agrees to pay 10% of their future income (as long as they earn over a pre-determined 
minimum) and the payments continues for a fixed number of years. The amount that the 
student ends up paying is determined by their future income -- if the student has no (or very 
low) income then they will pay nothing, and HCP will make a loss; if the student has an 
average income, they will pay an average amount; and if the student has a high income, they 
will end up paying many times more than the cost of university tuition.  
The exact amount of finance provided by HCP will depend on the price of university tuition 
that year, whether the student has a partial scholarship, and whether the student is able to self-
finance for some of the degree. If the student requires the maximum amount (full price 
university tuition for all four years) then the HCP contract requires that they make their 10% 
payments for 10 years, though on average most students have an obligation of about six or 
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seven years. Graduates are also given the choice to pay 20% of their income and halve the 
repayment time. 
The money paid by HCP graduates is used to pay for future HCP students, somewhat similar 
to a “pass it forward” scheme. The operation of HCP in Australia is run entirely by 
volunteers, while the operation costs of HCP in Cambodia are still relatively low and are 
funded by donors. The fact that that graduate payments are used to fund future students is an 
important part of the funding model, since that charitable element helps to encourage greater 
honesty from HCP graduates. This is an important consideration since personal equity 
finance involves long-term contracts, and the legal system in Cambodia (as with many 
developing countries) is not always reliable.  
In the first year HCP funded three students, and by 2015 that has increased to over 100 
students who have been in the system. While there are several generations of HCP graduates 
now, and some of them are earning enough to make regular payments, there is still a 
dependence on foreign donors to help cover the costs of new students each year. The project 
is not (yet) self-sustaining, but it is moving in the right direction. It is still too early to 
undertake meaningful analysis of HCP outcomes, but the activities of HCP nonetheless serve 
as the inspiration for this thesis, and the main case study that is used when considering the 
issue of personal equity finance in Cambodia. 
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1.2 – Education economics   
 
The core of this thesis focuses on the economics of education, with six chapters dedicated to 
the topic. Some of the key outputs include:  
• Correcting an interpretation mistake that substantially changes the best previous 
estimate of the annualised university premium in Cambodia;  
• Presenting the first Cambodian survey conducted specifically for the purpose of 
collecting data for education models;  
• Making use of the most robust education model that has been applied to Cambodia to 
estimate a range of education-related relationships, which provides the latest (and 
arguably best) estimates of Cambodia’s education premium;  
• Revealing the fundamental flaws in the conventional approach of presenting the 
annualised university premium;  
• Exploring two new models to address the possibility of heterogeneous experience 
premiums, and evaluating the implications;  
• Calculating the first full-method estimate of the rate of return on education in 
Cambodia, with extensive sensitivity analysis; and also 
• Measuring the net present value and benefit-cost ratio from Cambodian education.  
Directly following this introduction, Chapter 2 starts with a review and critique of the 
foundational Mincer model of education, where log wages are determined by years of 
education, years of experience, and experience squared. While the Mincer model serves as a 
good starting point for education economics, there are nine important qualifications that must 
be considered when trying to understand the relationship between education and income. The 
first chapter also provides a brief introduction to the role of education in growth theory, and a 
review of the global evidence about the return on education. Chapter 3 moves on to look 
directly at education in Cambodia, reviewing the best previous estimates provided by Ashish 
Lall and Chris Sakellariou in 2010, and then identifying an error they made while interpreting 
the annualised education premiums which substantially changes their conclusion.   
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In order to have the specific data needed by a robust education model it was necessary to 
gather primary data, which took the form of the Regional Cambodia Education Survey 
(RCES) conducted in Battambang and Kampong Cham provinces in the first half of 2012. 
The methodology and raw results of that survey are presented in Chapter 4. Crucially, the 
data includes key variables that make it possible to build an education model that is more 
theoretically robust than the models used in previous studies.    
Chapter 5 starts with the simple Mincer model and then presents two other education models 
that are copied directly from previous studies, before introducing a “preferred model” that 
includes control variables to account for ability endogeneity and socio-economic factors. The 
preferred model is first presented with linear education, and a second version uses dummy 
variables relating to education levels to allow for non-linear education premiums. Further 
models are presented in Chapter 6, which allow for different polynomials (education squared 
and experience cubed) and alternatives to ordinary least squares regressions such as Poisson 
regression and non-parametric analysis. In particular, Chapter 6 presents two innovative 
education models that allow for heterogeneous experience premiums. These models can 
factor in the possibility that experience premiums are higher for people with more education, 
and the results suggest the need to rethink the relationship between education and wages.    
The education premium is not the same thing as the education rate of return, and Chapter 7 
uses the premium from the preferred model (from Chapter 5) to present the first proper 
calculation of the rate of return on education in Cambodia, along with an extensive sensitivity 
analysis. The chapter looks at the rate of return at different education levels, and goes past the 
usual rate of return statistics to also present the net present value and benefit-cost ratio for 
education, estimated separately for men and women.  
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1.3 – Personal equity finance    
 
After calculating the financial benefit of education in Chapter 7, the thesis changes pace for 
the next two chapters to explore the issue of personal equity finance in greater detail. 
Personal equity is the present value of a person’s future income stream. The relationship 
between personal equity and education goes in both directions, since education increases the 
value of personal equity (by increasing expected future income) and access to personal equity 
finance can help people to pay for their education.  
Chapter 8 covers the case for personal equity, the problems and possible solutions, the real 
world applications, and personal equity estimates for Cambodia. The chapter starts by talking 
about the discovery (not invention) of personal equity, and the related concept of income-
contingent loans, before listing possible benefits such as (i) easier access to university for 
people without money; (ii) ability to reallocate risk to those most able and willing to accept it; 
(iii) the benefits to investors; (iv) increased education spending up to efficient levels; and (v) 
use of personal equity for income smoothing or social insurance.  
Discussing potential problems of personal equity includes an extended discussion of issues 
relating to information economics (adverse selection and moral hazard), institutional 
economics, and transaction costs. The review of real world applications goes beyond the few 
current experiments and also considers examples of implicit personal equity such as marriage 
and tax. A large part of the chapter is taken up with an estimate of the marginal change in the 
value of Cambodian personal equity caused by different levels of education, as well as a 
naïve estimate (ignoring behavioural changes and risk) of the return on personal equity from 
the perspective of the Human Capital Project. The discussion of HCP finance also challenges 
the conventional wisdom (put forward by the global authority on personal equity Miguel 
Palacios1) that ineffective legal systems will prevent personal equity finance, extending the 
earlier institutional discussion by giving practical details.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  his	  groundbreaking	  book,	  “Investing	  in	  Human	  Capital”	  (2004),	  Palacios	  suggests	  that	  personal	  equity	  may	  
not	  be	  possible	  in	  developing	  countries	  due	  to	  “the	  instability	  of	  the	  law,	  the	  difficulty	  in	  enforcing	  payments”	  
among	  other	  reasons.	  
2	  One	  approach	  is	  to	  include	  a	  variable	  for	  political	  connections,	  though	  getting	  reliable	  data	  is	  difficult.	  For	  
more	  about	  links	  between	  political	  connections	  and	  financial	  rewards,	  see	  papers	  by	  C.	  K.	  Murray	  (2012,	  2014).	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Finally, in Chapter 9 the thesis switches focus from personal equity contracts to the 
theoretical idea of personal equity markets trading in personal equity funds. Treating personal 
equity as a financial asset, this chapter starts by expanding on the idea of personal equity 
backed securities, and how they could help reduce some of the transaction costs outlined in 
the previous chapter. The traded price of personal equity funds would also provide valuable 
information about the expected income from different degrees, which is useful for students, 
universities, and policy makers.  
While this is just theory at the moment, Chapter 9 concludes by looking at the opportunity for 
the Australian government to establish a personal equity market without changing education 
policy, and giving the government full discretion over their financial risk profile, including 
the option of no change.       
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Chapter 2: The Economics of Education  
 
The rise of education economics (and human capital more broadly) over the last fifty years 
has changed the way most economists think of prosperity and economic growth. It is now 
widely accepted that education is integral in determining the prosperity of individuals and the 
wealth of nations. This has almost become a truism. The search to better understand the role 
of education in the economy has given rise to a large microeconomic literature estimating and 
interpreting the education premium and rate of return on education, as well as influencing 
macroeconomics through endogenous growth theory.  
As the field of education economics has grown, researchers have grappled with a variety of 
difficult questions and modelling problems. This chapter provides an overview of that 
literature. Section 2.1 will introduce the popular Mincer model of education, and then 
systematically consider a variety of issues that need to be addressed in the context of 
education econometrics. A complete understanding of these points is necessary for any 
researcher who wants to build a robust education model.  
Section 2.2 looks at the macroeconomic debates about human capital and economic growth. 
Finally, section 2.3 provides a brief overview of the international evidence regarding the size 
of the education premium.  
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2.1 – Microeconomics of education   
 
There is a very thorough literature covering the link between education and earnings that goes 
back at least to Friedman and Kuznets (1954). Since Jacob Mincer (1974), the dominant 
approach to measure the financial benefit from education has been to use ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression based on the Mincerian equation (Card 1999, 2001): 
 ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑆 +   𝛽!𝐸 +   𝛽!𝐸! + 𝑒                                                                                                              (1) 
 
Where: 
ln = national logarithm; 
w = wages; 
S = schooling (years of education);  
E = years of experience;  
E2 = years of experience squared; 
βx = Mincer coefficients; and  
e = the error term 
 
For an explanation of the theoretical foundations of the Mincer equation, see Heckman et al. 
(2003). The simplest form of the Mincer equation has (the log of) wages depending only on 
years of schooling and years of experience, with a linear relationship between schooling and 
log wages. 
While the Mincer equation has been hugely popular and offers a good starting point, there 
have been many critiques made, and suggested improvements offered. The accuracy of the 
basic Mincer approach rests on a series of assumptions that are often violated. The following 
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sub-sections consider nine issues that need to be considered when trying to estimate the 
financial benefit from education.   
 
2.1.1 Non-linearity of education 
Numerous studies have drawn into question the assumed linearity of log wages and 
schooling. While Card and Krueger (1992) concluded that the relationship was essentially 
linear (with the exception of the first few years and last few years), since that time a large 
body of evidence has suggested that education premiums are becoming increasingly convex 
(Mincer, 1997; Deschenes, 2001; Lemieux, 2003; Belzil, 2006).  
Mincer (1997) argued that this is a logical response to a relative increase in the demand for 
human capital. Another potential reason for non-linearity may be “sheepskin” effects, where 
achieving the final credential (e.g. a high school certificate or university degree) is more 
important than non-credentialed education.  For example, completing four out of four years 
of a university degree may result in a large wage premium, but a person who completes only 
three out of four years of the same degree may receive a much smaller wage premium.   
The most common response to these concerns has been to split education up into different 
levels (e.g. primary, secondary, tertiary) and estimating different premiums for the different 
levels. This approach is used regularly in education economics, and the functional form is 
given as: 
 ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝐸𝑑! +   𝛽!𝐸𝑑! +   𝛽!𝐸𝑑! +   𝛽!𝐸 +   𝛽!𝐸! + 𝑒                                                                      (2) 
 
Where: 
Edx = education dummy variables; and 
βx = Mincer coefficients.  
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Another approach sometimes used to account for non-linearity in the education premium has 
been to include schooling squared as an explanatory variable (Lemieux, 2003; Kifle, 2007; 
Diagne & Diene, 2011), as shown:  
 ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑆 +   𝛽!𝑆! + 𝛽!𝐸 +   𝛽!𝐸! + 𝑒                                                                                              (3) 
 
Where: 
S = schooling (years of education); and 
S2 = years of education squared. 
 
A positive β2 coefficient would show that education premiums are convex (increasing 
premiums for higher education) while a negative coefficient would show that education 
premiums are concave (decreasing premiums for higher education). A growing body of 
evidence shows that “the non-linear (convex) shape of the wage schooling relationship is 
acute” (Belzil, 2006, p14). 
 
2.1.2 Ability endogeneity  
One of the most common concerns with education economics is the degree to which 
schooling is endogenous, with most attention focused on the possibility that a missing ability 
variable is causing an ability bias. Harmon et al. (2003) describe endogeneity and ability bias 
as “the preoccupation of the empirical literature since the earliest contributions” (p119).  
People with greater abilities (or some other hidden advantage) are likely to receive more 
schooling and also receive higher incomes, which could result in a correlation between 
schooling and wages that does not accurately describe the causal link. If ability is a driver of 
both schooling and wages, then the basic Mincer equation will give biased results. A large 
ability bias would help explain the convex relationship between education and (log of) wages, 
as discussed above, and it would also create an upward bias in the education coefficient.   
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One potential response to this problem is to include explanatory variables in the model that 
are assumed to capture natural ability, such as performance on an IQ test or school grades 
(Harmon et al., 2003; Maluccio, 1998). 
Another common approach is to use an instrumental variable (IV) that correlates closely with 
schooling but is not correlated with ability or wages. Two common examples are distance to 
school and spouse’s education. Lall and Sakallariou (2010) used education of spouse as well 
as early age smoking, with the theoretical rationale that smoking indicates a high time value 
of money (high discount rate) while education generally requires a relatively lower time 
value of money (low discount rate). One problem with using IV is that it is not possible to 
relax the assumption of linear education premiums. If education non-linearity were fully 
explained by the ability bias, this restriction would not be a major concern. However, studies 
by Belzil and Hansen (2002) and Belzil (2006) show that the non-linearity is “not solely a 
reflection of omitted skill heterogeneity” (Belzil, 2006, p17).  
The IV approach also produces an unexpected result. If ability bias were a significant 
problem, then we would expect the education premium using the IV approach to be lower 
than the education premium found using the OLS approach. Strangely, the reverse is often the 
case, with IV estimates regularly found to be higher than OLS estimates (Card, 1999; 
Blundell, et al., 2001; Maluccio, 1998; Harmon et al., 2003).  
Several reasons have been put forward to explain the difference between the IV and OLS 
estimates. One response associated with Griliches (1977) has been to highlight the risk of 
measurement error that causes the OLS results to be biased downwards, though Card (2001) 
notes that the difference between IV and OLS estimates is too large to be explained only by 
measurement error.   
Card (2001) notes that the OLS estimates are for an average person, but some IV estimates 
will represent groups with relatively high marginal returns. Likewise, Trostel (2005) argues 
that IV generally captures the causal effect of education at the point of highest marginal 
return, which causes the IV method to overestimate the average education premium. In 
addition, the IV approach may suffer from weak instruments (Staiger & Stock, 1997) or 
inappropriate instruments (Heckman & Urzua, 2009). For example, while distance to school 
may be uncorrelated with ability and wages (and so avoid that particular endogeneity 
problem), it may instead be correlated with socio-economic status, and so it would still bias 
the estimate. As explained by Card (1999): 
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“the validity of a particular IV estimator depends crucially on the assumption that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with other latent characteristics of individuals that may 
affect their earnings.” (p1821).  
Ability bias takes up a large part of the Mincer-related literature, but it may ultimately have 
only a marginal impact on estimates. In his comprehensive analysis of education economics, 
Griliches (1977) argued that ability endogeneity was not a large issue, a position also 
supported by the findings of Angrist and Krueger (1991) and then also by Hogan and 
Rigobon (2002). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) suggest that net ability bias is relatively small 
because unobserved abilities of those who acquire more schooling and those who do not are 
negatively correlated. In other words, there are lots of different types of ability, and their 
combined impact may not be relevant when measuring education premiums.  
One way to check the importance of ability is to compare the outcomes for people with 
school grades marginally above and below the necessary cut-off to get into university. If the 
school grades are an appropriate proxy for ability, then any difference between the 
marginally above cut-off and the marginally below cut-off students cannot be explained by 
ability. Natural experiments from the United States of America (USA) show that there is a 
significant difference between academically similar students based on whether they had 
access to university (Zimmerman, 2013; Goodman et al., 2015), which suggests that ability 
bias may not be a large concern.  
The decade-old words of Heckman et al. (2003) are probably still appropriate today: “the 
current empirical debate on the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of schooling is 
far from settled” (p3). The issue of ability bias will be revisited in the following section on 
the macroeconomics of education. 
Putting aside the debate about whether there is an endogeneity problem, it is highly 
questionable whether the IV approach provides an effective solution since an IV model is not 
able to relax the linearity assumption, the instrumental variable used may raise other 
endogeneity problems, and the IV approach has historically provided anomalous results. This 
thesis will focus on OLS estimates, though Chapter 6 will briefly consider IV and other 
statistical techniques.  
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2.1.3 Other missing variables  
While ability is the most prominent example of an omitted variable, there are many other 
issues that may have an important impact on wages that are not included in the basic Mincer 
equation. For example, Altonji and Williams (1997) and Topel (1991) both found significant 
positive relationships between tenure and wages. In contrast, Kifle (2007) found a negative 
tenure-wage relationship in Ethiopia, which he interpreted as a cost caused by lack of job 
mobility. In his examination of the relationship, Williams (1991) found that tenure was 
positively related to wages only for the first few years of employment, suggesting a non-
linear relationship.  
Some literature has explored the importance of socio-economic factors in determining wages. 
For example, Lam and Schoeni (1993) reported that having a father with a university degree 
instead of being illiterate provides a 20% wage premium for the child, ceteris paribus, while 
Iyer et al. (2013) show that the interruption to schooling during the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution had a noticeable impact on the schooling outcomes of the next generation. The 
transmission mechanism of socio-economic factors may be through an improved learning 
environment, or it may be through more effective family connections to the job market. 
While the latter is difficult to measure2, the former can be controlled for by including parents’ 
education and/or income levels.  
Another potential factor is whether a person works in the public or private sector. Mann and 
Kapoor (1988) have suggested that public sector workers can be paid more than their private 
sector counterparts, and Rees and Shah (1995) suggested that this is potentially a result of 
public wages not being limited by economic constraints. However, Lall and Sakellariou 
(2010) found a negative premium on public sector employment, which suggests a more 
complicated relationship between employment sector and wages. The Lall and Sakellariou 
result is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Other variables that have been suggested include gender, marital status, hours worked, type 
of industry, and other personal details. One control that would be especially helpful is the 
quality of schooling, though this can be difficult to measure. Including additional variables 
extends the Mincer equation: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  One	  approach	  is	  to	  include	  a	  variable	  for	  political	  connections,	  though	  getting	  reliable	  data	  is	  difficult.	  For	  
more	  about	  links	  between	  political	  connections	  and	  financial	  rewards,	  see	  papers	  by	  C.	  K.	  Murray	  (2012,	  2014).	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 ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑆 +   𝛽!𝐸 +   𝛽!𝐸! + 𝛿𝑋 + 𝑒                                                                              (4) 
Where: 
X = vector of control variables; and 
δ = vector of coefficients for control variables.  
 
2.1.4 Education-specific experience  
Another Mincer assumption that has been drawn into question is the idea that the experience 
premium is the same for everybody, regardless of education level. In Heckman et al. (2003), 
this issue was explored by observing whether the earnings-experience profiles for different 
education levels in the United States were parallel, which was rejected. Belzil (2006) and 
Card and Lemeiux (2001) found the same results. The problem of heterogeneous experience 
premiums leading to divergent wage growth paths is regularly noted in the literature, but 
most studies provide no solution.  
In one response, Andini (2008) offers a dynamic Mincer equation, where ln(w) is dependent 
on “ln(wt-1)” as well as the usual schooling and experience variables: 
 ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽! ln 𝑤!!! + 𝛽!𝑆 +   𝛽!𝐸 +   𝛽!𝐸! +   𝑒                                                                (5) 
 
Note that for simplicity, the above function excludes a vector of control variables. The main 
innovation is that the dynamic Mincer equation includes a co-efficient (β1) that measures the 
relationship between wages and previous wages. Andini finds a significant value for β1, 
suggesting a high degree of path dependence in wages.  
Andini offers a theoretical justification for the dynamic Mincer by suggesting that observed 
earnings are not equal to net potential earnings due to wage bargaining imbalances, and also 
potentially due to asymmetric information, the role of unions, and/or efficiency wage 
arguments. He posits an adjustment variable (ρ) that is between 0 and 1, which measures the 
speed at which observed wages approach potential earnings. Using this theoretical 
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framework, if (ρ) = 1 then the original Mincer equation would hold (automatic and full 
adjustment). However, Andini finds evidence that (ρ) is closer to 0.3, which suggests that 
adjustment of observed earnings to potential earnings takes time. All of these conclusions rest 
crucially on holding fixed the other Mincer assumptions.  
One interpretation of Andini’s model is that part of the benefit of experience is actually a 
delayed benefit from schooling. If this is true, then Andini’s theory (2008) explains why there 
would be a different experience profile for different levels of education, since the delayed 
education benefit (which would show up as an experience benefit) may be larger (or occur 
faster) depending on the level of education.  
An alternative theory to explain divergent wage profiles is that the experience premium may 
in part represent general productivity improvements, and that productivity growth may be 
different at different skill levels. For example, if there was low productivity improvement in 
unskilled work but high productivity growth in highly skilled work, and the productivity 
changes flowed through into wage changes, then the wage profile for unskilled and highly 
skilled workers would diverge.     
A third potential reason for divergent wage profiles is that high-skilled jobs may include a 
significant amount of on-the-job training that doesn’t get captured by the schooling 
coefficient, and the benefits of these new skills are therefore incorporated in the experience 
coefficient.  
While Andini’s solution (2008) does effectively control for divergent wage profiles, his 
reliance on lagged wages to explain future wages hides the underlying contributions of other 
explanatory variables. The solution by Heckman et al. (2003) was to use non-parametric 
analysis, which does avoid the problem of inappropriate specification but that lack of 
specification means that we do not get a better understanding of the relationship between 
education, experience, and wages.  
The issue of education-specific (or heterogeneous) experience is arguably the largest 
unresolved problem within education economics. If highly educated people tend to have a 
higher experience premium, then standard Mincer models will overestimate the university 
education coefficient and underestimate the education coefficients for lower levels of 
education, artificially exaggerating the convexity of the education-wage relationship.  
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This would also fundamentally change the way that the benefits of education should be 
conceptualised. While the university coefficient may be smaller than previously thought, the 
true benefit of education now includes both the education coefficient and the marginal change 
in the experience coefficient. It then becomes an empirical question of whether the main 
benefit of higher education comes from the direct link to wages or from the indirect 
transmission mechanism where education is linked to a job with higher wage growth.  
Chapter 6 of this thesis will introduce models that allow heterogeneous experience premiums. 
The Heterogeneous Experience Model includes different experience coefficients for each 
different level of schooling, and the Two-Tier Experience “Andini” Model includes an extra 
explanatory variable that represents Andini’s idea of a delayed education benefit. The results 
show that Mincer’s experience assumption is violated, and models that ignore experience 
heterogeneity will give biased results.     
 
2.1.5 Uncertainty and growth  
The standard Mincer approach assumes a constant economic environment (including no 
technological change) and certainty about future incomes. Factoring in the non-stationarity of 
earnings over time (i.e. expected future productivity improvements) will likely increase the 
education premium, as was found by Heckman et al. (2003) in the US. The stationarity 
assumption can be relaxed either by using data for a consistent cohort, or by artificially 
adjusting wages for expected future changes in productivity. 
Relaxing the certainty assumption has two important consequences. First, if the population is 
generally risk averse, then the risk-adjusted rate of return of education will be lower than the 
rate of return calculated using the standard Mincer approach. This may go some way to 
explaining why the rate of return on education appears to exceed market rates of return, since 
the difference may be caused by the risk premium faced by individual students. This could be 
interpreted as evidence of capital market failure, where a risk-averse student is unable to 
hedge their idiosyncratic risk and so under-invests in education. With physical capital, high-
value and high-risk investments can be pooled into a diversified portfolio that reduces the risk 
down to market risk levels, but this option generally doesn’t exist for students investing in 
their own human capital. One solution to this problem is personal equity finance (or “human 
capital contracts”), which is discussed in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9.  
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The second consequence of introducing uncertainty as well as sequential decision-making is 
that it changes how the education rate of return should be interpreted. The value of early 
education is not only the measured rate of return, but also the “option value” of being able to 
go on to higher levels of education. This means that a naïve use of the measured rate of return 
will not accurately predict behaviour and should be interpreted with caution (Heckman et al., 
2003). Of course, this issue has less relevance for higher education since there are fewer 
education options remaining after you have finished university.  
 
2.1.6 Education premium or rate of return  
There is sometimes confusion in the literature between education premium (which comes 
from the coefficient for schooling in the Mincer regression) and the rate of return on 
education. While related, these two concepts are not the same (Meghir & Rivkin, 2010). The 
education premium measures the benefit from education in terms of higher wages. In 
contrast, the rate of return on education factors in both the benefits and costs of education.  
Psacharopoulos (1994) warns that authors have too often labelled their coefficients as returns 
to education, when they would more accurately be described as a total wage effect, or wage 
premium. For example, Garcia-Suaza et al. (2009) admit that in Colombia most papers have 
conflated these two statistics, which has resulted in those papers over-stating the return on 
education. 
Under some very strict assumptions, the education premium will be the same as the rate of 
return, though these assumptions are nearly never met in practice. In addition to the normal 
assumptions about linearity of log-wages in schooling and the independence of education and 
experience (discussed above), the additional assumptions are that education is free, has no 
psychological benefits or costs, has no impact on the length of work life, and there are no 
taxes. Heckman et al. (2003) explores this issue for the US and shows that while the 
assumptions were perhaps plausible in the 1960s, they have been “at odds with the data ever 
since” (p1).  
When these assumptions are violated, the rate of return on education will be different than the 
education premium. In some cases the difference can be substantial. Confusion between these 
two concepts can have important consequences when considering the desirability of further 
education. When making investment decisions, the relevant metric should be the rate of 
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return, and while they are less common in the education literature, other appropriate financial 
indicators include the net present value and the benefit-cost ratio. It is not sufficient to use the 
education premium, since that would mean only considering the financial benefits of 
education without factoring in the costs.  
 
2.1.7 Private or social returns 
It is also important to draw a distinction between what is called the social rate of return and 
the private rate of return, and various other potential variations (Palacios, 2004). The private 
rate of return includes only the private financial benefit (increase in after-tax income) and 
only the private costs paid by the student, while the social rate of return also includes the 
benefit to the government (tax payments on higher incomes) and the costs incurred by the 
government through education subsidies.  
This language is somewhat misleading, as the social rate of return does not include any 
potential externalities from education. This is sometimes interpreted to mean that the real 
social returns are higher than the stated returns, and indeed Palacios (2004) insists that the 
social rate of return “can be useful only for setting the lower limit of the social value of 
education” (p15). Likewise, Tilak (2007) argues against the standard analysis as it excludes 
what he claims are the “huge set of non-economic benefits” and he goes on to argue that the 
standard approach to education economics “is viewed as a ploy and even as a capitalist 
conspiracy to see that developing countries do not develop strong higher education systems, 
would remain under-developed educationally as well as economically, and would forever 
remain dependent on the advanced countries”. The transmission mechanism from education 
to social benefits is often left unstated, but one possibility is a change in the labour market 
leading to higher wages for unskilled workers (Moretti, 2004).  
Despite the common assertion of “huge” positive externalities, these claims need to be treated 
with some scepticism. Education is not only about increasing human capital, and if education 
is pursued for reasons such as signalling or consumption, then there will be fewer positive 
externalities (Palacios, 2004; Caplan, 2012).  Also, if education proves to be a costly way to 
signal pre-existing abilities, then education can actually create a negative “positional 
externality” (Frank, 2005), where students waste scarce resources in a zero-sum academic 
arms race. The proposed externality benefits and costs are difficult to measure with any 
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accuracy (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). In his overview of the literature, Venniker 
(2001) finds ambiguous results, with some studies suggesting net negative externalities and 
others claiming large net positive externalities. A comprehensive analysis by Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2000) concludes that the net externalities from education are small and not 
statistically significant.  
Claims of externalities from any specific activity (often linked with a call for more 
government subsidies or taxes) must be seen in the proper context – where nearly all of 
human activity creates several positive and negative externalities that are impossible to fully 
understand.  Indeed, there is no rent-seeking behaviour that does not have an elegant 
externality argument, often in both directions, depending on who is seeking the rent.  
While the private rate of return is of interest to students deciding on whether to invest in 
education, the best measure of the value of education comes from the social rate of return, 
which includes the full cost and the full financial benefit of the education. In situations with 
low taxes and education subsidies, the two estimates will converge. This is nearly the case 
with the Cambodian university sector since most students pay the full price for tuition and 
income tax is not widely enforced.  
 
2.1.8 Average or marginal return 
Economic theory suggests that the marginal return on education will be lower than the 
average return on education, and that outcome is confirmed by the work of Carneiro and 
Heckman (2002), Carneiro et al. (2005), and the analysis of Murray (2008a, 2008b). In their 
meta-study, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) show that average returns to schooling have 
declined as education has increased, echoing the same finding 10 years earlier, when 
Psacharopoulos (1994) concluded that “the returns to education obey the same rules as 
investment in conventional capital, i.e. they decline as investment is expanded” (p1335). 
Contrary evidence that education premiums increased in America over the late 20th century 
has been attributed to a rise in the ability bias (Kaymak, 2009).  
The difference between average and marginal return offers another potential reason for why 
education has a seemingly higher rate of return compared with investments in physical 
capital. While education might have a higher average rate of return, the relevant issue for 
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determining marginal investment decisions is the marginal rate of return, and it may be that 
the marginal return on education is no higher than the marginal return on physical capital.  
The results discussed in this thesis are average education premiums. In many instances, the 
average premium is the appropriate metric for comparisons, judgement and policy formation. 
However, in other contexts (such as evaluating an increase in education) it would be more 
appropriate to consider the marginal education premium, and in those contexts the average 
premium is likely to be an overestimate.  
 
2.1.9 Reporting the education premium 
The final issue considered in this section is the manner in which education premiums are 
often reported. There are two conventions that are technically correct but lend themselves to 
confusion unless they are clearly explained.  
First, when using a continuous education regressor, the associated coefficient is referred to as 
the education premium. This is a technically accurate since the education coefficient literally 
measures instantaneous rate of change in wages at the margin. However, in most of 
economics (and life) it is more common to think in terms of compounded annual rates of 
change rather than instantaneous rates of change. Converting the instantaneous rate (c) into a 
compounded annual rate (r) can be done with the simple formula r = exp(c)-1, and the result 
would be an education premium that aligns more accurately with how the premium is 
generally interpreted.  
When the coefficient is relatively small, the instantaneous and annual rates of changes will be 
functionally equivalent. While it is simple to convert the coefficient, the convention in 
education economics is to simply report the instantaneous rate as the education premium, and 
the relatively small difference between the numbers does not justify going against convention 
in this thesis.   
There is another reporting issue that requires more serious attention, since it can result in 
reported education premiums that are substantially higher than the actual premiums. As 
discussed in sub-section 2.1.2 above, a common way to allow for education non-linearity is to 
include a series of education level dummy variables. When interpreting the regression results, 
the education level coefficients are commonly converted into annualised education 
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premiums3 so that different estimates can be reported in a comparable way. Unfortunately, 
given the way that annualised education premiums are often calculated, they are not an 
accurate representation of the marginal wage benefit from education.  
The education premium is generally understood to measure the marginal increase in wages 
associated with education. When the education premium comes from the coefficient of a 
continuous education regressor (as discussed above), it does represent the marginal increase 
in wages, but the annualised education premium calculated from education dummy variables 
measures something slightly different, and so the two premiums aren’t directly comparable. 
Comparisons between the two types of premiums can give a misleading impression, 
especially with regards to university education.   
The annualised education premium represents a percentage increase in wages from an 
additional year of education (as expected), but it does not represent a marginal change 
because it is not measured as a change from the previous education position. Instead, the 
annualised education premium measures the increase in wages as a percentage of a 
hypothetical “no education” wage level, regardless of the actual amount of education already 
completed.  
Measuring the percentage increase from a “no education” wage is appropriate when looking 
at the impact of primary school education, but it is not appropriate for university education. 
For a person deciding whether to attend university or begin working, the relevant issue is the 
marginal premium from university. However, the university premium that is commonly 
reported will overestimate the marginal premium, because the reported premium is calculated 
as a percentage increase over an artificially low “no education” starting wage.  
A simplified example may help clarify this issue. Consider a situation where a person with no 
education has a wage of $100 and the only relevant explanatory variable is years of 
education. The reported premiums in this hypothetical are 5% annualised school premium 
and 10% annualised university premium. For a person with no education, each year of 
schooling produces a marginal benefit of $5 (5% of $100), and therefore a person with six 
years of education would receive $130 while a person who has completed school would 
receive $160. At this point, consider the situation from the perspective of a school graduate. 
They have a choice to either start working with a wage of $160, or study at university and get 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  section	  3.3	  for	  details	  on	  how	  to	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  into	  an	  annualised	  premium.	  	  	  
	   24	  
a 10% annualised education premium. It is easy to see how this situation is misleading and 
could be misunderstood. From the perspective of the school graduate, a 10% marginal wage 
benefit would mean $16 higher wage (10% of $160), but in reality the reported university 
premium only equates to $10 higher wage (10% of the original $100). In this situation, the 
marginal wage premium from one year at university is actually 6.25% and not the 10% that 
was reported.  
Not all university premiums are reported in this way, and the lack of consistency in the 
literature is another reason to be cautious when comparing education premiums between 
different papers. Since the above approach of reporting annualised education premiums is 
fairly common, it is necessary to use the same approach to create comparable information. In 
section 5.5 this issue will be reconsidered, and the annualised university premium will be 
recalculated so that it represents the marginal impact on wages.  
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2.2 – Macroeconomics of education  
 
While this thesis is focused on the microeconomics of education (as discussed in section 2.1), 
to fully understand the role of education in the economy it is worth exploring how it is treated 
in the macroeconomic literature, and specifically the connection (if any) between education 
and economic growth.  
The main education-related questions in macroeconomics are: (1) whether education actually 
leads to higher productivity, or whether the links between education and productivity are a 
matter of signalling and/or ability bias; and (2) if education does impact productivity, then 
what exactly is the mechanism, with the goal of understanding whether more education will 
increase the level of output (meaning a short-term growth premium until the higher output 
level is reached) or the growth of output (meaning a permanent growth premium).  
 
2.2.1 Education and economic growth  
For those who work in education, the question of whether education benefits the economy 
can seem almost sacrilegious. Given the importance of productivity growth in explaining 
economic growth and the theoretical link between education and productivity, it is common 
to suggest or assume that education has a key role in economic growth (Mishra, 2011). 
However, there are several challenges to the dominant paradigm. 
The correlation between education and income that is consistently found in the 
microeconomic literature could theoretically have three causes: (i) education increases human 
capital and improves productivity; (ii) an underlying difference in ability causes both 
education and income, as discussed in sub-section 2.1.2 above; and (iii) educational 
achievements are part of a signalling game, where prospective employees use certificates, 
awards, and grades to show their value to the world.  
These options were considered by Caplan (2012), who explains that: (i) if education is about 
increasing human capital and productivity then it will benefit both the student and the 
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economy; (ii) if the education premium is explained by ability bias4, then it has no financial 
benefit to the student or the economy; and (iii) if education is a signalling game, then it has a 
benefit for the student but no direct benefit for the economy. The truth is almost certainly 
some combination of the three, but knowing the relative importance of each explanation is 
necessary for determining the true value of education.  
As discussed in sub-section 2.1.2, there is ongoing debate in microeconomics about the size 
of the ability bias and many attempts to control for ability through the use of additional 
explanatory variables or using instrumental variables as a proxy for education. The 
microeconomic evidence suggests that the human capital explanation dominates the ability 
explanation. 
Unfortunately, it is more difficult to control for the impact of signalling, since the 
consequences from signalling ones ability and learning new skills are observationally 
equivalent at the individual level. In both cases the student will receive a financial benefit, 
and so conventional analysis will show an education premium. The signalling serves a 
productive function by reducing information asymmetries, but it also raises the possibility 
that education can create negative externalities.  
A positional externality exists whenever people use resources in a zero-sum race for status or 
position. In the case of education, people may feel obliged to collect the same qualifications 
and certificates as other people in the job market, without necessarily learning any valuable 
skills, simply to retain the same position in the pecking order that they would have had if the 
certificate did not exist. In effect, the students are caught in a zero-sum educational arms race, 
and the consequence is wasteful over-education. An additional problem arises if education 
proves to be an unreliable signal. If education is primarily motivated by signalling, there will 
still be a link between education and income, but not between education and economic 
growth. The evidence that has been collected suggests that the signalling effect is real but 
small in comparison to the human capital effect (Land & Kropp, 1986; Tyler, Murnane & 
Willett, 2000; Kaymak, 2012). Also, as mentioned in sub-section 2.1.7 there are education 
externalities in both directions, and the net impact is unknown but probably small.  
Another concern is the possibility that increased education may not provide a productivity 
benefit if the people with increased skills are taking jobs in non-productive sectors of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  student	  may	  receive	  a	  consumption	  benefit	  from	  studying,	  and	  the	  “pure	  ability”	  scenario	  is	  
observationally	  equivalent	  to	  a	  “pure	  consumption”	  model	  of	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economy, such as parts of the bureaucracy (Pissarides, 2000). As with signalling, there will 
still be a benefit to the individual, but not necessarily for society. 
Most macroeconomic evidence does suggest a link between education and productivity, 
though the results vary significantly and are sometimes insignificant. For example, Jones 
(2012) finds no relationship between schooling growth and economic growth in a cross-
country comparison over the last 40 years, and Hamilton and Monteagudo (1998) report that 
“investment in human capital has no ability to account for changes in growth rates over time” 
(p1). On the other hand, Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) found that an increase in school 
enrolment rates by one percentage point would boost GDP growth between 1 and 3 
percentage points, and Barro (1998) used panel data from around 100 countries to estimate 
that an additional year of schooling increases economic growth by 0.7%. Commenting on the 
diversity in the literature, Pissarides (2000) notes that “human capital is sometimes found to 
be significant, sometimes insignificant and most often with a variety of estimated coefficients 
that do not always make theoretical sense.” (p8). An appropriate conclusion consistent with 
all the above evidence is that education can increase productivity, but whether this happens in 
any particular example depends on the details of that country. 
While the macroeconomic evidence is mixed, the combined weight of the macro and 
microeconomic evidence leads to the conclusion that education does create at least some 
productive human capital to the benefit of both the student and their society.  
 
2.2.2 Education and growth theory 
Understanding the transmission mechanism between education and growth is still a matter of 
disagreement within macroeconomics. Traditional growth theory does allow for education to 
positively impact output. However, the assumption of decreasing marginal returns means that 
the benefit of education (and all investment) is finite and cannot explain long-term economic 
growth. Consequently, economic growth in traditional growth theory comes entirely from an 
exogenous “productivity” element. 
Two significant contributions to endogenous growth theory originated from Robert Lucas and 
Paul Romer, who both proposed growth models that emphasised the importance of education. 
In the Lucas model (1988), education is able to drive economic growth because of non-
decreasing marginal returns on human capital accumulation, so more education will always 
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lead to more output.  The Romer model (1990) draws out the transition mechanism in more 
detail, suggesting that education can result in more research, which increases technology (the 
“productivity” element that was exogenous in traditional growth theory) and therefore 
economic growth. An interesting implication of this model is that higher levels of education 
will lead to a permanently higher growth rate (not just a higher level of output).  
While Lucas and Romer focused on education, other prominent contributions to endogenous 
growth theory suggested different drivers for economic growth. Barro outlined a government-
led growth model (1990), Aghion and Howitt proposed a model based on intellectual 
property rights and creative destruction (1992), and Romer himself had previously suggested 
a “learning by doing” model (1986). With these three models, along with traditional growth 
theory and many other endogenous growth theories, education does not have a role in 
explaining economic growth.  
In recent years there has been a greater focus on institutions to explain growth, with Jones 
and Romer (2010) recognising that “the quality of intuitions is a key factor that shapes 
economic evolution and that institutions are more complicated and matter much more than 
the neoclassical model once suggested” (p228). Institutional Economists Kasper, Streit and 
Boettke (2012) argue that growth requires rules that allow entrepreneurs to benefit from their 
innovations (protection from theft and moderate tax) but also be challenged by new 
competition (low barriers to entry). Similar ideas can be found in Austrian economics 
(Kirzner, 1973) and evolutionary economics (Markey-Towler, 2014), while evidence from 
trade theory also supports the idea that lower barriers to entry result in more competition and 
higher productivity (Humphreys & Stoeckel, 2005) 5. One of the implications of these 
theories is that government tax and regulations (which are barriers to entry) should have a 
negative impact on economic growth, ceteris paribus. There is some support for this idea, 
with Barro (1998) finding a significant negative relationship between government 
consumption and growth, and similar evidence reported elsewhere (OECD, 2003; Smith, 
2006; Davidson, 2012; Cowen, 2013). If the tax burden negatively impacts on economic 
growth, this raises complications for how to fund other potentially pro-growth policies, such 
as education.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In trade theory the link between competition and growth is called the “competitive effect of liberalisation” or 
sometimes the “dynamic effect” (as opposed to the neoclassical “trade effect of liberalisation” or “static effect”). 
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Some other contributions to growth theory emphasise social or cultural elements. Frijters 
(2013) suggest that growth can be partly explained by social capital and the number of 
connections between people, while McCloskey (2011) argues that growth and development 
has been driven by cultural factors such as the degree of anti-authoritarian sentiment and 
positive social attitudes to trade.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) take their argument one step further. They agree that growth 
depends on having what they call “inclusive economic institutions” (private property, 
unbiased laws, opportunity to start new businesses and trade), but then they go further and 
argue that good economic institutions will only be sustainable if a society also has “inclusive 
political institutions” (political pluralism and shared power) since a political autocrat is likely 
to corrupt the economic system for their own benefit.   
None of these institutional growth theories have an explicit role for education, but that does 
not necessarily mean that education is irrelevant. It is possible that education is relevant in 
forming (or maintaining) the sort of institutions that are needed for growth. The literature on 
social benefits from education suggests possible links to volunteering, voting, social 
cohesion, and trust (Haveman & Wolfe, 1984), though once controlled for other factors some 
of those results disappear (Dee, 2003) or even reverse (Gibson, 2001). The link between 
education and voting is fairly well established (Dee, 2003), but the link between voting 
turnout and pro-growth institutions is dubious at best (Caplan, 2007). While education may 
play some role in institutional development, it is worth noting that the literature on 
institutions does not focus on education, which suggests the connection may not be very 
strong.   
 
2.2.3 Education as capital or institution 
None of the various growth theories argue against the important role of education in 
determining the wealth of nations. In all growth theories, education has a positive impact on 
output. However, the different models do lead to different conclusions on exactly how 
education impacts on the macro-economy. Either education acts like productive capital so 
that growth comes from an increase in human capital; or else education acts like a pro-
growth institution, which means growth is caused simply by the existence of human capital.  
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Specifically, it is the Romer (1990) model that suggests that education has cause economic 
growth, even when the level of education is not increasing. Most other models treat education 
as a type of capital (hence the term “human capital”), where an increase in education will 
result in higher economic growth for a number of years until the economy reaches a higher 
level of productivity, and then the growth premium will end.  
In searching for evidence about the Romer (1990) hypothesis, van Leeuwen (2007) regressed 
GDP growth against the level of human capital and the growth of human capital, reasoning 
that a significant “level” effect would support the Romer approach. In five out of six 
scenarios, van Leewen found evidence that suggested against the Romer model. Likewise, 
Krueger and Lindahl (2001) found that increases in education could cause growth, but that 
high and stable levels of education did not impact on growth rates.   
Sianesi and van Reenen (2003) explored the literature on education and growth, and 
concluded that the it was more likely that education created a temporary growth premium, 
which they say is also more consistent with microeconomic results. In particular, using 
neoclassical assumptions they estimated that an additional year of education would increase 
output by 3% and 6% in total. This would manifest as higher economic growth in the short 
term as the economy adjusted to the higher level of output, but then the growth premium 
would fade. When they used the Romer model, their results were wildly implausible and 
inconsistent with OECD data.  
Many of the growth theories discussed in this section are complementary with each other, and 
the truth may include elements of several models. The exact nature of the relationship 
between education and economic growth is an open question with important implications, 
though for the purposes of this thesis the crucial point is the confirmation that education does 
have a meaningful relationship with economic output. This supports the microeconomic 
assumption that education is an investment in human capital.  
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2.3 – Estimates of return on education 
 
There have been literally thousands of studies done looking at the return on education, 
covering most countries on earth. A complete review of the evidence on education economics 
would require several books, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the below 
discussion will only offer a short summary of the global literature.   
The “father” of education economics is George Psacharopoulos, who has published widely on 
the topic (1982, 1994). Jimenez and Patrinos (2003) describe Psacharopoulos as “one of the 
most prolific scholars in the economics of education”. Table 2-1 outlines the results from his 
third global update published. 
 
TABLE 2-1: RATE OF RETURN ACCORDING TO PSACHAROPOULOS 
 Primary Secondary Higher 
Social return 20% 13.5% 10.7% 
Private return 30.7% 17.7% 19% 
Estimates from Psacharopoulos (1994, p1328) 
 
It should be noted that the private returns are consistently higher than the social returns. This 
means that government education subsidies are bigger than the extra tax revenue that comes 
from the higher education. If there are any positive or negative externalities from education, 
those have not been included in either approach, and it’s also appropriate to admit that the 
returns are not able to factor in the unmeasurable costs of education, such as the utility loss 
for people who do not enjoy studying.  
An important feature of the early studies in education economics was the relatively high 
benefit that came from primary education, with an average of 20% social rate of return 
(30.7% private return). The rate of return for university was less impressive, but at 10.7% 
social rate of return (19% private return) it was still above market returns. A similar pattern 
was still evident a decade later (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004).  
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Comparing between countries, Psacharopoulos found that the return was highest in low-
income countries, and across all income groups the return was highest for primary school and 
lowest for higher education. Table 2-2 shows the annual social returns for four different 
income groups. 
 
TABLE 2-2: SOCIAL RATE OF RETURN BY COUNTRY INCOME LEVEL 
 Primary Secondary Higher 
Low income (<$610) 23.4% 15.2% 10.6% 
Low-middle (<$2449) 18.2% 13.4% 11.4% 
Upper-middle (<$7619) 14.3% 10.6% 9.5% 
High income (>$7620) n/a 10.3% 8.2% 
Estimates from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) 
 
The relatively higher returns for primary school education was once considered the 
conventional wisdom in education economics, but more recent evidence has made this a 
contentious issue. In their review of 18 recent studies, Colclough, Kingdon and Patrinos 
(2010) find that 17 of those studies showed greater wage premium from higher education 
than primary school, and they note that the main difference from earlier literature is that the 
return on primary schooling has decreased significantly. In his review of the literature 
relating to Africa, Kifle (2007) cites eleven different studies that suggest increasing returns to 
education, and his own study finds the same thing. Bennett (1996) concluded that increasing 
returns to education was more likely, and argued that weaknesses in Psacharopoulos’ data 
and methodology made his conclusions unreliable. 
It is important to be aware of the difference between the education premium and the rate of 
return, and consequently to be cautious of making comparisons between studies unless they 
have consistent methodologies, which is often not the case. The seeming divergence in the 
literature described above could be a result of the authors measuring different things – which 
would explain increasing returns in the “wage premium” but a decreasing “rate of return” 
once you factor in all costs (Kara, 2010).  
	   33	  
While there is large heterogeneity between countries, many studies continue to find average 
results that are broadly similar to the return reported by Psacharopoulos. In a paper that 
included eight East Asian nations and eight Latin American nations, Patrinos, Ridao-Cano, 
and Sakellariou (2006) find that the average benefit from schooling is 11.1% (East Asian, 
excluding Cambodia) and 11.6% (Latin America). In their update of education economics in 
Colombia, Garcia-Suaza et al. (2009) report a rate of return for higher education between 
7.4% and 12.8%, and in the case of Turkey, Kara (2010) finds a return to schooling of 
between 6% and 16%.  
Conlon and Patrignani (2011) estimate a university premium of 27.4% for the UK, and given 
an average undergraduate degree takes three years, the total premium is equivalent to an 
annual premium of about 9%. Interestingly, this study also highlighted the different returns 
for different degrees, with medicine, maths, computer sciences and law giving a much larger 
income premium, while degrees in communications, history or creative arts produced very 
little income premium. In a few instances, the income premium was statistically insignificant 
from zero. In their study of 24 European countries, Badescu, D’Hombres and Villalba (2011) 
found an average university premium of 39%, with the annual university premium ranging 
from as low as 3% for Sweden up to well over 10% for Slovenia, Hungry, Portugal and 
Lithuania.  
For Australia, Borland (2002) finds a private rate of return to university education of 14.5%, 
Wei (2010) uses two different approaches to estimates 12-12.5% for men and 13-13.4% for 
women, and Corliss et al. (2013) estimate 15% for men and 12% for women. These results 
are roughly consistent with previous Australian studies that found a private rate of return at 
13.4% (Johnson & Lloyd, 2000), 9.4% (Chapman & Salvage, 1997), 13.5% (Maglen, 1994) 
and 21.1% (Miller 1982). As with the global studies, both of the Australian studies that 
measured the social rate of return (Johnson & Lloyd; Miller) found social returns lower than 
private returns, which makes sense given the large government subsidy. Corliss et al. (2013) 
also provide information on the rate of return for different degrees, with returns above 15% 
for IT, medicine, nursing, and dentistry.  
Patrinos, Ridao-Cano and Sakellariou (2006) offer a useful summary when they say that 
“average returns to schooling, as compiled from hundreds of studies, is about 10 percent” 
(p2), and they note that the number is often slightly higher in developing countries and closer 
to 7.5% in OECD countries.  
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In an economy with perfect capital markets, the marginal return on investment in each sector 
should converge to the general market return. Any sector that offered relatively higher returns 
would quickly attract additional investment until the marginal returns were equalised, and 
that logic extends to the education sector (Palacios, 2002; Heckman et al., 2003). Yet the 
return on education has exceeded the average market return in most countries for most of the 
time since estimates became available. There are several possible explanations for the 
relatively high return on education. 
(1) The high estimated returns may be a result of modelling errors, and the true financial 
return is lower. Given the extensive work that has gone into correcting, improving and 
refining the economic models of education, and the consistency of the results across 
various estimation techniques, this answer seems unlikely.  
(2) It may be that the financial return is high, but the net benefit from education is 
somewhat lower due to disutility from study (which would increase the cost of 
education) or the disutility from work (which would decrease the benefit).   
(3) Education may have a high average rate of return, and yet have a marginal rate of 
return in line with the market. This implies the marginal return on human capital 
decreases more quickly than the marginal return on physical capital6. 
(4) The final explanation is that capital markets have failed, and there is insufficient 
investment going into the education sector. Harmon (2011) explains that risk-averse 
students are unable to hedge their risk are likely to under-invest in education, and he 
suggests that the solution is government intervention.  
The possibility of capital market failure will be discussed further in Chapters 8, and in 
particular how incomplete capital markets may lead to an inefficiently low level of education. 
Unlike Harmon, the discussion in Chapter 8 will consider the possibility of creating the 
missing markets to remove the failure, rather than accept the failure as inevitable.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  return	  on	  human	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  could	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  diminishing	  returns	  across	  two	  
dimensions.	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  to	  physical	  capital,	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  marginal	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  of	  the	  use	  of	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  to	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  as	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  are	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  first.	  In	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  the	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  constant	  (or	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  slowly),	  but	  when	  the	  
ability	  of	  the	  worker	  is	  the	  binding	  constraint,	  the	  marginal	  return	  on	  education	  will	  drop	  sharply.	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2.3.1 Education & inequality 
Some more recent education research has concentrated on the effect of education on 
inequality. Yang (2011) argues that the main driver for increased education was economic 
growth, and therefore predicts that increased education may result in greater inequality.  
Patrinos et al. (2006) found that education tended to decrease inequality in East Asian 
countries, but increase inequality in Latin American countries. They interpret this to mean 
that education is a substitute for ability if it decreases inequality (East Asia) and education is 
a compliment for ability if it increases inequality (Latin America), and that this might be 
related to the stage of economic development. Other studies have suggested that education is 
a compliment (increases inequality) in developed countries – see Martins and Pereira (2004), 
Mwabu and Schultz (1996) and Buchinsky (1998).  
Issues of inequality and envy go beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: Education in Cambodia 
 
Compared to most countries, there is relatively little information on the education system and 
education returns in Cambodia, which is understandable given recent history. This chapter 
provides a brief review of the evidence that does exist.  
The most comprehensive study of the Cambodian education premium comes from Ashish 
Lall and Chris Sakellariou (2010), which provides estimates for 1997, 2003/04, and 2007 
using data from Cambodia’s National Institute of Statistics (NIS), and applying both 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) models. However, their 
interpretation of the education level dummy variable coefficients was incorrect, which 
resulted in a large error in their estimates for annualised university education premium.  
Using their original coefficients (kindly provided by Sakellariou) it is possible to recalculate 
the adjusted annualized education premiums. Further, using updated data from the 
Cambodian NIS it is also possible to extend the series by Lall and Sakellariou to 2010.  
This chapter is split into four parts: section 3.1 gives a brief overview of the Cambodian 
education system; section 3.2 looks at the evidence regarding Cambodia’s education 
premium; section 3.3 adjusts the annualized education premiums calculated by Lall and 
Sakellariou; and section 3.4 uses an imitation of Lall and Sakellariou’s model on more recent 
2010 Cambodian government data.  
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3.1 – Education sector in Cambodia 
 
Following the Vietnamese defeat of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Sloper (1999) estimated that 
there were “no more than 300 persons who had post-secondary education remaining in 
Cambodia; and most of those left the country as soon as they could” (p7). Howes and Ford 
(2011) suggest that during the Khmer Rouge, 75% of lecturers and 95% of students were 
killed or left to resettle in other countries.  
The last decade has seen significant change. Today there are over 100 Universities, though 
there is an ongoing concern about the quality of education (Marshall et al., 2009). Using 
2003-05 data, Patrinos, Ridao-Cano and Sakellariou (2006) report that Cambodian university 
enrolment was 1.7%, compared with 17.4% in Thailand and 27.6% in Vietnam. Since then, 
Mishra (2011) reports that Cambodian university enrolment has increased to 2.7%. While 
low, these numbers need to be put into the context of Cambodia having a very young 
population. If we consider the level of university graduates as a percentage of all “five years 
post-school” population, then in Cambodian the number has increased from 0.1% in 1983 up 
to 2.5% in 2001 and then 14.5% in 2011 (World Bank, 2012), which shows strong growth in 
university culture in the last decade (through this number is still lower than exists in 
neighbouring countries).  
Much of the increase in education spending has been funded by the private sector. While his 
paper is over 15 years old, Bray (1998) estimated that about 75% of public primary school 
costs were paid by households, compared to the household contribution in China, Laos, 
Myanmar and Thailand that was closer to 20%. These high private costs for public education 
continue in the form of after-school “tutoring” done by public school teachers, while 
government education funding remains low by international standards. In addition to high 
private costs in public schooling, there has also been an increase in private schooling, both 
because of more charitable schools and also private schools aimed at the growing middle 
class population. From 2004 to 2009 the number of people in private education increased 
from 3.4% to 4.6% of the population, with most of this growth due to private universities 
(NIS, 2010).  
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The Cambodian education system has undergone several rounds of reform, and in recent 
years the government has cracked down on cheating (Retka, 2015) and increased the 
requirements on schoolteachers so that upper secondary teachers are now required to have a 
university degree. Schooling is split between primary (6 years) and secondary (6 years) with 
the nine years being considered the mandatory minimum.  University degrees are fixed at 
four years, with the first year often being a “foundation year”. Consequently, a person with a 
university degree will often have completed 16 years of schooling in total.  
Howes and Ford (2011) note that over 80% of Cambodian universities are privately run, 
though many of these are relatively small universities. The average cost to attend university is 
$500 per year, with the more expensive universities in Phnom Penh, and generally a lower 
tuition cost in regional cities and rural areas. It is still common for students to get admission 
to a university for as little as $200 per year. The average cost of attending school is estimated 
at about $26 per year for primary school, rising to $69 for lower secondary and $165 for 
upper secondary school. This is an average price, with prices significantly higher than 
average in Phnom Penh and about 50% lower in rural areas.  
The UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) collects statistics on education from around the 
world, with UIS questionnaires sent to member states annually. The main output is their 
“Global Education Digest” (2011). That report gives data on all member countries for 2009, 
and says that Cambodia currently has 123,000 students enrolled (34% female), 3675 students 
are studying abroad (mostly Thailand, France, Vietnam, Australia, and USA), a total of 
17,000 university graduates (27% female), with 66% of those graduates having a degree in 
“social science, business and law”.  
In their summary of the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey of 2009, the Cambodian 
government explain that literacy among the population aged over 7 has increased from 67% 
in 2004 up to 73% in 2009, and is as high as 93% in Phnom Penh (NIS, 2010). The most 
illiterate group are still rural women, with 38% still being reported as illiterate in 2009, and 
81% of rural women over 65 years being reported as illiterate.   
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3.2 – Return on education in Cambodia 
 
Patrinos, Ridao-Cano and Sakellariou (2006), using data from “Socioeconomic Survey of 
Households 2003-05” but with an unspecified model, estimated the premium for education in 
Cambodia to be 38.3%, which is more than double the return for any other country in their 
analysis. Though it should be noted that this relatively high premium was an average for all 
education levels, and in this instance it was significantly biased upwards by the 100.1% 
premium for primary education and 32% premium for secondary education. Their estimated 
premium for Cambodian university education, while still relatively high, was closer to the 
return of neighbouring countries, as seen in Table 3-1 below.  
 
 
TABLE 3-1: HIGHER EDUCATION PREMIUM IN ASIA 
Country Wage Premium from Higher Education 
• Cambodia 17.5% 
• Vietnam 10.5% 
• Indonesia 13.6% 
• Thailand 22.0% 
• China 9.8% 
Estimates taken from Patrinos, Ridao-Cano and Sakellariou (2006) 
 
 
Kingdon, et al. (2008) also do a review of multiple countries which includes Cambodia, and 
they find a university education premium of 11.1%, which is lower than all other estimates in 
their study except for China.  
The most comprehensive study on the rate of return on education in Cambodia is from Lall 
and Sakellariou (henceforth L&S, 2010) who use data from 1997, 2003/04, and the 2007 
Cambodian Socio-economic Survey of Households (CSES) collected by the Cambodian 
National Institute of Statistics (NIS), and use several models that include a variety of control 
variables.  
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As they were limited by the data available in the CSES, L&S were not able to include every 
explanatory variable that they may have wanted. They used a modified Mincer model, with a 
standard formula to calculate “potential experience” (Age – years of schooling – 6), and 
including the extra explanatory variables of marriage, urban/rural, and private/public sector. 
They reported their results separately for men and women and gave results for each of the 
three survey years. The average premium and the university premium for men and women for 
each year are shown below in Table 3-2.  
 
TABLE 3-2: L&S EDUCATION PREMIUM FOR MEN AND WOMEN 
 MEN WOMEN 
 Average University Average  University 
1997 3.3% 7.5% 1.7% (Not significant)  0.3% 
2003/4 7.2% 12.1% 7.1% 14.9% 
2007 6.6% 11.3% 6.8% 12.0% 
Estimates taken from Lall and Sakellariou (2010) 
 
For brevity, only the 2007 results will be discussed. The return on schooling in general was 
estimated at 6.6% for men and 6.8% for women, with both results significantly different from 
zero with over 99% confidence. An additional year of experience provided a 2.9% increase in 
income for men but no benefit for women. The impact of marriage on income was positive 
but not statistically significant for both men and women. There was a marginally higher wage 
for urban workers (significant at 95% confidence), though this does not control for cost of 
living and so should not be over-interpreted.  
Most noticeably, public sector wages were significantly lower than private sector wages 
(significant at 99% confidence), despite the fact that public sector workers had a higher 
average level of education. Their paper explains this seeming paradox by suggesting that 
public sector jobs have more job-security and are less demanding, while private sector jobs 
attract those with more innate ability. An alternative interpretation is that private sector jobs 
need to pay a premium to make up for the lack of opportunities for corruption and off-the-
books income. If this alternative view is considered plausible, then the public/private work 
premium could be interpreted as a corruption premium and used as a proxy measure for the 
perceived value of corruption to the public official.  
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To address the potential endogeneity problem from innate ability and self-selection, L&S 
perform another regression using smoking at an early age and spouse’s education as 
instrumental variables (IV). If the endogeneity problem is real and their IV choices were 
appropriate, then the IV estimate for the return on education should be lower than their OLS 
counterparts, however the IV schooling coefficients are actually slightly larger than the OLS 
coefficients, a point that L&S note is repeated regularly elsewhere in the education 
economics literature.  
Looking at education by level, L&S report a return on university education of 11.3% for men 
and 12% for women. These results are consistent with global averages, but somewhat lower 
than the results found by Patrinos et al. (2006). However, the L&S study made the error of 
not adjusting their dummy coefficients (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980; Kennedy, 2004) and 
so they underestimate the true education premium. The adjusted annualized university 
premium is 26.6% for men and 28.7% for women, which is relatively high compared with 
most other countries.  
A discussion of the L&S error and adjusted results is given below in section 3.3 and an 
update for the L&S time series to include 2010 data is below in section 3.4.  
Note that while the education premiums (both original and adjusted) are increasing with 
education, this does not necessarily mean that the rate of return is increasing with education. 
Neither Patrinos et al. (2006) or Lall and Sakellariou (2010) calculate the rate of return in 
their analysis. The education premium they reported can only be interpreted as a rate of return 
under circumstances that are not met in the case of Cambodia. Chapter 7 provides the first 
estimate of Cambodia’s rate of return on education.  
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3.3 – Recalculating L&S annualised education premium  
 
In their 2010 paper, Ashish Lall and Chris Sakellariou (L&S) make a valuable contribution to 
the understanding of education in Cambodia. Their paper represents the most robust analysis 
of the Cambodian education premium yet published, reporting premiums for men and women 
from three different time periods (1997, 2004, 2007), including a series of control variables in 
their regressions (locality, employment sector, marriage status), and using both OLS and IV 
regression on a modified Mincer model.  
In their first model, L&S include years of schooling as a continuous regressor, and they 
correctly interpret the education coefficient as the schooling premium without any need for 
adjustment. For example, using the 2007 data, they find an education coefficient of 0.066 for 
men and 0.068 for women (p342), which mean that every additional year of schooling is 
associated with higher incomes of 6.6% and 6.8% respectively.  
In their second model, L&S allow for non-linearity in the education premium. They do this 
by replacing the continuous education regressor with a series of education dummy variables 
for each level of education (primary, junior high, senior high, university). Based on the 
coefficients for these dummy variables, L&S report an annualized education premium for 
each different level of education. Where the first model estimated an education premium of 
6.8% for women in 2007, the non-linear model estimated an annualized education premium 
of 7.9% for primary school, 5.5% for junior high, 7.8% for senior high, and 12% for 
university (p343).  
Those estimates, however, are based on an error in how L&S interpreted the dummy variable 
coefficients, which results in a significant downward bias.  
Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) were the first to note the common misinterpretation of 
dummy variable coefficients in log-linear models, pointing to several examples including 
papers by luminaries such as Robert Lucas (1977) and Zvi Griliches (1971). At least Lall and 
Sakellariou are in good company. The coefficient for a continuous regressor can be 
interpreted as the premium, but when dealing with dummy variables such an approach will 
result in substantial errors. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) pointed out that the coefficient c 
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needs to be transformed by exp(c)-1 before it can be interpreted as a premium. Subsequently, 
Kennedy (1981) pointed out that the Halvorsen and Palmquist transformation requires that we 
know the value of c with certainty, and he provides a more robust solution where the 
estimated coefficient c’ needs to be transformed by exp[c’–½V(c’)]–1 before it can be 
interpreted as a premium, where V(c’) is the variance of the estimated coefficient c’.  
Lall and Sakellariou did not use either of these transformations, and their omission 
significantly changes the results. In correspondence, Chris Sakellariou kindly provided the 
coefficients and t-values for each of the dummy variables.  Based on the numbers provided, 
Tables 3-3 and 3-4 show three different results for the premium: (1) unadjusted annualized 
premiums as reported by L&S; (2) annualized premiums using the Halvorsen and Palmquist 
transformation; and (3) annualized premiums using the Kennedy transformation.  
 
TABLE 3-3: ANNUALIZED EDUCATION LEVEL PREMIUMS (men) 
 Coefficient 
(and t-values) 
Lall & Sakellariou 
original result (1) 
Halvorsen-Palmquist 
transformation (2) 
Kennedy 
transformation (3) 
1997 
Primary 0.042 (0.6) 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 
Junior High 0.168 (2.2) 4.2% 4.7% 4.6% 
Senior High 0.273 (3.3) 3.5% 4.4% 4.3% 
University 0.573 (3.8) 7.5% 11.5% 11.1% 
 
2003/04 
Primary 0.273 (4.7) 9.1% 10.5% 10.4% 
Junior High 0.513 (8.8) 8.0% 11.9% 11.9% 
Senior High 0.702 (10.9) 6.3% 11.6% 11.5% 
University 1.186 (13.1) 12.1% 31.4% 31.2% 
 
2007 
Primary 0.204 (1.8) 6.8% 7.5% 7.3% 
Junior High 0.438 (4.5) 7.8% 10.8% 10.8% 
Senior High 0.639 (6.3) 6.7% 11.5% 11.4% 
University 1.091 (7.9) 11.3% 27.1% 26.6% 
 Note: university takes four years; each other level takes an additional three years. 
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TABLE 3-4: ANNUALIZED EDUCATION LEVEL PREMIUMS (women) 
 Coefficient 
(and t-values) 
Lall & Sakellariou 
original result (1) 
Halvorsen-Palmquist 
transformation (2) 
Kennedy 
transformation (3) 
1997 
Primary 0.009 (0.1) 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
Junior High 0.066 (0.5) 1.9% 2.0% 1.8% 
Senior High -0.033 (0.2) -3.3%* -3.4% -3.5% 
University -0.023 (0.2) 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
 
2003/04 
Primary 0.219 (3.6) 7.3% 8.2% 8.1% 
Junior High 0.438 (5.6) 7.3% 10.2% 10.1% 
Senior High 0.669 (7.0) 7.7% 13.4% 13.3% 
University 1.265 (7.1) 14.9% 39.8% 38.6% 
 
2007 
Primary 0.237 (3.6) 7.9% 8.9% 8.8% 
Junior High 0.402 (4.5) 5.5% 7.6% 7.5% 
Senior High 0.636 (3.9) 7.8% 13.1% 12.5% 
University 1.116 (6.8) 12.0% 29.1% 28.7% 
Note: university takes four years; each other level takes an additional three years. 
* Lall and Sakellariou report this value as -1.1% based on the total Senior High coefficient instead of the 
relevant difference. 
 
To calculate the annualized premiums, the process is to convert coefficients into premiums, 
take the difference between the relevant premiums (e.g. university - senior high) and then 
divide that number by the number of additional years of study (e.g. four years for university).  
As an example, the results for men in 2007 show a high school coefficient of 0.639 and a 
university coefficient of 1.091 (see bottom two rows of Table 3-3). At this point L&S did not 
transform the coefficients into premiums. They took the difference between the two 
unadjusted numbers (1.091 - 0.639 = 0.452) and then divided that by the number of years 
spent at university (0.452/4 = 0.113) and so they reported an annualized male university 
premium of 11.3%. In contrast, if they had transformed the coefficients first then the 
annualized male university premium would have been 27.1% (Halvorsen-Palmquist 
adjustment) or 26.6% (Kennedy adjustment).  
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As shown in the above tables, the adjusted results are significantly different from those 
originally published by Lall and Sakellariou (2010), and especially in the case of university 
education. The updated results suggest that the Cambodian education premium is much 
higher than originally thought. The updated premiums are high by international standards, but 
the premiums build off a very low base so the high premiums do not translate into a large 
change when measured in dollars, and high premiums are consistent with having relatively 
lower levels of university attendance.  
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3.4 – L&S model with 2010 CSES data 
 
In their original paper, Lall and Sakellariou (L&S) applied a consistent model to data from 
1997, 2003/4, and 2007 taken from the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES). It is 
possible to extend their time series by applying their model to the data collected in the 
subsequent surveys, and this section extends the L&S Mincer model through to include the 
2010 CSES data.  
Unfortunately, the 2010 CSES results provided by Cambodia’s National Institute of Statistics 
did not include one of the variables used by L&S (location = rural/urban) and so it was 
necessary to create a proxy variable (work type = agriculture/other) as a replacement. In 
another minor difference, the original L&S model used “rural” as the base case and provided 
a coefficient for the dummy variable “urban”, while the model applied to the 2010 data uses 
“non-agriculture” as the base case and provides a coefficient for the dummy variable 
“agriculture”. A third difference between the Lall and Sakellariou models and this imitation is 
that L&S used only data for people between 22 and 65 years of age who earn a wage, while 
the current analysis uses data for anybody who earns a wage. Unfortunately, these differences 
may make a direct comparison unreliable.  
Tables 3-5 and 3-6 show the coefficients from the L&S Mincer model over four years, with 
the first six rows representing their linear schooling model, and then the four education 
dummy variable coefficients are included underneath. To enable the reader to compare the 
raw data, the dummy variable coefficients shown in Tables 3-5 and 3-6 have not been 
adjusted. It is worth noting that the negative coefficient for public service work remains in the 
2010 results.  
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TABLE 3-5: CAMBODIAN MINCER REGRESSION FROM 1997-2010 (men) 
 1997 2003/04 2007 2010 
Schooling 0.033 0.072 0.066 0.083 
Experience 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.024 
Exp^2 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 
Married 0.129 0.045 0.088 0.052 
Urban (Agric) -0.036 0.242 0.133 (-0.700) 
Public sector -0.768 -0.817 -0.874 -0.404 
 
Primary 0.042 0.273 0.204 0.161 
Junior High 0.168 0.513 0.438 0.298 
Senior High 0.273 0.702 0.639 0.709 
University 0.573 1.186 1.091 1.301 
 
 
TABLE 3-6: CAMBODIAN MINCER REGRESSION FROM 1997-2010 (women) 
 1997 2003/04 2007 2010 
Schooling 0.017 0.071 0.068 0.069 
Experience -0.010 0.029 0.000 0.007 
Exp^2 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 
Married 0.144 -0.110 0.024 0.104 
Urban (Agric) -0.018 0.175 0.118 (-0.684) 
Public sector -0.390 -0.561 -0.671 -0.254 
 
Primary 0.009 0.219 0.237 0.102 
Junior High 0.066 0.438 0.402 0.257 
Senior High -0.033 0.669 0.636 0.685 
University -0.023 1.265 1.116 1.220 
 
 
Tables 3-7 and 3-8 report the annualized education premiums for each data set, using the 
Kennedy transformation. As with the earlier years, the results for 2010 show a convex 
education premium, though in 2010 this is even more pronounced. Compared to the 2007 
results, the education premium in 2010 is smaller for primary and junior high, and larger for 
senior high and university. Unfortunately, the slight difference between the 2007 and 2010 
models makes it difficult to interpret these different results.  
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TABLE 3-7: ANNUALIZED EDUCATION PREMIUMS 1997-2010 (men) 
 1997 2003/04 2007 2010 
Primary 1.3% 10.4% 7.3% 5.8% 
Junior High 4.6% 11.9% 10.8% 5.7% 
Senior High 4.3% 11.5% 11.4% 22.8% 
University 11.1% 31.2% 26.6% 40.9% 
 
 
TABLE 3-8: ANNUALIZED EDUCATION PREMIUMS 1997-2010 (women) 
 1997 2003/04 2007 2010 
Primary 0.2% 8.1% 8.8% 3.5% 
Junior High 1.8% 10.1% 7.5% 6.2% 
Senior High -3.5% 13.3% 12.5% 22.9% 
University 0.4% 38.6% 28.7% 34.8% 
 
 
The 2010 results are in line with previous estimates that show the Cambodian education 
premium is convex and that the university premium is relatively high by international 
standards. A limitation of these estimates is that they excluded certain variables that are likely 
to be relevant due to data limitations. The following chapters will introduce a new data and 
new models that make use of that additional data.   
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Chapter 4: Regional Cambodia Educational Survey (RCES) 2012 
 
The Cambodian National Institute of Statistics (NIS) conducts a regular Cambodian Socio-
Economic Survey (CSES), which provides enough information on income and education to 
allow for Mincer regressions and to estimate Cambodia’s education premium, as was done by 
Lall and Sakallariou (2010). However, the CSES data does not include some of the key 
variables that would be desirable in a robust model of education economics. 
The Regional Cambodia Education Survey (RCES) was designed specifically to collect 
primary data that could be relevant in more detailed and accurate education models. 
Depending on the size of the sample, the survey data could potentially be used to investigate 
the comparative performance of different universities and different areas of study, which can 
be useful information for students, universities, and policy makers.  
The RCES was conducted in early 2012 in the provinces of Battambang and Kampong Cham 
in Cambodia, and included four sections asking information about education, income, 
experience, socio-economic status, ability, and various other variables. The results from this 
survey are used in a range of education models in Chapters 5 and 6, which allow new 
estimates about the education premium in Cambodia.  
This chapter is split between section 4.1, which explains the survey methodology; and then 
section 4.2, which describes the results of the survey.  
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4.1 -- Regional Cambodia Education Survey methodology  
 
Between March and June 2012 an education survey was conducted in the Battambang and 
Kampong Cham provinces of Cambodia. Since this survey was designed with the express 
purpose of measuring the education premium, the questions focused on issues that would be 
relevant to identifying and isolating the impact of education on income. This is the first time 
that education-specific data has been available for Cambodia.  
 
4.1.1 Designing the survey 
The survey was designed in three stages. The first stage was done in Australia in late 2011 
and early 2012, and included an extensive review of the theory and application of education 
economics to create an exhaustive list of potentially useful data series, framing appropriate 
questions from which to get that data, consulting with economists in Australia, filtering those 
questions down to include only what was likely to be useful, and arranging ethical approval 
from the University of Queensland.  
The second stage was consultation with Cambodian associates who shared an interest in this 
research, including representatives of the Accreditation Committee of Cambodia (ACC) and 
the University of Management and Economics (UME), making appropriate adjustments, and 
having the survey translated into Khmer (the language of Cambodia). The final stage 
involved running pilot surveys (March, 2012) and collecting feedback on the Khmer 
language version from three unconnected translators, which lead to additional changes to 
some of the questions as well as some modifications of the translation.   
The final version of the survey is given in the appendix to this thesis, and was split into four 
sections, asking about:  
(1) Personal details; 
(2) Living arrangements;  
(3) Educational achievements; and 
(4) Work situation and history.  
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For education economics, the essential data relates to income, education and experience. For 
income, the survey asked for both current and historical income, as well as the income of 
family members. For education, the survey included both the years of education and the 
highest education level achieved, grades, the name of the university (if applicable), and the 
preferred area of study. For experience, respondents were asked both for their number of 
years of total work experience, their tenure at their current job, and also for estimates of their 
income in previous years of work, which implicitly gave another estimate for number of 
years worked.  
In addition to the core data about income, education and experience, the survey included a 
range of questions to get information that could potentially be used as control variables and 
improve the quality of the model. To address concerns about skill endogeneity, the survey 
included questions about grades and whether the respondent had failed a university subject. 
To control for socio-economic status, the survey included questions about parents’ education, 
parents’ income, whether the student lived with their parents while at school, whether the 
respondent had family living in Phnom Penh, and whether the respondent had to regularly 
miss school while growing up. Other questions asked about work intensity (hours per day, 
days per month), marriage status, public sector involvement, English language proficiency, 
job tenure, and religion.  
Several questions were included in the hope of finding data that could be used in an 
instrumental variable (IV) model. Two commonly options used in the literature are “distance 
from school” and “spouse’s education”, and so those questions were included also.  
 
4.1.2 Conducting the survey 
For the purposes of this discussion, Cambodia will be divided into two categories, which are 
(1) the capital city of Phnom Penh, and (2) regional Cambodia, which covers everything 
outside of Phnom Penh. There are significant economic, educational, and social differences 
between Phnom Penh and regional Cambodia, and while people move freely between the 
two, they can reasonably be treated separately. As the name of the survey suggests, responses 
were only collected from regional Cambodia, and it should be stressed that this survey was 
not conducted in Phnom Penh.  
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The main part of the survey was conducted between April and June 2012, and the sampling 
frame included all working age people who live or work near the provincial of Battambang 
(BB) and Kampong Cham (KPC). Population estimates for these regional centres (about 
250,000 and 120,000 respectively) are not an accurate indicator of the available population as 
they exclude the significant population that lives on the easily accessible periphery of these 
towns.  
These two provinces were chosen because of ease of access for researchers, because there are 
several universities in each province, they are the two largest regions when measured by 
number of schools (MEYS, 2012), and because they are populous provinces that are 
representative of “average” Cambodian life (National Institute of Statistics, 2012). For 
example, of the 24 provinces that existed in 20127, most had an estimated poverty rate 
between 19% and 29% (with a simple average of 24.7%), while the poverty rate for 
Battambang and Kampong Cham was 24.8% and 20.4% respectively (Asia Development 
Bank, 2014).  
The survey did reach a significant rural population, but it did not include people from remote 
farming communities, since including such groups would have extended the time and cost of 
the survey beyond what was available. Nonetheless, since the vast majority of Cambodians 
live close to a regional centre, the sampling frame of this survey can still be considered as 
broadly representative of regional Cambodia. 
The target sample was not purely random. Since one of the goals was to gather information 
on the return to university education, it was necessary to explicitly target university graduates 
to ensure there was sufficient data to draw meaningful results. Information about where 
graduates could be found was gathered from the Accreditation Committee of Cambodia 
(ACC), the University of Management and Economics (UME), and Chea Sim University 
(CSU). The original hope was that many of the surveys could be distributed to graduates (and 
the answers received) via e-mail, though the alumni records from the BB and KPC 
universities were insufficient for this to be an effective strategy. It should be noted that the 
universities were keen to cooperate and interested in knowing the results, but they simply did 
not have updated contact details for their graduates.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  In	  2013	  the	  Cambodian	  government	  created	  the	  additional	  province	  of	  Tbong	  Khmum,	  taking	  the	  total	  
number	  of	  provinces	  to	  25.	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Since the online option proved unviable, the vast majority of survey results where gathered 
from random visits to homes and workplaces, both during the week and the weekend, and at a 
variety of different times of the day and evening. Since the majority of Cambodians do not 
speak English it was necessary to use translators to help with the survey work. Respondents 
were incentivised to do the survey with automatic entry into a random draw that gave a 
chance to win one of several cash prizes.  
After the surveys were completed, the winners of the cash prizes were drawn out of a hat and 
the prizes distributed, and then the answers were translated back into English and the data 
saved into excel spreadsheets. 
 
4.1.3 Assessing the sample 
In total, 530 surveys were returned, with 173 from Battambang (33%) and 357 coming from 
Kampong Cham (67%). The difference was not intentional, but is not considered a problem 
since both provinces are roughly representative of regional Cambodia. The cause was partly 
due to logistics, where slightly more time was spent gathering data in Kampong Cham, and 
partly because the Kampong Cham neighbourhoods that were surveyed had higher population 
density, and of course the ever-present randomness of life.  
Having responses from two different regions potentially allows for a comparison between 
those regions, though there are also plenty of uncontrolled extra variables that will complicate 
such a comparison. For example, since Battambang is relatively close to the border with 
Thailand, there is a sizeable minority of young adults who move from Battambang to 
Thailand to work for a while (legally or illegally), while there is not the same “missing 
cohort” from Kampong Cham8.  
If the original plan of coordinating some surveys online had been successful then it would 
have been possible to increase the sample size further. There was an unintended benefit from 
not using online surveys, since the alternative approach of relying on street, work, and home 
interviews prevented the possibility of having a sample that is biased towards computer 
literacy and internet access.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Up	  to	  one	  million	  Cambodians	  are	  working	  in	  Thailand,	  far	  more	  than	  any	  other	  destination.	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The survey intentionally includes an over-representation of university graduates, who make 
up 15% of the sample. By comparison, the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) 
included almost 3% university graduates. The number of university responses was actually 
lower than hoped for, which makes it more difficult to draw strong conclusions about 
differences within the university cohort. This bias is perhaps the most consequential, and it 
makes comparisons with other data sets largely meaningless.  
It is worth dwelling on one comparison, since reported income is such a crucial variable, and 
one of the few where a comparison can be made. As will be discussed below in section 4.2, 
the average income from the survey was just over $100 per month. By comparison, the 
equivalent result from the CSES data is about $85 per month. This difference is consistent 
with the fact that the data gathered for this thesis intentionally includes an over-representation 
of university graduates, who have a higher average income. While it is an imperfect proxy 
measure, taking the average income for each education level in this survey and assuming the 
same mix of education levels as found in the CSES gives an average income of $87 per 
month, which is close to the CSES result.  
The sample included 43% women, which is slightly lower than the national figure of 51% 
women in the population. This may be because men have a slightly higher level of workplace 
participation and some of the surveys were conducted at workplaces (National Institute of 
Statistics, 2013), and it may be a result of the focus on including university graduates, since 
women are underrepresented among graduates.  
The main limitations of this survey are the unavoidable consequence of limited time and 
money. The first issue is simply that it would have been preferable to have a larger sample 
size, and in particular it would have been desirable to have a larger cohort of university 
graduates so that a more detailed analysis would have been possible of intra-graduate 
comparison between universities and between areas of study. The second issue is that the 
survey could not sample across the full variety of Cambodian society, and in particular this 
survey does not extend to the capital city or remote communities. While the details of 
education in remote Cambodia is undoubtable a story worth telling, it was not the focus on 
this thesis both because (1) the Cambodian population is concentrated around regional 
centres; and perhaps more to the point (2) since one of the primary motivations of this survey 
was to better understand university education it was necessary to gather data from regions 
that had universities.  
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An additional limitation, that is of minor consequence but worth admitting, is that the survey 
did not include any information from the small group of mega-wealthy Cambodians. The 
method of data collection was primarily to visit accessible homes and businesses, which 
created a bias towards “average Cambodians” (including the underclass, working class, and 
middle class) and prevented access to the rich and powerful elites. While the story of 
education for the mega-rich in Cambodia may also be worth exploring, it was not the focus of 
this thesis and so the omission of the mega-rich is not considered a problem.  
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4.2 -- Summary of RCES results 
 
Selected aggregate information from the survey is given in the Table 4-1 below.  
 
TABLE 4-1: RCES 2012 SUMMARY DATA 
Variable  Average Standard Deviation 
Income (USD) 104.4/month 81.4 
Hours worked per month 213.6 62.8 
Income/hour (USD) 0.52/hour 0.50 
Education (years) 9.4 4.7 
University graduate 0.149 (14.9%) 0.356 
Experience (years) 7.9 6.1 
Tenure at current job (years) 4.0 3.5 
Parents education (years) 2.5 2.9 
Parents income (USD) 57.3/month 98.9 
School grades (out of 100) 49.1 16.6 
Public sector 0.098 (9.8%) 0.30 
Married 0.353 (35.3%) 0.48 
Spouse education (years) 6.7 2.0 
Good English 0.149 (14.9%) 0.356 
Not Buddhist 0.055 (5.5%) 0.228 
 
It should be noted that the average income ($104/month) is the average for those who 
indicated receiving a wage. The average for all respondents, including the 14 people who 
indicated no income, was $102/month.  Further, the average income/hour is a simple average 
for all workers and is not a weighted by the number of hours worked. The weighted average 
income/hour is $0.48, and is lower than the simple average ($0.52) because low-wage earners 
tend to work more hours.  
With regards to the socio-economic variables, the parent’s education (measured in years) was 
averaged while parent’s income was summed.  
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4.2.1 Education results 
Regarding education, respondents were asked both for their years of education and also for 
their level of education. As a test of data reliability, the years of education data was used to 
create a proxy measurement of education level. After splitting up the result of “school years” 
into incomplete primary (1-6), some secondary (7-11), school graduate (12-15), and 
university graduate (16 or more) then the school year data shows similar results to the self-
reported data about level of education, which gives anecdotal evidence to support the 
reliability of the data9. The self-reported education level is the preferred indicator when using 
dummy variables.  
While the survey provided for seven possible educational levels, several of those levels were 
combined when used in the models. Specifically, “secondary”, “some university” and “non-
university tertiary” were combined; and “university” and “postgraduate” were combined. One 
reason for this was the low number of responses from “non-university tertiary” and 
“postgraduate”. Another reason was that this combination ensured the best match with the 
data from educational years. Table 4-2 below describes the percentage of respondents in each 
educational level, the average years of study at each level, the marginal additional years for 
each level (this is important information that is used to determine annualised education 
returns), and the average hourly income at each level. For interest, respondents with 
postgraduate qualifications had an average income/hour of $1.04 (double the average) though 
this observation should be tempered by the fact that there were only 13 such respondents.  
 
TABLE 4-2: EDUCATION LEVEL, YEARS OF STUDY, AVERAGE INCOME 
 Percentage Average years Average income/hour 
(1) Did not finish primary school 33% 4.3 $0.37 
(2) Primary, but not finish secondary 21% 8.3 (4 extra) $0.48 
(3) Secondary, not university 31% 12.4 (4.1 extra) $0.54 
(4) University graduate 15% 16.2 (3.8 extra) $0.87 
     Total 100% 9.4 $0.52 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The “proxy level” measurements aligned with self-reported level slightly better when “some secondary” was 
limited to 7-10 grades of school. This is probably due to some confusion about whether secondary school 
finishes after nine years (compulsory education) or 12 years (full secondary education).   
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In addition, respondents were asked about which university they attended and their area of 
study.  It had been hoped that the survey would provide enough information to provide 
separate estimates for a range of different universities and areas of study, but a relatively low 
response rate from graduates made this impossible. Instead of offering a range of estimates, 
the data was sufficient only for a comparison of one particular university (University of 
Management and Economics) vis-à-vis all other universities, and one particular area of study 
(business related) vis-à-vis all other areas of study. The percentage of graduates from both 
cohorts is given in Table 4-3 below.  
 
TABLE 4-3: UNIVERSITY GRADUATE DETAILS 
 % of graduates 
University of Management and Economics (UME) 53.2% 
Business related subjects  38.0% 
Female graduates 30.4% 
 
In Cambodia, grades are reported as a letter (A to F) and/or a number (out of 100). When 
respondents only gave a letter grade, they were given a mid-point number estimate aligning 
to that letter10. Table 4-4 show the average grades for people from each education level, 
which shows that university graduates score about 10% higher than high school graduates, 
who in turn score about 10% higher than primary school graduates. Interestingly, people who 
finished primary school did not score any higher than people who did not finish primary 
school. 
 
TABLE 4-4: AVERAGE SCHOOL GRADES, BY EDUCATION LEVEL 
 Average school grade 
(1) Did not finish primary school 45.9 
(2) Primary, but not finish secondary 45.5 
(3) Secondary, not university 51.6 
(4) University graduate 56.1 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Number equivalents for each letter grade were A = 95, B = 85, C = 75, D = 60, E = 40 and F = 20. Note that 
an “E” is considered a pass in Cambodia.	  These	  levels	  are	  being	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Cambodian	  government	  and	  
be	  changed,	  but	  they	  were	  correct	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  survey.	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As a simple measure of the benefit of education, we can calculate the average percentage 
difference in wages between different education levels11. This is shown in Table 4-5, and 
suggests that the largest benefit comes from finishing university and the smallest benefit 
comes from finished high school. These numbers should be treated as anecdotal only and 
more robust premium estimates will be calculated in later in this chapter.   
 
TABLE 4-5: SIMPLE EDUCATION PREMIUM 
 Simple premium (% higher) 
Benefit of finishing primary school = (2) / (1) 31.8%  
Benefit of finishing secondary = (3) / (2) 12.1%  
Benefit of finishing university = (4) / (3) 61.3%  
 
 
4.2.2 Employment results 
For occupational area, respondents were split into four categories, including (1) farming and 
agriculture; (2) urban unskilled jobs such as sales or driver; (3) semi-skilled white collar and 
trades; and (4) managers and professionals. This data was also used to provide a proxy 
estimate of “rural” (occupation 1) and “urban” (all other occupations). Table 4-6 outlines the 
percentage of respondents from each occupational area.   
 
TABLE 4-6: OCCUPATIONAL SECTOR, INCLUDING URBAN v RURAL 
(1) Farming and agriculture (rural) 39% 
(2) Urban unskilled 35% 
(3) Urban semi-skilled 18% 
(4) Urban skilled 8% 
(2-4) All urban 61% 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This idea of a “simple education premium” is taken from Kifle (2010).  
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Regarding work experience, there were three potential sources of information -- the direction 
question about experience, tenure at current job, and income information for previous years 
of employment. Where these answers were not consistent, the higher value was used. When 
survey responses were missing or problematic12, then a proxy measure was used based the 
respondent’s age, minus years of schooling, and minus an estimate of non-working years, 
which was calculated as an average from the respondents who did answer the question.  
 
4.2.3 Summary of survey data 
Given the goal of trying to represent over 10 million people in regional Cambodia, the sample 
size of 530 that comes from only two provinces is less than ideal. The modest sample size, 
combined with some intentional biases and unavoidable sampling biases, are all issues that 
need to be kept in mind when interpreting the results of regression analysis presented in later 
chapters.  
By design, this survey did not include responses from the capital city of Phnom Penh, and 
that choice may have put a downward bias on the level of education and the reported wage. 
Though the survey also excluded remote farmland (whose exclusion would add an upward 
bias regarding education and income), and the survey frame was set around major regional 
centres that score close to the national average in social and economic indicators.  
The other intentional bias that was included in this survey was an over-representation of 
university graduates (15% in the survey, but only 3% in the population). Since one of the 
goals of this survey was to study the impact of university education on wages, it was 
necessary to ensure sufficient responses from university graduates, and so we sought help 
from the Cambodian government and from several universities within our target regions. The 
original hope that the survey would include enough graduates to include detailed comparisons 
between universities or topics did not eventuate, but there were enough responses to make 
some basic comparisons possible.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 An experience estimate was considered “problematic” when it was very low as a percentage of the 
respondents working life.    
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Due to the intentional over-sampling of university graduates (and to a lesser degree the 
exclusion of Phnom Penh), a comparison with national data is not meaningful. 
Nonetheless, a comparison of average incomes between this survey and the Cambodia Socio-
Economic Survey (CSES) gives an interesting result. As expected, the average income in this 
survey was higher than the CSES average, which is consistent with the over-sampling of 
university graduates. Though when the data from this survey was calibrated to imitate the 
education information from the CSES data, the proxy income estimate was $87/month, 
compared to the CSES estimate of $85/month. While this is only one data point, and all of the 
earlier limitations and caveats are still relevant, the similarity in incomes should provide 
some small amount of comfort that the data presented in this chapter is useful.  
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Chapter 5: Education Premium in Cambodia 
 
This chapter uses primary data from the 2012 Regional Cambodia Education Survey 
(described in Chapter 4) and a series of increasingly robust education models to produce a 
new estimate of the education premium. The Mincer-related literature usually reports the 
coefficient estimate along with either the standard error or t-statistic, and this thesis will stay 
with that convention by reporting the standard error along with each estimate.  
All of the regressions in this chapter use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, and the 
confidence level shows the likelihood that the coefficient is not zero (one-tailed test). This 
chapter is split into five sections, with the first three sections using models copied from other 
economists. The model used in section 5.1 is the basic Mincer model, and then more details 
are added with section 5.2 using the model introduced by Lall and Sakallariou (2010), and 
section 5.3 using a non-linear occupation model introduced by Kifle (2007).  
After considering these pre-existing models, section 5.4 described the preferred model, which 
has been optimised for use with the new RCES data. This section also includes a version with 
non-linear education, and a version that provides more detailed information about the 
university sector in Cambodia. The results from the preferred model are used as inputs in 
Chapter 7 to produce the first properly calculated estimate of the rate of return for education 
in Cambodia.  
Finally, section 5.5 will question the conventional approach for reporting university 
premiums, and suggest an alternative that is more helpful in explaining the decision being 
faced by a school leaver.  
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5.1 – Basic Mincer model 
 
Despite the many legitimate concerns about using the basic Mincer approach, it is still a 
common starting point (and sometimes end point) in much of the literature, and the results are 
reported here as a reference case. The first regression uses the primary data from the CES 
survey where respondents have shared their own details (N = 530) and the second regression 
uses an expanded data set that includes answers given by respondents about the education and 
income of their family members (N = 1647). While the results may look plausible, the reader 
is encouraged to put more stock in the later models that include control variables.  
 
5.1.1 Basic Mincer model with primary data set 
The simplest version of the Mincer model is limited to regressing education, experience, and 
experience squared against log-wages. The primary data includes information on hours 
worked so the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages.  Table 5-1 gives the estimated 
coefficient and standard error for each estimate13.  
 
TABLE 5-1: BASIC MINCER REGRESSION 
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -1.965 0.173 99% 
Education 0.086 0.010 99% 
Experience 0.024 0.020 Not significant (89%) 
Experience squared -0.000 0.001 Not significant 
 
Sample size 530   
R squared (adjusted) 0.133   
F-stat 28.1   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.843   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Convention	  in	  the	  Mincer-­‐related	  literature	  is	  to	  report	  either	  the	  standard	  error	  or	  the	  t-­‐statistic,	  but	  not	  
the	  confidence	  interval.	  This	  thesis	  will	  follow	  convention,	  and	  report	  the	  standard	  error	  for	  all	  new	  estimates.	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The adjusted R2 is relatively low by Mincer standards, meaning that the model has fairly low 
predictive power. Note that the adjusted R2 is only slightly higher in later models. This does 
not undermine the validity of the coefficient estimates (Abelson, 1985), which are our main 
priority.  
The estimated constant shows the hypothetical log-wage for a person with no schooling or 
experience. To convert this into a wage estimate we can simply take the inverse of the 
exponential value of the constant. Based on the estimated constant of -1.965 then the 
hypothetical wage for a person with no schooling or experience is $0.14 per hour, which 
equates to about $30 per month14.  
Since this is a log-linear model, we can interpret the coefficient for continuous regressors as 
the percentage impact of that regressor on wages. Strictly speaking, the coefficient represents 
the “instantaneous rate of growth” for the dependent variable. In many instances it would be 
more useful to know the “compounded rate of growth”, which is simple to calculate based on 
the instantaneous rate. While keeping this in mind, the convention within education 
economics has been to report the instantaneous rate as being the premium, with the 
understanding that the two rates are very similar. For sake comparison, this thesis has 
conformed to that convention.   
The above table shows the education premium is 0.086, which means an additional year of 
education will increase income by 8.6%15. The table also shows an experience coefficient of 
0.24, which suggests that an additional year of experience will increase income by 2.4%, 
though due to a relatively high standard error we cannot be confident that the experience 
coefficient is statistically significant. With a coefficient of 0.24 and a standard error of 0.2 we 
can conclude that there is an 89% chance that the premium is above zero, but the convention 
within education economics (as with most statistics) is to require at least a 90% probability 
before considering an estimate to be statistically significant.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Monthly	  wage	  is	  calculated	  using	  the	  average	  hours	  worked	  per	  month	  (see	  Chapter	  4	  for	  details).	  
15	  It	  is	  not	  strictly	  accurate	  to	  say	  that	  the	  education	  “will	  increase	  income”	  since	  the	  model	  only	  tells	  us	  about	  
correlation	  and	  not	  causation.	  However,	  this	  document	  will	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  loose	  language	  of	  causation	  in	  
many	  instances	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  language	  efficiency.	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5.1.2 Basic Mincer model with expanded data set 
There were 530 responses to the survey, and those first person answers have been used to 
populate the data set used for all of the other models in Chapters 5 and 6. However, the 
survey also included questions about the respondents’ parents, partner and siblings.  
This data set is second hand information, includes many gaps that may introduce additional 
bias, and does not have sufficient detail to allow for appropriate control variables. 
Nonetheless, with a few assumptions it is possible to use the expanded data set to run a basic 
Mincer regression. The expanded data set includes 1647 observations of workers. Some basic 
information about the expanded data set is provided in Table 5-2.  
 
TABLE 5-2: SUMMARY INFORMATION ABOUT EXPANDED DATA SET 
 Average Standard deviation 
Wage (dollars per month) 89.12 76.31 
Education (years) 7.0 4.6 
University graduates 0.08 (8%) 0.27 
 
 
There was no information on hours worked so the dependent variable in this instance is (the 
log of) monthly wages instead of (the log of) hourly wages as used in all other models. There 
were no direct questions to determine the experience in the expanded data set. Instead, 
experience was determined by calculating age, less years of schooling, less an estimated 
number of non-work years based on other responses in the data. The basic Mincer model with 
the expanded data set gives the results in Table 5-3 below.  
The estimated education premium from the expanded data set is 5.2% for additional years of 
study. This is lower than the estimated education premium of 8.6% from original data set, 
with the difference being statistically significant with 99% confidence. With the expanded 
data set there is a negative experience premium of -0.5% per year, which highlights the 
weakness of the expanded data set. This result is likely caused by the addition of data for 
respondents’ parents, who have high levels of estimated experience (due to a higher age), but 
who often have lower incomes than their children.  
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TABLE 5-3: BASIC MINCER WITH EXPANDED DATA SET 
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant 3.990 0.047 99% 
Education  0.052 0.004 99% 
Experience -0.005 0.002 99% 
Experience squared 0.000 0.000 99% 
 
Sample size 1647   
R-squared (adjusted) 0.168   
F-stat 111.93   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.602   
 
 
Education data from the expanded data set can be rearranged into education levels. It is then 
possible to introduce education level dummy variables in a model that allows for non-linear 
education premiums. Table 5-4 shows the coefficients for each education dummy variable 
(with standard errors in brackets), along with the adjusted annualised education premiums.  
 
 TABLE 5-4: ANNUALISED EDUCATION PREMIUM (EDUCATION LEVEL) 
 Coefficient * Annualised education premium 
Complete primary school 0.185  (0.036) 5.1% 
Complete secondary school 0.354  (0.05) 5.4% 
Graduate university 0.822  (0.063) 22.4% 
* All values are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  
 
The education premiums in the non-linear model are convex and broadly consistent with the 
results reported in Chapter 3 using the L&S model. 
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All of the coefficients relating to the expanded data set are statistically significant at the 99% 
level, but the second hand nature of most of the data mean that these results should be treated 
with scepticism. These data concerns are compounded by the lack of information on hours 
worked, reported experience, and control variables. The basic Mincer model provides some 
interesting context, but the following sections will explore various improvements on the 
Mincer model, culminating in section 5.4 with the development of a preferred model.  
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5.2 -- Lall and Sakellariou model 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the most robust study of the Cambodian education premium 
currently available was done by Lall and Sakellariou (2010). This section applies their 
approach to the new survey data.  
 
5.2.1 Lall and Sakellariou model (gender dummy) 
To recreate the model used by Lall and Sakellariou (henceforth called “L&S model”) it is 
necessary to consider four additional variables: gender, marriage status, sector of 
employment (public/private), and location (urban/rural).  If we include each of these as 
dummy variables we can calculate an L&S combined model, which gives the results shown in 
Table 5-5 below.  
 
TABLE 5-5: L&S COMBINED MODEL 
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -1.901 0.180 99% 
Schooling 0.074 0.012 99% 
Experience 0.020 0.020 Not significant 
Experience squared 0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Female  -0.225 0.075 99% 
Married 0.172 0.084 95% 
Urban 0.206 0.091 95% 
Public sector -0.107 0.127 Not significant 
 
Sample size 530   
R squared (adjusted) 0.154   
F-stat 14.78   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.833   
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An initial observation that can be made about the L&S combined model is that the inclusion 
of control variables (in particular the urban/rural distinction) has resulted in an education 
premium of 7.4%, compared to the basic model estimate of 8.6%. While this change is 
consistent with expectations, the difference between the two estimates is not statistically 
significant so we cannot draw any strong conclusions.  
 
5.2.2 Lall and Sakellariou model (gender specific) 
The original L&S study did not include a gender dummy variable but instead reported the 
results separately for men and women. Copying the L&S model exactly gives the results in 
Table 5-6.  
 
TABLE 5-6: L&S MODEL (SEPARATE FOR MALE & FEMALE) 
VARIABLE MALE FEMALE 
 Value Standard 
error 
Confidence Value Standard 
error 
Confidence 
Constant -1.956 0.194 99% -2.050 0.334 99% 
Schooling 0.069 0.013 99% 0.084 0.022 99% 
Experience 0.031 0.021 90% 0.005 0.039 No 
Experience 
squared 
-0.001 0.001 No 0.001 0.001 No 
Married 0.260 0.099 99% 0.076 0.143 No 
Urban 0.312 0.104 99% 0.052 0.163 No 
Public sector -0.234 0.137 95% 0.157 0.261 No 
 
Sample size 303   227   
R2 (adjusted) 0.171   0.091   
F-stat 11.39   4.75   
Root MSE 0.73   0.953   
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It’s worth noting that the model fits the male data relatively better than the female data, with 
the male-specific regression scoring a considerably higher adjusted R2 (0.17 v 0.09), higher 
F-statistic (11.4 v 4.8), lower root MSE (0.73 v 0.95). Further, the L&S-male model finds 
statistically significant coefficients for five variables and the constant while the L&S-female 
model only has statistically significant coefficients for the education variable and the 
constant.  
The estimates are quite similar to the results found in the original L&S paper.  
• The estimate for the male schooling premium is 6.9% and the difference between this 
premium and the 8.6% estimate in the basic Mincer (section 5.1 above) is statistically 
significant at 90% confidence. The estimate for male experience premium is 3.1%, 
and unlike the previous estimates this value is statistically significant. When 
compared to the 6.6% education premium and 2.9% experience premium from the 
original L&S study, the results are statistically equivalent.  
• For women, the estimate for the schooling premium is 8.4% and the experience 
premium is close to zero and statistically insignificant, and these results are 
statistically equivalent to the original L&S study estimates of 6.8% education 
premium and no experience premium.  
• The similarity in the estimates between the original L&S study and the current study 
when using the same model is anecdotal evidence that the 2012 RCES data used in 
this thesis is roughly accurate, or at least that both the RCES and CSES data have 
similar errors.  
Based on the estimated constant, the hypothetical starting wage for a rural unmarried person 
with no schooling or experience is $0.14/hour ($30/month) for men and $0.13/hour 
($28/month) for women. The difference between male and female starting wage is not 
statistically significant, and this result is also statistically equivalent to result from the basic 
Mincer model.    
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Using the “L&S combined model”, there is a large and statistically significant negative wage 
impact for women. The coefficient for the gender dummy was -0.225, which translates to a 
wage penalty of 20.4% for women.16  
The gender specific L&S models show the difference between men and women in more 
detail. Surprisingly, the estimated education premium is 8.4% for women and 6.9% for men, 
though the difference is not statistically significant. The real difference comes from the 
control variables, where women seemingly get no benefit from experience, marriage, or 
working in the city – all of which provide a positive premium for male workers but are 
statistically insignificant for women.  
One interpretation of these results is that men and women receive similar treatment when 
they are entering the work force, but that men are more successful at increasing their wage 
over time. Potential reasons for this difference is that men and women work in different 
industries with different wage profiles, that men may be more assertive in pursuing 
promotions, there is gender discrimination regarding career advancement (the so-called 
“glass ceiling”), or some combination of the above. It is also worth considering that the 
inclusion of some low-income older women (with lots of experience) may have biased the 
data in a way that does not accurately reflect the prospects for women currently entering the 
workforce. This thesis does not offer an opinion on the cause of the gender wage gap except 
to note that it is statistically significant. 
In their original paper, L&S stress their finding of a large and statistically significant negative 
coefficient for public sector employment. For 2007, their public sector coefficient was -0.874 
for men and -0.671 for women. L&S note that this is true despite public sector workers 
having higher average education and they pose the following question: “what are the reasons 
for the self-selection of more educated workers in the public sector in the presence of private 
sector wage premiums?” (p343). 
The results in the current version of the L&S model using RCES data are not as dramatic as 
those found in the original L&S paper. For women the public service coefficient is 
statistically insignificant (estimate of 0.157 and standard error of 0.261) and for men the 
coefficient is -0.234, which translates to a 21.6% wage penalty. As with the original L&S 
paper, we find that public sector workers on average have more schooling that private sector 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  When	  interpreting	  coefficients	  for	  dummy	  variables,	  this	  thesis	  will	  use	  the	  Kennedy	  adjustment	  unless	  
stated	  otherwise.	  For	  more	  details	  see	  the	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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workers (13 years v 9 years) and are more likely to have graduated from university (35% v 
13%). While not as pronounced, once again we are observing higher educated people going 
into the public sector despite the wage penalty, and this seeming anomaly still requires an 
explanation.  
 
5.2.3 Public sector wages and corruption 
The suggested reason given by L&S is that people with more schooling but relatively lower 
skills may self-select into the public sector. However, the current data also shows a (small) 
positive correlation between public sector workers and grades. Further, if the L&S model is 
re-done including “grades” as an additional control variable, there is still a statistically 
significant public sector coefficient of -0.23 for men. These results argue against the “low 
skill public sector” hypothesis.  
Another theory presented by L&S is that private sector workers may be on average more 
willing to take on risk (with the associated risk premium), or that public sector work has non-
wage benefits such as high job security and less demanding work conditions.  
One other potential reason for the wage gap is the existence of unofficial income available to 
low-level public servants through various “service fees” and “fines”. The existence of 
“service fees” within the bureaucracy is an open secret in Cambodia, where it is widely 
known that government paperwork can be held up for months (or years) until the right people 
have received sufficient payment. Other examples of unofficial income for public servants 
include public school teachers who provide important learning material during after-school 
private tutorials, or police officers who negotiate immediate cash payments for traffic 
infringements.  
If the public sector wage gap is caused by persistent low-level corruption, then the size of the 
public sector wage penalty can be interpreted as a proxy indicator for the size of low-level 
corruption in Cambodia’s public service.  
Public servants have about four years more education than private sector workers. Using the 
results from the combined model, each year of education is associated with a 7.4% wage 
premium, so we would ordinarily expect a public servant to earn about 30% more than a 
private sector worker. Instead we see that public sector wages are about 10% lower in the 
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public sector. If we assume that workers will switch between sectors in order to equalise their 
marginal benefit, then we can tentatively conclude that the value of low-level public sector 
corruption is worth about 40% of the average private sector income. Given an average wage 
of about $100 per month, then the cost of low-level corruption is about $40/month for each 
person employed in the public service. There are about 200,000 public servants in 
Cambodia17, which gives a rough value of low-level corruption at $8 million per month or 
approximately $100 million per year.  
Measuring the size of corruption is notoriously difficult. One earlier estimate used by the 
International Labor Organisation (2014) is that corruption may be as large as 10% of the 
Cambodian economy, or $1.5 billion18. Given that service fees by low-level public servants 
are only one part of corruption, these two estimates are not in conflict with each other.  
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Taliercio	  (2004)	  reports	  that	  public	  servants	  are	  1.4%	  of	  the	  population,	  which	  is	  just	  over	  15	  million.	  	  
18	  Cambodia’s	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  was	  just	  over	  $15	  billion	  in	  2013	  (World	  Bank,	  2015).	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5.3 -- Occupation (Kifle) model  
 
In preparing this analysis, one of the papers that was used for inspiration was an analysis of 
the education premium in Eritrea by Kifle (2007). That study was similar to this thesis in that 
it involved the gathering of original data in a developing country explicitly to use in models 
of education, and it made use of several different Mincer models. 
Kifle’s first model is a basic Mincer model (as done above in section 5.1), where he finds an 
education premium of 11% and an experience premium of 2%. As with much of the post-
Mincer literature, Kifle then relaxes the assumption of linearity of education premiums by 
replacing the continuous education regressor with a series of education dummy variables 
representing various educational levels19.  
 
5.3.1 Recreating the Kifle model 
The main Kifle model includes four levels of education, represented by three dummy 
variables. The levels of education are “primary”, “secondary”, “post-secondary” and 
“university”. Additional control variables in his model included tenure, parents’ education, 
employment sector (public or private), and gender. Perhaps the most interesting part of the 
Kifle model was the inclusion of dummy variables for occupations.  
In his paper, Kifle had five occupational categories. While not quite equivalent, a rough 
comparison can be made between his categories and the four categories described above in 
Table 4-6. For comparison, a mapping of the Kifle and current occupational categories is 
shown in Table 5-7 below.  
A minor problem with the above mapping is that Rural Unskilled is matched against some 
occupations that are Urban Unskilled. The combination of 3-Clerks and 5-Crafts into Urban 
Unskilled is somewhat justified by the results of Kifle’s regression, where the two have the 
most similar results of any of his occupational categories. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Kifle	  also	  includes	  a	  “schooling	  squared	  model”	  which	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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TABLE 5-7: COMPARING OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES 
 
Kifle occupational categories 
 
Humphreys occupational categories 
 
1. Senior officials, managers and professionals   Urban Skilled 
2. Technical and associate professionals   Urban Semi-skilled 
3. Clerks   Urban Unskilled 
4. Service workers, agricultural and fishery workers 
and those who do elementary occupations 
  Rural Unskilled 
5. Craft & trade workers and plant & machinery 
operators 
  Urban Unskilled 
 
 
Another difference between Kifle’s approach and the occupation model used here is that 
Kifle used (the log of) wages as his dependent variable and included hours worked as an 
independent variable, while this model uses (the log of) hourly wages as the dependent 
variable. Also, while Kifle uses both parents’ education separately in his model, this 
occupation model used here includes an average of parents’ education.  
One final small divergence from Kifle is the order of the dummy variables. Kifle uses a 
university educated skilled women as the base case, and uses dummy variables for lower 
educational levels, less skilled occupations, and being male. The below model uses an 
uneducated unskilled rural male as the base case, and uses dummy variables for higher 
education levels, more skilled occupations, and being female.  
 
5.3.2 Results from the Occupation (Kifle) Model 
The results of the occupation model are shown below in Table 5-8, which shows statistically 
significant results for all independent variables except for primary school education, 
experience and experience squared.  
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TABLE 5-8: OCCUPATION MODEL  
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -1.332 0.154 99% 
Primary school 0.047 0.111 Not significant 
Secondary school 0.227 0.120 95% 
University 0.560 0.159 99% 
Experience -0.005 0.021 Not significant 
Experience squared 0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Tenure 0.024 0.013 95% 
Female -0.248 0.074 99% 
Parents education 0.018 0.013 90% 
Public sector -0.245 0.130 95% 
Occupation: urban unskilled 0.184 0.092 95% 
Occupation: urban semi-skilled 0.469 0.128 99% 
Occupation: urban skilled 0.781 0.167 99% 
 
Sample size 530   
R squared (adjusted) 0.172   
F-stat 10.15   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.824   
 
 
Based on the estimated constant, the hypothetical wage for a rural unskilled male who didn’t 
finish primary school and has no experience is $0.26 per hour, which translates to just over 
$56 per month.  
The experience coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant (estimate of -0.005 
and standard error of 0.021). The lack of an experience premium can be explained by the 
inclusion of tenure as an explanatory variable, which is strongly correlated with experience. 
The correlation coefficient between “experience” and “tenure” is 0.59 (giving a Variance 
Inflation Factor of 1.5420), so it is possible to conclude that tenure is acting as proxy measures 
of experience. The tenure coefficient is 0.024, which is the same as the experience coefficient 
reported in the basic model (see section 5.1) and statistically equivalent to the 0.02 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  Variance	  Inflation	  Factor	  (VIF)	  is	  an	  estimate	  of	  how	  much	  the	  variance	  of	  a	  coefficient	  has	  been	  
increased	  (“inflated”)	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  other	  correlated	  variables	  in	  the	  regression.	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experience coefficient in the combined L&S model (see section 5.2). The gender coefficient 
is -0.248, which is statistically significant and represents a wage penalty of 22.2% for female 
workers. The public sector coefficient is -0.245, which is statistically significant and 
translates to a 22.4% wage penalty for working in the public sector.  
The occupation coefficients are all positive and statistically significant, which means that 
moving to an urban area has a wage premium regardless of whether you get an unskilled, 
semi-skilled, or skilled job in the city. That being said, the wage benefit is very different for 
the different occupations, and those differences are also statistically significant. The 
occupation coefficients are 0.184 for urban unskilled, 0.469 for semi-skilled, and 0.781 for 
skilled, which translates into an occupation based wage premium of 19.7%, 58.6%, and 
115.3% respectively. 
One thing to keep in mind is the potential relationship between occupations and education. 
There is an obvious theoretical link between more education and skilled employment, 
especially as some high skill jobs require a university degree as a condition of employment. 
Unsurprisingly, there is a significant positive correlation between skilled work and education, 
and a significant negative correlation between unskilled rural work and education. To some 
degree, the “occupation premium” and the “education premium” are measuring the same 
thing. If that is true then it would be more appropriate to include either occupation or 
education, and the inclusion of both variables in the regression will result in multicollinearity, 
which would make the education coefficients unreliable. Specifically, if occupation and 
education are correlated then it is likely that the occupation model will underestimate the 
benefit associated with education. 
Since the original Kifle model relates to a different country (Eretria) and uses different 
dummy variable specifications, there is little point coming the results. Nonetheless, there are 
some similarities in that both studies report a wage premium for men, a wage penalty for 
public servants, and similar coefficients for education and parents’ education.  
 
5.3.3 Annualised education premium for Occupation (Kifle) model 
To convert the education dummy coefficients into annualised education premiums we need to 
follow several steps. First, it is necessary to adjust the coefficient using either the Halvorsen-
Palmquist or Kennedy approach (see section 3.3 for discussion). Second, to calculate the 
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marginal benefit of an education level, take the difference between the adjusted coefficient 
for that level and the adjusted coefficient for the preceding level (e.g. the marginal benefit 
from university is the difference between the adjusted coefficients for “university” and 
“secondary school”).  
Once the marginal premium for a level of education is known, the final step is to convert that 
into an annualised education premium by dividing the premium by the average number of 
years it takes to achieve that education level. The average number of years taken to move 
between each education level is shown on Table 4-2. Making the necessary calculations 
based on the education level coefficients in Table 5-8 (using the Kennedy transformation) the 
estimates for the annualised education premium for each education level is given in Table 5-9 
below.  
 
TABLE 5-9: ANNUALISED EDUCATION PREMIUM (AT EACH LEVEL) 
 Annualised education premium (Kennedy transformation) 
Complete primary school 1.0% 
Complete secondary school 5.0% 
Graduate university 12.8% 
 
 
The basic Mincer and L&S models used above included education as a continuous regressor, 
and therefore estimated a linear relationship between education and wages, where one year of 
school gave the same benefit as one year at university. In the basic model the size of the 
education premium was estimated as 8.6% and in the combined L&S model that education 
premium was estimated as 7.4%, and both of those estimates applied to all levels of 
education. This model has relaxed the assumption of linear education premiums instead has 
found different premiums for different levels of education.  
Specifically, the results show a convex relationship between education and wages, with a 
higher education premium for higher levels of education. This is consistent with much of the 
recent evidence around the world and also consistent with the results found in Chapter 3 
using CSES data.  
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The other main thing to note about these results is that the education premiums are relatively 
low compared to other estimates for Cambodia. For primary and secondary schooling the 
education premiums are relatively low by international standards, with the primary school 
result being statistically insignificant. One explanation for this is the inclusion of occupation 
types in the regression, which has hidden some of the benefit of education in the skilled 
occupation coefficient. 
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5.4 – Preferred model 
 
The above three sections in this chapter have borrowed models directly from other papers and 
applied them to the new data from the 2012 Regional Cambodia Education Survey (RCES). 
This section will propose a new version of the Mincer model that makes the best use of the 
available data.  
The preferred model intentionally uses the conventional functional form taken from the 
Mincer-related literature to allow for easy comparisons (see section 2.1 for discussion), with 
the only difference being the addition of control variables that were previously excluded due 
to lack of data. Some alternative functional forms will be considered in Chapter 6, but it will 
be the results of this preferred model that are used in the analysis of the later chapters. While 
the RCES data makes it possible to include previously unavailable regressors (in particular 
relating to ability and socio-economic status), the RCES data is also imperfect and 
incomplete and so the preferred model will still suffer from missing variables.   
 
5.4.1 Elements of the preferred model 
The model proposed below is not innovative in functional form or the choice of regressors, 
but it has been optimised in the sense that it includes those variables that help to improve the 
explanatory power of the model and reduce the omitted variable bias (including ability 
endogeneity), but also minimises the amount of multicollinearity to maximise the accuracy of 
each coefficient estimate. A summary of the main variables considered for the preferred 
model is given in Table 5-10 and more information on available data is in Chapter 4.   
For the first time it is possible to include a variable for ability in a Cambodian education 
model. The problem of ability endogeneity is an ongoing concern for education economists 
(see section 2.1) and including a variable that controls for ability can help to address this 
problem. The RCES data includes several questions that could be used as an indicator of 
ability, including high school grades, whether the person had to repeat subjects at university, 
and potentially also the number of missed classes or the parents’ level of education.  
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TABLE 5-10: VARIABLES CONSIDERED FOR PREFERRED MODEL 
Variable Discussion 
High school grades Included as the best control variable for “ability” 
Repeat university subjects  Potentially a control variable for “ability” but was rejected in favour of 
“high school grades”; not statistically significant  
Missed classes  Potentially a control variable for “ability” but was rejected in favour of 
“high school grades”; not statistically significant 
Parents’ level of education Potentially a control variable for “ability” or “socio-economic status”, but 
rejected in favour of “school grades” and “parents’ income” respectively 
Parents’ income Included as best control variable for “socio-economic status” 
Occupation or Industry The survey had detailed work information, had to be aggregated; work 
types were strongly correlated with education, so rejected due to 
multicollinearity; for more on occupation see section 5.3 
Tenure Strongly correlated with experience, so rejected due to multicollinearity; 
negligible impact on explanatory power of the model 
Married Strongly correlated with experience, so rejected due to multicollinearity; 
negligible impact on explanatory power of the model 
Sector (public/private) Coefficient was statistically insignificant, and including “sector” in the 
model reduced the adjusted R2. 
Location (urban/rural) Theoretically relevant; statistically & economically significant; improved 
the explanatory power of the model 
Gender Theoretically relevant; statistically & economically significant; improved 
the explanatory power of the model 
 
 
The preferred model uses “school grades” both for theoretical and data reasons. To be 
specific – the grades coefficient shows the percentage change in expected wages based on a 
10 point change in the grades out of a 100 point scoring system. Grades are theoretically the 
most direct measure available of student ability. Practically, in all variations of the Mincer 
model, the coefficient for grades is both statistically and economically significant, and 
increases the explanatory power of the model by more than any other variable related to 
ability. In the cases of “repeat subjects” and “missed classes”, neither variable was 
statistically significant.  
Another feature of the preferred model is the inclusion of a variable to control for socio-
economic status. While some education economists prefer to use “parents’ education” as a 
measure of socio-economic status, the preferred model will use “parents’ income” instead, 
where the coefficient shows the percentage change in expected wages based on a change of 
parents’ income of $100 per month.  
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Theoretically, parents’ income is the most direct measure of a family’s socio-economic 
standing as it is a direct measure of affluence. Further, “parents’ education” is commonly 
regarded as being both a proxy indicator of ability as well as socio-economic status, and since 
this model already has an ability-related variable then this dual role was considered a flaw 
and not a feature.  
As expected, parents’ education and parents’ income were closely correlated, and used on 
their own they are both statistically and economically significant and improve the explanatory 
power of the model. However, “parents’ income” was statistically significant at a higher 
confidence level and had the greater impact on the adjusted R2 value. When both variables 
are used in the same model, the coefficient for parents’ education becomes negligible and 
statistically insignificant.  
The preferred model does not include occupational dummy variables. As mentioned in 
section 5.3 above, there is a strong correlation between occupation and education, creating 
the prospect of multicollinearity that will artificially depress the reported education premium. 
Indeed, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) warn against the inclusion of occupation for this 
exact reason.  
The preferred model also excludes tenure and marriage. As suggested in section 5.3, there is a 
high correlation between tenure and experience. The same is also true for marriage, which 
makes sense theoretically since people are more likely to get married as they get older, and 
old people tend to have more experience. Both of these variables raise the prospect of further 
multicollinearity, while having negligible impact on the explanatory power of the model (as 
measured by the adjusted R2). Another omission from the preferred model, that was included 
both in L&S and Kifle, is a dummy variable for working in the public sector. The reason for 
this omission is that in all version of the Mincer model that use the full population, the 
coefficient for public sector is statistically insignificant, and reduces the adjusted R2.   
Two independent variables that remain from the L&S and Kifle models are “urbanity” and 
“gender”. There are good theoretical reasons why both of these variables would have a 
significant impact on income for reasons unrelated to education and/or experience. In all 
variations of Mincer models, both coefficients are statistically and economically significant, 
as well as noticeably increasing the explanatory power of the model.  
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It is important to note that the preferred model has been chosen based on the quality of the 
data that was available, and that data will inevitably be incomplete and imperfect. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Regional Cambodia Education Survey is an imperfect data set, 
and it may be that different data would suggest a different specification for the preferred 
model. Also, information such as the quality of education, geography of workers and 
employers, the difficulty of different jobs, and industry-specific booms and busts (among 
other issues) will influence wages, but data was not available for these issues.  
The first version of the preferred model imposes linearity on the education premium, and the 
second version allows non-linearity by including education level dummy variables. The 
functional form for the preferred linear model is: 
  ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑆 +   𝛽!𝐸 +   𝛽!𝐸! +   𝛽!𝐹 +   𝛽!𝑌 +   𝛽!𝐺 +   𝛽!𝑈 +   𝑒                                              (6) 
 
Where: 
S = years of schooling; 
E = years of experience; 
E2 = years of experience squared; 
F = dummy variable for “female”; 
Y = parents income; 
G = grades at school; 
U = dummy variable for “urban”; 
βX = coefficients for each variable; and 
e = error  
 
Note that in the preferred linear model, β4 and β7 are coefficients for dummy variables, while 
all other β coefficients are for continuous variables.  
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5.4.2 Estimates from the linear preferred model 
Running the preferred model with a linear education premium (i.e. without educational 
dummy variables) gives the results in Table 5-11 below. Based on the estimated constant, the 
hypothetical wage for a rural male with no education and no experience is $0.13 per hour, 
which translates to just under $29 per month.  
 
TABLE 5-11: PREFERRED MODEL WITH LINEAR EDUCATION 
Variable Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -2.010 0.195 99% 
Education  0.066 0.012 99% 
Experience 0.024 0.019 Not significant (89%) 
Experience squared -0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Female -0.217 0.074 99% 
Parents’ income 0.087 0.037 99% 
Grades 0.036 0.023 90% 
Urban 0.166 0.090 95% 
 
Sample size 530   
R squared (adjusted) 0.160   
F-stat 15.39   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.83   
 
 
The preferred model has an education premium of 6.6%, which is statistically no different 
from the L&S results using CSES data. The difference between this estimate and the 8.6% 
education premium from the basic model is statistically significant at 95% confidence, with 
the difference caused by the addition of control variables for ability, urban living, and socio-
economic status, all of which have a statistically significant positive impact on wages.  
The estimate for the experience coefficient is 0.024, but with a standard error of 0.019 this 
result is not statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Note that the experience 
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coefficient is statistically significant at the 89% confidence level, which means there is an 
89% probability that the estimate is above zero. By convention, the 90% probability level is 
considered the lowest level that can be regarded as statistically significant, but the reader is 
invited to draw their own conclusion.  
As with the previous models, living in an urban area is associated with a higher wage, with a 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.166 that translates into a wage premium of 17.6%. The 
preferred model again finds lower wages for women, with a statistically significant 
coefficient of -0.217 translating into a wage penalty for women of 19.8%.  
More interesting are the results for the new variables. The ability control variable of “grades” 
suggests that a person can expect 3.6% higher income for every 10 point increase in their 
school grades. To put that in context, that means an income premium of about 20% for an A-
student over an E-student. The socio-economic control variable of “parents’ income” says 
that coming from a family with an income $100/month more than an otherwise equivalent 
family is associated with a wage premium of 8.7%.  
 
5.4.3 Estimates from non-linear preferred model 
The above regression assumes linearity in education premiums. A non-linear version of the 
preferred model replaces the education variable with a series of dummy variables that 
represent different education levels. In this model, the base case is “not finished primary 
school” and the dummy variables represent “finished primary”, “finished secondary”, and 
“graduated university”. Re-running the preferred model with non-linear education gives the 
results in Table 5-12.  
Adjusting the coefficients for the education dummy variables using both the Kennedy 
transformation and the Halvorsen-Palmquist transformation (see section 3.3 for discussion) 
produces annualised education premiums as shown in Table 5-13. Unless stated otherwise, 
the following discussion will use the results of the Kennedy transformation.  
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TABLE 5-12: PREFERRED MODEL WITH NON-LINEAR EDUCATION 
Variable Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -1.550 0.179 99% 
Finish primary 0.073 0.112 Not significant 
Finish secondary 0.277 0.119 99% 
Graduate university 0.747 0.147 99% 
Experience 0.011 0.019 Not significant 
Experience squared -0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Female  -0.239 0.075 99% 
Parents’ income 0.073 0.037 95% 
Grades 0.042 0.023 95% 
Urban 0.227 0.089 99% 
 
Sample size 530   
R-squared (adjusted) 0.153   
F-stat 11.63   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.833   
 
 
TABLE 5-13: ANNUALISED EDUCATION PREMIUM (EDUCATIONAL LEVEL) 
 Annualised education premium 
(Kennedy transformation) 
Annualised education premium 
(Halvorsen-Palmquist	  transformation) 
Complete primary school   1.7%   1.9% 
Complete secondary school   5.9%   6.0% 
Graduate university   20.6%   21.0% 
 
 
These results show that the education premium in the RCES data is non-linear. While the 
premium on secondary school is close to the linear estimate, the premium on primary school 
is much lower (and statistically insignificant) and the premium for university education is 
much higher, with the difference between all of the estimates being statistically significant. 
As shown in Table 5-14, the annualised university premium falls in the middle of the range of 
previous estimates. 
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TABLE 5-14: ANNUALISED UNIVERSITY PREMIUM IN CONTEXT 
 Annualised university premium  
Preferred model  20.6% 
Patrinos, Ridao-Cano, and Sakellariou (2006) 17.5% 
Lall and Sakallariou (2010) for 2003/04 -- adjusted 31.2 - 38.6% 
Lall and Sakallariou (2010) for 2007 -- adjusted 26.6 - 28.7% 
L&S model with 2010 data 34.8 - 40.9% 
Basic model with extended data set 22.4% 
Occupation (Kifle) model 12.8% 
 
 
The results from the preferred model represent the best available estimates of Cambodia’s 
education premium. The preferred estimates improve on the L&S estimates because it is able 
to control for ability and socio-economic status; and the preferred estimates improve on the 
Occupation (Kifle) results because the preferred model does not suffer from multicollinearity 
between education and occupation, which hides the wage benefit associated with education.  
 
5.4.4 University-specific variables 
One of the original motivations for this research was to look at differences within the 
university sector, both between universities and between areas of study. The relatively small 
number of graduate responses (79) meant that it was not possible to compare many 
universities or subjects, but there was sufficient data to make some binary comparison. 
Regarding inter-university comparisons we can compare the performance of the University of 
Management and Economics (UME) with all other universities. With regards to university 
courses, we can compare business graduates with all other graduates.  
For each comparison, we start with the non-linear preferred model, and then replace the 
university dummy variable with two dummy variables representing the two things that we are 
comparing. In the “university model” we introduce a dummy variable for UME graduates and 
a separate dummy variable for non-UME graduates. In the “subject model” we introduce a 
dummy variable for business graduates and another dummy variable for non-business 
graduates. In both cases, the coefficients for all other variables (excluding the university 
specific dummies) were very similar to the preferred model.  
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The relevant results for the “university model” are shown in Table 5-15 below, with the first 
row repeating the university coefficient for all graduates (taken from Table 5-13), the second 
row reporting the coefficient for the UME graduate dummy variable, and the third row 
showing the coefficient for non-UME graduate dummy variable. These coefficients are then 
converted into an annualised education premium. While the table shows slightly different 
outcomes, it should be noted that the difference between all the coefficients is not statistically 
significant (indeed the difference between estimates is much less than one standard error), 
and so the estimates are effectively equivalent.  
 
TABLE 5-15: PREFERRED MODEL WITH SEPARATE UME VARIABLE 
 Coefficient Annualised education premium* 
Average university graduate 0.747 20.6% 
UME graduate 0.703 18% 
Other graduate 0.795 23% 
* Using the Kennedy transformation 
 
The relevant results for the “subject model” are shown in Table 5-16 below, which copies the 
format of the “university model” above. As with the comparison of universities, the 
comparison of subject areas shows slightly different outcomes, but the difference between the 
coefficients is not statistically significant. This could be interpreted to mean that the decision 
regarding which course to study or which university to attend is less important than the 
decision about whether to go to university at all.   
 
TABLE 5-16: PREFERRED MODEL WITH SEPARATE BUSINESS VARIABLE 
 Coefficient Annualised education premium* 
Average university graduate 0.747 20.6% 
Business graduate 0.768 21.4% 
Other graduate 0.734 19.7% 
* Using the Kennedy transformation 
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With all of the above estimates, it should be remembered that we are talking about the 
education premium (the link between education wages) and not the rate of return on 
education. The rate of return is a function of the education premium as well as the costs 
associated with studying, and will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
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5.5 – Re-reporting university premiums  
 
The discussion in sub-section 2.1.9 explained how the standard way of reporting the 
annualised university premium could potentially be misleading. The premiums reported 
above do not represent the marginal increase in wages that a decision maker faces when 
deciding whether or not to attend university. The above results (and those published in 
Chapter 6 below) follow convention to allow for a comparison with previous literature. This 
section will re-report the university education premiums in a way that is more intuitive and 
more meaningful from the perspective of a prospective university student.   
 
5.5.1 Standard and alternative methodology 
The standard methodology for converting education dummy variable coefficients into 
annualised education premiums was outlined in section 3.3 above. In brief, the standard 
approach takes advantage of the fact that a variable’s coefficient in a log-linear regression can 
(with only a minor adjustment) represent the percentage change in wages caused by that 
variable. Therefore, when using education dummy variables, it is relatively simple to know 
the total impact each level of education has on the wage.  
To measure the marginal impact, the standard approach simply takes the difference between 
each education premium, and this marginal change is then divided by the number of years 
involved in achieving that level. So for example, with the preferred (non-linear) model the 
steps were as follows: 
 
TABLE 5-17: STANDARD METHODOLOGY FOR ANNUALISED PREMIUMS 
 Coefficient Adjustment* Marginal Per year 
Finish primary 0.073 0.069 0.069 0.017 
Finish secondary 0.277 0.310 0.241 0.059 
Graduate university 0.747 1.088 0.778 0.206 
* Using the Kennedy transformation as explained in section 3.3 
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The problem is that the reported numbers do not indicate the percentage increase over the 
previous education level, but rather they represent the percentage increase compared to a “no 
education” level. While this will have little or no effect on the lower levels of education 
(primary and secondary), it can make a significant difference on the annualised university 
premium. For a person deciding whether or not to go to university the relevant options are 
either studying or taking a job at the “finish secondary” wage rate. By measuring the benefit 
as a percentage of an artificially low base (the “no education” wage, instead of the “finish 
secondary” wage), the conventional approach has artificially inflated the university premium. 
An alternative approach is to resist the temptation to directly interpret the coefficients and 
instead use the model to calculate incomes for each education level, and directly compare the 
results. While slightly more labour intensive, this provides additional information, including 
our goal of finding the university premium as measured against the “finish secondary” wage 
counter-factual.  
With three dummy variables it is necessary to run the model four times to generate wage 
estimates for each of the dummy variable levels and once for the base case where all dummy 
variables are zero. Since the dependent variable of the Mincer model is the natural log of 
wages it is necessary to take the exponent of the dependent variable to find the estimated 
wage. Note that all other variables except for the constant and education dummy coefficients 
can be ignored without impacting on the estimated education premiums. After calculating 
four wage estimates it is now possible to do the calculation missing in the standard approach: 
for each level, find the percentage change in wages compared to the next level down. The 
final step is to divide that marginal premium by the number of years relevant to that level, 
and that provides the new estimate for the annualised university premium.   
 
TABLE 5-18: ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ANNUALISED PREMIUMS 
 Dependent variable Wage/hr* % level change Annual premium 
No dummy variable -1.550 $0.212 n/a n/a 
Primary school dummy -1.477 $0.228 7.6% 1.9% 
Secondary dummy -1.273 $0.280 22.7% 5.6% 
University dummy -0.803 $0.448 60.0% 15.9% 
* Wage/hr = exp(dependent variable) 
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As expected, the revised estimates are similar for the lower levels of education21, but the 
university premium is noticeably different between the two approaches. Using the 
conventional approach the university premium appears to be 20.6%, but that has been 
artificially inflated by using a low base. When measured against the correct base the 
university premium drops to 15.9%. 
 
5.5.2 Experimenting with the linear & non-linear models 
For sake of interest, we can estimate the implicit university premium from the linear model, 
and also the implicit linear premium from the non-linear model. 
Starting with the non-linear model (as used above), using the expected wages associated with 
four years of education (the average for people with no education qualification) and 16 years 
of education (the average for people with a university degree), we can derive the implicit 
linear premium that would be necessary to achieve the desired total change. Unsurprisingly, 
the implicit linear education premium within the non-linear model is 6.6%, the same result 
found using the linear education model.  
The results in the other direction are more interesting. Starting with a linear education 
premium of 6.6% we can measure the expected wages associated with each education level 
(average years of schooling = 4, 8, 12, 16 respectively). Based on those wage estimates we 
can calculate each level as a percentage change improvement over the “no education” base 
case. Note that such a calculation is intentionally copying the problem that exists within the 
standard methodology. We can then copy the rest of the standard methodology by taking the 
difference between the total premiums and dividing by the number of years associated with 
each level. The result is given in Table 5-19.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The revised estimate for primary school is identical to the annualised premium calculated using the 
Halverson-Palmquest adjustment (1.9% & 1.9%) and for secondary school premium the difference is relatively 
minor (5.6% & 6%).	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TABLE 5-19: MISLEADING UNIVERSITY PREMIUM FROM LINEAR MODEL 
 Linear premium Linear premium with 
standard problem added 
Annualised premium 
with standard problem 
Primary school 6.6% 9.9% 1.7% 
Secondary school 6.6% 13.0% 5.9% 
University 6.6% 16.9% 20.6% 
 
 
These results are telling. The left column simply repeats the result from the linear premium, 
which suggests a constant 6.6% premium from any additional years of education, and the 
right column repeats the annualised education premiums as calculated in section 5.4. The 
middle column uses only the linear education estimate, but then intentionally adds the 
problem that exists in the conventional approach to report university premiums. The premium 
for university jumps sharply from 6.6% to 16.9%.  
These results highlight how potentially misleading the conventional approach can be, and 
lends further support to the argument in this section that the reporting of university premiums 
needs to change.  
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Chapter 6: Alternative models of education 
 
The previous chapter presented the results of four variations on the Mincer model (basic, 
L&S, occupation, preferred), where each model kept to the basic Mincer formula of 
regressing log-wages against education, experience, experience squared, and control 
variables. This chapter makes use of some less conventional approaches to modelling 
education.  
At the start of this chapter, section 6.1 looks at two models with slightly different functional 
forms, including one model with a schooling squared variable (which can describe non-
linearity of the education premium) and another model that includes an experience cubed 
variable.  
Section 6.2 of this chapter explores the issue of heterogeneous experience. The non-linearity 
of education premiums is often addressed by introducing education dummy variables, and 
ability endogeneity can be resolved by adding an ability control variable (see section 5.4). 
However, relatively few models attempt to deal with the issue of heterogeneous experience 
premiums. This section will introduce two models with variable experience premiums.  
While the previous sections explored alternative functional forms, they all used ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression. Finally section 6.3 will look at non-OLS options including the 
instrumental variable approach (which is rejected), non-parametric analysis, and Poisson 
regression.  
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6.1 – Education models with modified exponents  
 
The models used in Chapter 5 are representative of standard Mincer models that are widely 
used in the education economics literature. This section will consider two alternatives that are 
less common, and involve slight changes to the functional form. 
 
6.1.1 Education squared model 
The most common way to factor in the non-linearity of education premiums has been to 
include education level dummy variables as used in Chapters 3 and 5. Another option that has 
been used by a few authors (Kilfe, 2007; Diagne & Diene, 2011) is to include education 
squared (ed2) as well as education in the model.  
A positive coefficient for ed2 suggests that the education premium is increasing with 
education, while a negative coefficient suggests that the education premium is decreasing 
with education. If the coefficient is zero then that is evidence for a linear education premium 
as assumed in the basic Mincer model.  
The results reported in the previous chapter showed that the university premium is higher 
than the school premium, therefore it is expected that the result for ed2 will be positive. The 
model used in this section is a modification of the preferred model from section 5.4, with the 
addition of ed2.  
The results are shown in Table 6-1 below. As expected, the coefficient for ed2 is positive with 
a value of 0.3%, and statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. This is further 
evidence that the education premium is non-linear, with an increasing premium for higher 
levels of education. Note that the estimates for all other coefficients are very similar to the 
preferred model, except for the education coefficient, which is almost zero and statistically 
insignificant. When the model included both education and education squared, apparently 
education squared is the variable that drives wages.  
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TABLE 6-1: PREFERRED MODEL WITH ED2 
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -1.743 0.259 99% 
Education 0.007 0.040 Not significant 
Education squared 0.003 0.002 90%  
Experience 0.024 0.019 Not significant (89%) 
Experience squared -0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Female  -0.222 0.074 99% 
Parents’ income 0.088 0.037 99% 
Grades 0.033 0.023 90% 
Urban 0.171 0.090 95% 
 
Sample size 530   
R-squared (adjusted) 0.162   
F-stat 13.81   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.829   
 
 
Based on the average amount of education for each education level, it is possible to calculate 
annualised education premiums for each education level to compare with previous estimates, 
which is done in Table 6-2. The first column of results shows the annualised education 
premiums calculated using education level dummy variables in section 5.4, the second 
column of results shows the annualised premiums based on the coefficient for ed2, and the 
third column of results shows the annualised premiums if the (statistically insignificant) 
education premium of 0.7% is included with the ed2 results22.  
The table shows that the preferred model with the addition of ed2 gives a similar result 
(slightly less convex) compared with the preferred model with education level dummies. The 
results of the ed2 model are (arguably) more in line with expectations, and the ed2 model has 
a marginally higher R2 value, which adds some credibility to this approach.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Note	  that	  including	  the	  coefficient	  for	  education	  involves	  more	  than	  simply	  adding	  that	  coefficient	  to	  the	  
previous	  number.	  The	  coefficient	  of	  a	  continuous	  regressor	  in	  a	  log-­‐linear	  model	  measures	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  
at	  the	  margin,	  so	  to	  calculate	  the	  impact	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  education	  requires	  solving	  the	  model	  for	  
different	  education	  levels,	  and	  then	  deriving	  the	  implied	  growth	  equivalent.	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TABLE 6-2: COMPARING ORIGINAL & ED2 MODEL PREMIUMS 
 Annualised premiums 
with dummy variables 
Annualised premiums 
with ed2 model 
Annualised premiums 
ed2 + educ premium 
Primary school 1.7% 4.2% 5.2% 
Secondary school 5.9% 8.5% 10.1% 
University 20.6% 15.6% 18.5% 
 
One unique feature of the ed2 model is that it can give estimates for the education premium at 
a variety of education levels not explored in the previous models. For instance, using the ed2 
model we can estimate that the basic education received by people who do not graduate 
primary school provides an annual premium of only 1.3% (or 2% when including both the ed 
and ed2 coefficients). At the other end of the scale, assuming that an average masters student 
does an additional two years of study, the ed2 model predicts an annual education premium of 
24.3% (or 29.1%) for their post-graduate study.  
 
6.1.2 Experience cubed model 
Another potential modification to the Mincer functional form (which is found occasionally in 
the literature but is not common) is to replace the experience-squared variable with a higher 
polynomial.   
Both Murphy and Welch (1990) and Lemeiux (2003) claimed that a higher power fit their 
data better than a quadratic. In a recent critique of “the Quadratic Mincer” by Hamlen and 
Hamlen (2012), they claimed that economic theory requires that experience should have a 
third degree polynomial instead of the quadratic used in most models. 
To explore the consequences of this alternative functional form, the linear preferred model 
was run with “experience cubed” (ex3) in place of “experience squared” (ex2). The results of 
the ex2 and ex3 models are compared in Table 6-3.  
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TABLE 6-3: COMPARING PREFERRED MODEL WITH EX3 MODEL 
  
Chapter 5’s “Preferred model”  
(ex2) 
 
 
Variation of preferred model  
(ex3) 
 Value Stand. Dev. Value Stand. Dev. 
Constant -2.010 0.195 -1.993 0.186 
Education  0.066 0.012 0.066 0.012 
Experience** 0.024 0.019 0.021 0.012 
Experience squared -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Female -0.217 0.074 -0.217 0.074 
Parents’ income 0.087 0.037 0.087 0.037 
Grades 0.036 0.023 0.036 0.023 
Urban 0.166 0.090 0.166 0.090 
 
Sample size 530  530  
R squared (adjusted) 0.160  0.160  
F-stat 15.39  15.39  
Root MSE 0.83  0.83  
** The experience coefficient is statistically significant for the ex3 model but not the preferred model. 
 
For the most part, the two models give the same results. For the control variables and the 
education coefficient, the value and standard deviations are identical to three decimal places. 
The constant has increased by less than 1%, which is well within the standard deviation so is 
a statistically insignificant change. Further, the root mean square error (Root MSE), adjusted 
R2 and F-statistic are identical in both models. This should give some comfort to education 
economists that, notwithstanding the theoretical critique, the results of their ex2 models are 
unlikely to be voided by the introduction of the ex3 model.   
There is one difference between the two models worth noting. There is a slight decrease in 
the coefficient for experience, though this change is statistically insignificant. However, the 
experience standard error has reduced noticeably (from 0.019 to 0.012) with the consequence 
being that the coefficient for experience has gone from being insignificant in the normal ex2 
model to being significant with 95% confidence in the ex3 model.   
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When using the non-linear preferred model (with education level dummy variables) with ex2 
replaced by ex3, once again there was nearly no change in the results. The only minor 
variations were the annualised education premiums for high school and university, which 
were 5.9% and 20.6% in the preferred model and 5.8% and 20.5% in the ex3 model, but 
neither change is statistically significant.  
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6.2 – Education models with heterogeneous experience  
 
Many of the concerns raised about the basic Mincer model can be addressed with small 
changes to the functional form and the addition of control variables. Allowing for 
heterogeneous experience premiums not only requires a new model but also requires us to re-
think the transmission mechanism between education and incomes.  
The conventional assumption is that the education premium and experience premium are 
uncorrelated, but there is growing evidence suggesting that the experience premium is higher 
for people with more education (see section 2.1). This is simultaneously one of the most 
economically interesting and yet least commonly addressed topics of education economics, 
with Belzil (2006) noting that it “is practically never discussed in the literature” (p19). This 
section looks at two models that allow for variable experience premiums.  
 
6.2.1 Heterogeneous experience through dummy variables 
To account for the possibility that the experience premium might be dependent on the level of 
education, this model simultaneously estimates four different experience premiums. To 
calculate separate experience premiums, this model makes use of the education level dummy 
variables. Each data point is associated with one of the education dummy variables (none, 
primary, secondary, university) so that each data point in the regression only influences the 
experience coefficient relevant to their level of education.  
When using education level dummy variables to estimate different education premiums (as 
done in Chapters 3 and 5) it was only necessary to use three dummy variables, and the forth 
education level is represented by the situation where all of the dummy variables are zero. In 
contrast, when using the education level dummy variables to estimate different experience 
premiums it is necessary to use four dummy variables, since we need to know four different 
experience coefficients.  
The functional form of the new model is: 
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ln 𝑤 =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑆  +   𝛾!𝐸𝑑!𝐸  +   𝛾!𝐸𝑑!𝐸  + 𝛾!𝐸𝑑!𝐸  + 𝛾! 1− 𝐸𝑑!!!!! 𝐸                        +   𝛿!𝐸𝑑!𝐸! +   𝛿!𝐸𝑑!𝐸! + 𝛿!𝐸𝑑!𝐸! + 𝛿! 1− 𝐸𝑑!!!!! 𝐸! +   𝑒                                        (7) 
 
Where: 
β0 = constant; 
S = years of education; 
β1 = education coefficient; 
Edx = education dummy variables;  
E = years of experience; 
ϒx = experience coefficients at each education level; 
E2 = years of experience squared 
δx = experience squared coefficients at each education level; and 
e = error 
 
The model used in this section is a variation of the linear preferred model (introduced in 
section 5.4), which includes a continuous education variable, and has control variables for 
ability (grades), socio-economic status (parents’ income), gender, and locality (urban/rural). 
The difference is that the variables for experience and experience squared from the preferred 
model are each replaced by four variables, with one for each level of education. Note that to 
measure the experience coefficient for people without any level of education, it is necessary 
to include the variable (1-ΣEdx), since there are only three education dummy variables but 
there are four education levels.  
The data used for this regression includes 174 people who didn’t finish primary school, 111 
who finished primary school, 166 who finished secondary school, and 79 who graduated 
from university (with a total sample size of 530 respondents).  Estimates for the 
heterogeneous experience model are given on Table 6-4 below. 
 
	   102	  
TABLE 6-4: HETEROGENEOUS EXPERIENCE PREFERRED MODEL  
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -2.023 0.260 99% 
Education 0.066 0.018 99% 
Experience (no school) 0.036 0.026 90% 
Experience (primary) 0.023 0.033 Not significant 
Experience (secondary) 0.016 0.037 Not significant 
Experience (university) 0.112 0.058 95% 
Exp^2 (no school) 0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Exp^2 (primary) 0.000 0.002 Not significant 
Exp^2 (secondary) 0.000 0.002 Not significant 
Exp^2 (university) -0.007 0.004 95% 
Female -0.225 0.075 99% 
Parents’ income 0.077 0.038 95% 
Grades 0.034 0.023 90% 
Urban 0.174 0.090 95% 
 
Sample size 530*    
R-squared (adjusted) 0.159   
F-stat 8.71   
Root Mean Square Error 0.83   
* Sample size includes 174 with no education, 111 primary school, 166 secondary school, and 79 university. 
 
Based on the estimated constant, the hypothetical wage for a rural male with no education 
and no experience is $0.13 per hour, which translates to just over $28 per month.  
The most important result in the above table is that the experience premium for university 
graduates is 11.2% and statistically significant. This result is considerably higher than the 
experience premiums for lower levels of education, most of which were statistically 
insignificant. This result is higher than the experience coefficients reported in all other 
models in this thesis (the difference is statistically significant) and also noticeably higher than 
experience coefficients reported elsewhere in the literature. This result lends further weight to 
the argument that the experience premium depends on education, contrary to the assumption 
of the Mincer model.    
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The large experience premium for university graduates, and the low (or non-existent) 
experience premium for non-graduates suggests a fundamentally different wage profile for 
different cohorts of the labour force. The implication is that the wage gap between university 
graduates and non-graduates grows over time, as non-graduates have a fairly constant wage 
over their lifetime while graduates can expect strong wage growth.  
The other results of the model are quite similar to the results of the preferred model. The 
education premium is identical at 6.6%, and still statistically significant with 99% 
confidence. The coefficients for the two dummy control variables (gender and location) are 
slightly higher and the coefficients of the two continuous control variables (grades and 
parents’ income) are slightly lower, but in all cases the change is negligible and not 
statistically significant.  
 
6.2.2 Heterogeneous experience and non-linear education 
The above model kept the standard Mincer assumption of a linear education premium. 
Relaxing this assumption has a different impact depending how it is done. If the education 
premium is replaced with dummy variables for education levels (as done in Chapter 5), then 
the adjusted R2 decreases and the coefficients for nearly all education and experience dummy 
variables become insignificant23. Little can be said about this model. 
Alternatively, if we allow for education non-linearity by including ed2 as a regressor (as done 
in section 6.1), then the adjusted R2, estimated coefficients, and statistical significance remain 
similar to the above linear education model, with the main exception being that education is 
now represented by two variables (ed and ed2). The new ed2 and heterogeneous experience 
model still had a very high experience premium for university graduates at 10.6%, which is 
statistically significant at 95% confidence. The slight change compared to the linear 
education model (10.6% v 11.2%) is not statistically significant. The experience premiums 
for other education levels and other variable coefficients are almost identical. The important 
conclusion here is that relaxing the linear education assumption did not change the 
experience premiums, which still reveals a fundamentally different wage profile for 
university graduates compared with non-graduates.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  one	  statistically	  significant	  coefficient	  was	  for	  university	  education,	  with	  an	  estimate	  of	  0.682	  and	  
standard	  error	  of	  0.349.	  This	  estimate	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  95%	  confidence.	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The remaining variables to consider are education and ed2. Recall that when ed2 was used 
with a conventional Mincer model (which has a homogenous experience premium), the ed2 
variable was the driver of wages while the education variable was nearly zero and statistically 
insignificant (section 6.1). Interestingly, when ed2 is added to the heterogeneous experience 
model, this time it is the ed2 variable that effective disappears (estimate of 0.001 and standard 
error of 0.003). The irrelevance of the ed2 variable suggests that it may be more appropriate 
to use a linear education model.  One interpretation of these results is that the earlier 
conclusion of a convex education premium may actually be a by-product of assuming a single 
experience variable.  
While the ed2 coefficient is effectively zero, the introduction of ed2 to the model causes the 
education coefficient to fall from 0.66 to 0.5 and lose statistical significance. With this new 
functional form, there is an 82% probability that the education coefficient is greater than zero, 
which falls well short of the conventional requirement of 90% probability needed for a 
coefficient to be considered statistically significant. This outcome is the result of 
multicollinearity, with the inclusion of a second education regressor in the model causing the 
standard error for education to increase from 0.018 (without ed2) up to 0.055 (with ed2). 
Consequently, while this non-linear and heterogeneous experience model is theoretically 
interesting, it is less informative than the linear education version, and the weak results do not 
allow for strong conclusions about the relationship between education and wages. 
As a theoretical exercise, it is possible to convert the estimates from the ed2 and 
heterogeneous experience model in the same way as done for the ed2 and homogeneous 
experience model, so as to determine the implicit annualised education premiums at each 
education level. A comparison of the two models is provided in Table 6-5, though again it 
should be noted that the education results for the ed2 and heterogeneous experience model do 
not have statistical significance with the current data, so we cannot draw any conclusions.  
 
TABLE 6-5: ED2 MODEL WITH DIFFERENT EXPERIENCE ASSUMPTIONS 
 Original Ed2 model Ed2 + heterogeneous experience 
Annualised primary school premium 5.2% 8.2% 
Annualised secondary school premium 10.1% 11.6% 
Annualised university premium 18.5% 16.1%* 
* For comparison, the 6.6% linear education premium is equivalent to 16.9% annualised university premium, 
which is measured compared to a “no education” base. See section 5.5 for more details on this issue.   
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Both of the non-linear heterogeneous experience models (ed2 and dummy variables) give 
education premiums that are relatively low and potentially zero.  
While the models don’t provide any helpful information about the education-wage 
relationship, the fact that their education coefficients were so low does tell us something 
about the consequence of allowing multiple experience coefficients, and the next sub-section 
will consider what that information means for education economics.     
 
6.2.3 Interpreting the heterogeneous experience model 
The results of the above heterogeneous experience model challenges the conventional 
wisdom regarding non-linear education models. When the traditional Mincer model relaxes 
the assumption of a linear education premium, the result is a convex education premium. As 
shown in Table 6-2, non-linear education models give relatively higher premiums for 
university education (20.6% using dummy variables and 18.5% using the ed2 model) and 
lower premiums for primary school (1.7% and 5.2% respectively). These results are 
consistent with much of the current Mincer-related literature, but the results in Chapter 5 and 
section 6.1 and the wider literature come from models that use a single experience premium 
for people regardless of their education level.  
Contrary to the common assumption of a single experience premium, there is good reason to 
believe that the university-specific experience premium is meaningfully higher than the 
average experience premium. In light of that difference, if there is no university-related 
variable, then a model that imposes the average experience premium on data for university 
graduates will underestimate the wages of those graduates. However, if there is a university-
related variable, then the coefficient for that variable will be exaggerated to compensate for 
the artificially low experience premium.  
Models that allow non-linear education premiums provide exactly such a university-related 
variable (the university dummy variable or the ed2 variable), and so the expectation should be 
that non-linear education models with homogenous experience premiums have artificially 
high university education premiums, which can only be corrected by introducing a university-
specific experience premium.  
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The heterogeneous experience model used earlier in this section found a university-specific 
experience premium of over 10%, and the difference between that estimate and the 2.4% 
experience premium estimated with the preferred Mincer model is statistically significant.  
When considering the heterogeneous experience model with non-linear education premiums, 
two things become apparent. The first insight is that, when using a model with heterogeneous 
experience premiums, the linear education model is a better fit for the data than the non-linear 
education model. The linear education model gives a higher F-statistic and adjusted R2, a 
lower root MSE, and a greater number of variable coefficients that are statistically 
significant. This was particularly apparent in the case of the ed2 and heterogeneous 
experience model discussed above; where the addition of the ed2 variable achieved nothing 
except to make the model less informative. When the model already allows for heterogeneous 
experience premiums, it is no longer necessary (or helpful) to have non-linear education 
premiums.  
The second insight comes from comparing the non-linear education and heterogeneous 
experience models with the normal non-linear education models. The available results 
reinforce the idea that the normal non-linear education models have over-estimated the 
university education premium. With conventional models that apply the average experience 
premium to all the data, the annualised university premiums were 20.6% using dummy 
variables, and 18.5% using ed2 (Table 6-2). In contrast, when the models allow for a 
university-specific experience premium, the annualised university premiums are 17.2% using 
dummy variables, and nominally 16.1% using ed2, though the ed2 result is not statistically 
significant. For context, a linear education premium of 6.6% is equivalent to an annualised 
university premium of 16.9%,24 so the above results from the non-linear education and 
heterogeneous experience models are effectively in line with the linear education model.  
The lessons from this discussion of heterogeneous experience premiums will be called the 
experience hypothesis (EH), and there are two possible claims that can be made.  
The strong version experience hypothesis (SEH) is the more dramatic and speculative claim, 
which says that the apparent convexity of the education premium in non-linear Mincer 
models is actually the consequence of using an artificially homogeneous experience premium 
in the model, and if heterogeneous experience premiums are included then the education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  convention	  in	  the	  Mincer	  literature	  is	  to	  report	  the	  annualized	  university	  premium	  as	  a	  percentage	  
increase	  over	  a	  “no	  education”	  level,	  which	  exaggerates	  the	  result.	  See	  section	  5.5	  for	  further	  discussion.	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premium will be linear. The above evidence from Cambodian data is consistent with the 
SEH, since the heterogeneous experience model successfully corrects for the apparent 
convexity in the education premium. While the Cambodian data fits the SHE, as a general 
hypothesis this claim is still speculative and needs further testing.  
The weak version experience hypothesis (WEH) makes a more modest and more credible 
claim. The WEH argues that conventional non-linear education models will overestimate the 
university education premium and exaggerate the convexity of the education premium, 
because they use an artificially homogeneous experience premium. Note that the SEH claims 
that a heterogeneous experience model will entirely remove the education premium 
convexity, while the WEH simply claims that the convexity will be reduced.  
Both the strong and the weak versions of the experience hypothesis operate on the 
assumption that the university-specific experience premium is larger than the average 
experience premium. If that assumption is violated then the above conclusions are void, but if 
the assumption is accurate then the experience hypothesis is valid, which represents an 
important shift in the economics of education. As a consequence, it would be necessary to 
rethink the transmission mechanism from education to income, and the change would also 
impact the size of the net present value and rate of return for education.  
 
• Mincer models that allow for non-linear education premiums (but not for 
heterogeneous experience premiums) will over-estimate the university education 
premium and underestimate the experience premium for university graduates. 
Therefore, wage profiles based on standard Mincer models will overestimate early-
career salaries and underestimate late-career salaries. By artificially bringing forward 
the benefit of university education, standard Mincer models will artificially inflate the 
discounted present value and the rate of return on education.  
 
• The reverse is true for primary school graduates: standard Mincer models will 
underestimate the primary school education premium and overestimate their future 
wage growth. The distortion in the wage profile artificially pushes back the benefit of 
primary school education, and so artificially deflates the discounted present value.  
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• At a theoretical level, the transmission mechanism for the impact of education on the 
economy may need to be revised. The argument that education creates skills that have 
immediate value is not fully consistent with the above evidence. Alternative theories 
may be that (1) education teaches people how to learn and solve problems, (2) 
university provides access to jobs that have high productivity growth and/or 
additional training, (3) university provides networks and/or credentials that help with 
future promotions, (4) university provides the motivation for people to work harder, 
(5) and of course the perennial concern that university is correlated with ability and it 
is actually ability that is the main variable that explains future wage growth. This 
thesis does not offer an opinion on which of the above theories are more likely. 
 
The heterogeneous experience model may help us to better understand the nature and size of 
the benefit from education. If the experience hypothesis is correct, then models that ignore 
variation in the experience premium (such as the conventional Mincer model) will exaggerate 
the convexity of the education premium, which may produce misleading results. The model 
used in this section is one possible solution, and further experiments are suggested.   
 
6.2.4 Two-Tier experience (Andini) model  
This section has concentrated on the above “heterogeneous experience model” but there is 
more than one way to factor in variable experience premiums.  
One of the few attempts to address the relationship between education and experience was 
provided by Andini (2006) and discussed in section 2.1 above. In his article, Andini outlines 
the idea that observed earnings may be less than education-appropriate earnings due to 
inefficiencies in the labour market that artificially depress wages for people with little or no 
experience. Over time the wage shortfall will be corrected, which will show up in the data as 
a benefit from experience but is actually a delayed benefit from education. While Andini does 
not propose the addition of a new explanatory variable to the standard Mincer model to 
capture this phenomenon, the idea is worth exploring.  
Since this proposed new variable is attempting to capture a delayed education benefit that 
will be most prominent in the first few years of experience, it needs to increase (sharply) with 
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education and decrease (sharply) with experience. After trialling a range of alternatives25, the 
proposed variable (called “Andini”) that is used in the below model is: 
 
Andini = !!!!!! /100                                                                                                                  (8) 
 
Dividing !"!!"!  by 100 was done for convenience of data presentation. Adding the extra Andini 
variable to the preferred model gives the results described in Table 6-6. Compared to the 
preferred model, this Two-Tier Experience Model provides very similar coefficient estimates, 
most with slightly higher statistical significance, and a marginally higher adjusted R2 value.  
 
TABLE 6-6: PREFERRED MODEL WITH EXTRA “ANDINI” VARIABLE 
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -2.003 0.195 99% 
Education  0.063 0.011 99% 
Experience 0.024 0.021 Not significant (87%) 
Experience squared -0.000 0.001 Not significant 
Andini 0.027 0.028 Not significant (83%) 
Female -0.201 0.073 99% 
Parents’ income 0.086 0.037 99% 
Grades 0.038 0.022 95% 
Urban 0.179 0.089 95% 
 
Sample size 530   
R squared (adjusted) 0.164   
F-stat 13.91   
Root Mean Square Error 0.815   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Several	  functional	  forms	  were	  tried	  with	  different	  combinations	  of	  education	  and	  experience	  raised	  to	  
various	  powers.	  Some	  combinations	  were	  rejected	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  economic	  significance.	  Others	  were	  rejected	  
because	  they	  gave	  implausible	  results.	  The	  preferred	  alternatives	  were	  ed/ex2,	  ed2/ex2	  and	  ed3/ex2.	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The estimate for the Andini coefficient is 0.027, but it is not statistically significant. There is 
an 83% probability that the coefficient is greater than zero, which falls well short of the 
conventional requirement of 90% probability before we can be confident of significance. The 
inclusion of the Andini variable causes some changes to other coefficients; most obviously 
the education premium is now 6.3% instead of 6.6% as reported in the preferred model, 
though this difference is not statistically significant. It makes theoretically sense that the 
inclusion of Andini would change the education coefficient since the Andini coefficient is 
designed to be an indirect measure of the education premium. 
The lack of statistical significance means that the Andini model cannot provide any 
conclusions regarding the current data, and if the model is to prove useful it will need to be 
tested against another data set. While we cannot draw any conclusions from these results, as a 
theoretical exercise we can consider the impact that an Andini coefficient could have on the 
wage profile for a university graduate (Table 6-7) and a school graduate (Table 6-8), with the 
“perceived experience premium” combining the experience and Andini premiums.  
 
TABLE 6-7: EXPERIENCE, ANDINI, AND PERCEIVED EXPERIENCE FOR 
UNIVERSITY GRADUATES 
 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5 Yr 6 Yr 7 Yr 8 Yr 9 Yr 10 
Experience 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
Andini 6.8% 1.7% 0.8% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Experience* 9.2% 4.1% 3.1% 2.8% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 
* Perceived experience premium based on the combination of experience and Andini coefficients. Numbers may 
not add due to rounding.  
 
 
TABLE 6-8: EXPERIENCE, ANDINI, AND PERCEIVED EXPERIENCE FOR HIGH 
SCHOOL GRADUATES 
 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5 Yr 6 Yr 7 Yr 8 Yr 9 Yr 10 
Experience 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
Andini 3.8% 1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0% 0% 
Experience* 6.2% 3.3% 2.8% 2.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
* Perceived experience premium based on the combination of experience and Andini coefficients. Numbers may 
not add due to rounding.  
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Interpreting these theoretical (bust statistically insignificant) results, the Andini model 
suggests that a university graduate could expect to see a “perceived experience premium” of 
9.2% in the first year, which is made up of 2.4% that is actually the return on experience, in 
addition to another 6.8% that is interpreted as a delayed return on education. That university 
graduate would then face a perceived experience premium of 4.1%, 3.1%, and 2.8% in the 
following years, and within 10 years the delayed education premium (Andini premium) 
would have diminished to effectively zero, and their perceived experience premium would be 
made up of only the actual experience premium. The story is similar for high school students, 
except the Andini premium is smaller.  
Unfortunately, the results for the Andini model were not sufficiently robust to allow any 
actual conclusions about the relationship between education, experience, and wages, but the 
model is presented here as a suggestion that may prove more effective with another data set.  
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 6.3 – Alternatives to OLS regression 
 
The final education models to consider take an approach other than ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Using Instrumental Variables was considered but then rejected for both theoretical 
and data reasons. A non-parametric analysis provides results that can be compared to the 
OLS results. Finally, there is a reasonable argument that all of the above OLS regressions 
should be replaced by Poisson regressions.  
 
6.3.1 Instrumental variable (IV) approach 
A common concern with studying the economics of education is the possibility of ability 
endogeneity. Including an ability control variable is one way to address this concern (as done 
in the preferred model), and another approach is to replace “schooling” with an instrumental 
variable (IV) that is correlated with schooling but uncorrelated with ability. 
As discussed in section 2.1, there are good theoretical reasons to be sceptical of the IV 
approach to education economics, especially if there is a non-linear relationship between 
education and wages, as found in most of the above models. The preferred approach for this 
study is not to use IV. Nonetheless, the survey data did include questions that were thought to 
be potentially useful as instrumental variables, including “distance from school” and 
“spouse’s education”. Ultimately, both of these variables were poorly correlated with 
education, and nor were there any other appropriate IVs in the data set. While data limitations 
did not allow an IV regression, this is not considered a significant loss.   
 
6.3.2 Non-parametric analysis 
The next alternative that will be considered is to abandon any parametric modification of the 
Mincer equation and instead use non-parametric analysis. The obvious benefit of using a non-
parametric approach is that it removes any concerns about incorrect parameter specification.  
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Since the non-parametric approach requires an exponentially increasing sample size to cope 
with additional explanatory variables, it was necessary to restrict the analysis to only the most 
basic variables. Limiting the analysis to just education and experience, the result was an 
estimate for the average derivative of log wages with regards to schooling, and with regards 
to experience. These statistics are analogous to the schooling coefficient and the experience 
coefficient. The results from non-parametric analysis were: 
• Estimated schooling premium of 6.3% 
• Estimated experience premium of 5.3% 
 
The difference between the 6.3% schooling premium reported here and the 6.6% schooling 
premium found in the preferred model is not statistically significant, but the difference 
between this estimate and the 8.6% schooling premium found using the basic model (which 
used the same variables as used here) is statistically significant. The school premium is 
exactly the same as the result found in the Two-Tier Experience (Andini) Model from section 
6.2, which was one of the models that allowed for variation in the experience premium. It is 
possible that the restrictive assumptions about the experience premium in normal Mincer 
specification might cause a relatively higher education premium. 
Other studies have also reported finding relatively lower premiums while using a non-
parametric approach. Mariotti and Meinecke (2009) found the same thing in their study of 
South Africa and concluded that the parametric estimates are “severely upwards biased” (p1). 
They attribute the difference to unobserved heterogeneity within parametric estimates.  
 
6.3.3 Replacing log-linear OLS with Poisson regression 
As suggested by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and less formally by Gould (2011), an alternative 
to the log-linear approach used by Mincer is the Poisson regression. It is claimed that this 
approach has the potential to provide more accurate results without exposing the model to 
any inappropriate additional assumptions, so long as the regression specifies that the 
variance-covariance matrix of the estimates be estimated using the Huber/White/Sandwich 
linearized estimator (Gould, 2011).  
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Since most education economics is conducted using OLS regression, the above results have 
likewise been based on OLS to allow for comparisons, and it is the OLS results that will be 
used for the analysis in later chapters. Though for completeness, all of the above regressions 
were also run using the Poisson regression, which has sometimes provided coefficient 
estimates with greater statistical significance. Using the Poisson regression with the preferred 
model gives the results in Table 6-9. 
 
TABLE 6-9: POISSON REGRESSION OF PREFERRED MODEL 
 Value Standard error Confidence level 
Constant -1.712 0.190 99% 
Education 0.050 0.010 99% 
Experience 0.032 0.021 90% 
Experience squared -0.001 0.001 Not significant (85%) 
Female -0.201 0.077 99% 
Parents’ income 0.037 0.017 95% 
Grades 0.042 0.023 95% 
Urban 0.329 0.101 99% 
 
Sample size 530   
R2 equivalent 0.042   
Wald chi 187.46   
 
 
When compared with the OLS regression of the preferred model, there are a few clear 
differences. The Poisson education coefficient is lower than the OLS estimate (0.05 v 0.066) 
and the difference is statistically significant. The difference between the Poisson experience 
coefficient and the OLS experience coefficient (0.032 v 0.024) is not statistically significant, 
but it is noteworthy that the Poisson experience coefficient is statistically significant while 
the OLS estimate narrowly fails to reach significance at 90% confidence.  
Compared with OLS, Poisson had marginally higher coefficients for urbanity and grades and 
marginally lower coefficients for gender and parents’ income, though in all cases the 
differences are not statistically significant. Compared to the non-linear preferred model, the 
Poisson regression gives a noticeably different result, as shown in Table 6-10. 
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TABLE 6-10: COMPARING OLS AND POISSON EDUCATION PREMIUMS 
 OLS POISSON 
Complete primary school 1.7% 4.1% 
Complete secondary school 5.9% 1.0% 
Graduate university 20.6% 14.4% 
 
 
These results – lower education premiums (very low for secondary school) and a higher 
experience premium – are consistent themes of the Poisson regression vis-à-vis the OLS 
approach. The one exception is with the expanded data set, where the Poisson regression 
finds a marginally higher education premium, though the difference is not statistically 
significant. As noted in the discussion of the OLS results (section 5.1), there are reasons to be 
sceptical of the data quality in the expanded data set.  
The higher experience premium means that the Poisson regression sometimes finds a 
statistically significant experience coefficient where the OLS approach does not. For 
example, in the Heterogeneous Experience Model the Poisson regression found a greater 
number of statistically significant experience coefficients, and of the coefficients that were 
already significant with OLS, the Poisson estimates were at a higher level of significance. 
Also, in the non-linear Two-Tier Experience (Andini) Model, the Poisson approach estimated 
statistically significant coefficients for most variables (including experience and the “Andini” 
variable), with the exception of primary school education. 
For the university-specific models, the Poisson regression actually reversed the outcome 
regarding UME and other universities (annualised premium of 14.6% v 14%), though once 
again the difference between universities was not statistically significant.  
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Chapter 7: Rate of return for Cambodian education    
 
The previous chapters have used over a dozen different education models to estimate the 
education premium, which is the link between years of education and wages. It is important 
to recognise that the education premium is not necessarily the same thing as the rate of return 
on education. The rate of return (RR) or internal rate of return (IRR) measures the benefit as 
an annualised percentage return on the cost of the investment. For example, if an investment 
of $100 paid out a total of $120 after one year then the rate of return is 20%. The education 
premium is a measure of benefit, but to calculate the rate of return it is necessary to also 
factor in costs, including tuition fees, taxes, and forgone income. Under some strict 
assumptions, the Mincer education premium can be taken as a proxy for the rate of return 
(Card, 1999), but those assumptions are not appropriate in the case of Cambodia, or indeed 
for most countries (Heckman et al., 2003).  
This chapter will calculate (for the first time) the rate of return on education in Cambodia. In 
addition, the Net President Value (NPV) and Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) will also be reported.  
The calculations reported in this chapter are the “private rate of return”, which measures the 
benefits and costs from the perspective of the student. Since most university students do not 
receive a government subsidy26 and income taxes are weakly enforced, the private rate of 
return on university education will be a close approximation for the social rate of return. For 
school education there is a small government subsidy, and so the public rate of return for 
schooling will be slightly lower than the results reported herein.  
Section 7.1 will present the assumptions and sensitivity range, and section 7.2 will report the 
average IRR based on the education premium derived from the preferred Mincer model, 
along with sensitivity analysis. Section 7.3 will report the rate of return separately for each 
level of education, and section 7.4 will calculate the net present value of a Cambodian 
university degree.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  While	  there	  are	  many	  “public	  universities”,	  these	  often	  operate	  as	  businesses,	  with	  little	  government	  
support	  and	  similar	  fees	  to	  private	  universities.	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7.1 – Assumptions and sensitivity range 
 
The key inputs into the IRR calculations are the education premium and the experience 
premium, as calculated in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The base case scenario will use the premiums from the preferred model (section 5.4), which 
means an average education premium of 6.6% and an annualised university premium of 
20.6% (when reported the conventional way). Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 provide some context 
about the range of estimates for the education premium.  
Since the education model included a series of control variables it is also necessary to specify 
the characteristics of our hypothetical average person. In the case of “parents’ income” the 
base case assumes $100/month and for “grades” the base case applies to an average student 
scoring 50/100. The base case locality is set as “urban” and results will be provided 
separately for both men and women.  
 
TABLE 7-1: EDUCATION PREMIUMS USING RCES DATA 
 Average premium  Annualised university premium 
Basic Mincer 8.6% 31.9%* 
Basic (expanded data set) 5.2% 22.4% 
Copy L&S model  7.4% 25.1%* 
Copy Kifle model 5.0%+ 12.8% 
Preferred model 6.6% 20.6% 
Ed2 model 9.2%+ 16.4% 
Exp3 model 6.6% 20.5% 
Heterogeneous experience 6.6% 17.2%* 
Hetero experience & Ed2  6.7%+ 7.3%* 
Andini model 6.3% 19.1%* 
Non-parametric  6.3% n/a 
Poisson 5.0% 14.4% 
* Not previously reported. 
+ These models did not have an average premium. Used the estimated premium for high school instead.  
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TABLE 7-2: EDUCATION PREMIUM USING CSES DATA 
 Average premium  Annualised university 
premium 
Lall & Sakallariou 1997 (men) 3.3% 11.1%* 
Lall & Sakallariou 1997 (women) 1.7% 0.4%* 
Lall & Sakallariou 2004 (men) 7.2% 31.2%* 
Lall & Sakallariou 2004 (women) 7.1% 38.6%* 
Lall & Sakallariou 2007 (men) 6.6% 26.6%* 
Lall & Sakallariou 2007 (women) 6.8% 28.7%* 
Copy L&S 2010 (men) 8.3% 40.9% 
Copy L&S 2010 (women) 6.9% 34.8% 
* Not as reported by Lall & Sakallariou. Recalculated in Chapter 3.  
 
Assumptions about costs are crucial. To be exact, the internal rate of return (IRR) is the 
discount rate that ensures a time series of benefits and costs will sum to zero and if there is no 
cost then an IRR cannot be calculated. The cost of education includes the tuition fees, but the 
larger cost is often the amount of income forgone if a person does not work while they study. 
One of the most important assumptions required in IRR calculations relates to the amount of 
income that a student might be able to earn during their years of education, and 
Psacharopoulos (1994) identifies this issue as being one of the main complicating factors 
when comparing between different studies.    
In the case of Cambodia, the tuition fees for education ranges from about $50 per year for 
primary school up to $1000 per year (or more) for postgraduate university. While the prices 
are constantly changing, a price range of $50 to $200 for school and $200 to $500 for 
university represents a reasonable range, with $100 and $300 used in the base case27. The rate 
of return is also influenced by the timeframe of the analysis. For Cambodia the most common 
age of retirement is still 55, though this has been trending upwards and some civil servants 
now have a retirement age of 60 or 65. The base case will assume a retirement age of 60. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  price	  of	  education	  is	  generally	  higher	  in	  Phnom	  Penh	  compared	  to	  the	  regions.	  
The	  data	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  collected	  from	  two	  regional	  cities	  where	  education	  costs	  are	  relatively	  lower	  
than	  the	  capital.	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The final variable that should be added is an estimate for the amount of productivity growth 
in the economy. As discussed in sub-section 2.1.6, one of the critiques of the Mincer 
framework is that it does not factor in uncertainty or economic growth. While we cannot 
easily incorporate uncertainty into this analysis (see sub-section 8.4.3 for more on risk), it is 
possible to factor in growth by adding an annual growth premium.  
Making assumptions about 50 years of future economic growth is of course very speculative, 
and the estimates used will only be a rough (and artificially linear) approximation of what is 
going to happen. Having said that, it is still better to include an estimate for economic 
growth. The option of ignoring economic growth does not resolve the problem, and is 
equivalent to assuming that economic growth will be consistently zero. If anything, that 
assumption (implicit through inaction) is far more controversial and almost certainly less 
accurate that factoring in some amount of economic growth.  
The World Bank (2013) reports that Cambodia has had economic growth between 5% and 
13% since they started gathering data in 1994. The average over that time period is 7.8%, the 
average over the last ten years has been 8.0%, and the growth rate for 2011 was reported as 
7.1%, though it would be a brave analyst to assume that these rates of economic growth 
would continue uninterrupted for the next 50 years. According to the CIA World Fact book, 
for the last 15 years the level of real GDP growth around the world has been consistently 
between 2% and 5% except for the -0.7% reported in 2009 following the North Atlantic 
banking crisis (sometimes called the “Global Financial Crisis”). It should also be recognised 
that productivity improvements will impact on different sectors in different ways and don’t 
represent a perfect proxy for wage growth. The base case used in this chapter assumes a 
relatively modest 2% productivity growth. 
Another impact that would be included in a perfect analysis is a measure of the pleasure or 
pain that a student receives from studying. This factor should not be overlooked when 
evaluating student choice, but lack of reliable information and individual diversity means that 
it is ignored in any formal approach. 
The above set of assumptions are considered reasonable, but any analysis of this complexity 
requires a range of sensitivity analysis, both so that we can test the importance of the 
assumption, and so that the astute reader can draw their own conclusions based on their 
preferred set of assumptions. The below Table 7-3 summarises the base case assumptions and 
the range over which we provide sensitivity analysis. 
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TABLE 7-3: ASSUMPTIONS AND SENSITIVITY RANGE 
 Base case  Sensitivity range 
Education premium 6.6% 5% to 9% 
University premium 20.6% 15% to 25% 
Location Urban Rural 
Grades 50/100 0/100 to 100/100 
Parents’ income $100/m $0/m to $5000/m 
School fees $100 $50 to $200 
University fees $300 $200 to $500 
Child labour Part-time for older children Variable 
University student labour Part-time work for 2 years Variable 
Productivity growth 2% 0% to 5% 
Retirement age 60 40 to 70 
 
Obviously it is not possible to provide a full matrix to show the results from all permutations. 
Due to their importance and variability, a sensitivity range for tuition fees and labour 
assumptions will be included in every answer. Other variations will be considered 
individually. Note that considering the changes for different sensitivity tests are not 
necessarily additive. This chapter includes many different estimates, and for any additional 
variations feel free to contact the author.  
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7.2 – Average Rate of Return for education in Cambodia 
 
Even if we assume a constant education premium of 6.6%, the rate of return for one 
additional year of study still depends on whether it is a school year or a university year. An 
obvious reason is the difference between tuition fees, but even if they are held constant the 
results are slightly different because of the change in the timing of when a person begins their 
working life, and their starting wage. The hypothetical situation considered in this section 
includes the school price range of $50 to $200 (which crosses over with some of the cheaper 
universities) and assumes the person in question has a full working life in front of them.  
The results are reported separately for men and women. In addition to the three different 
prices for education, the tables also include three different assumptions about whether the 
students are working while they study.  
 
 TABLE 7-4: RATE OF RETURN FOR ONE YEAR OF HIGH SCHOOL (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Not working 7.1% 6.8% 6.3% 
PT work (1/2 wage) 11.0% 10.3% 9.1% 
FT work (full wage) 40.5% 26.9% 17.9% 
 
 
TABLE 7-5: RATE OF RETURN FOR ONE YEAR OF HIGH SCHOOL (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Not working 7.0% 6.7% 6.0% 
PT work (1/2 wage) 10.8% 9.9% 8.6% 
FT work (full wage) 35.5% 23.6% 15.6% 
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The most common assumption in education economics is that a student will not be working 
while they are studying, but they will be working if they are not studying. This assumption 
(along with many others) is implicit whenever the education premium is reported as being the 
same as the rate of return. As highlighted in the above tables, this assumption proves to be 
very important.  
Focusing on the base case tuition scenarios ($100/year in the middle column), if we assume 
no work while studying then the rate of return from doing an extra year at high school is 
6.8% for men and 6.7% for women28. For sake of brevity and clarity, the discussion of 
variations will focus on the result for men, though the same logic applies for both men and 
women.  
If a male student is facing the choice between starting work immediately or deferring work 
for one year so that they can study, then their expected rate of return on their education is 
6.8%. However, if the student is able to pursue part-time work while they study (or if their 
counter-factual scenario is that they will only do part-time work if they are not studying) then 
their rate of return increases to 10.3%. More dramatically, if the student is able to do full time 
work while they study (or if the counter factual involves being unemployed) then their rate of 
return from education is 26.9%.  
The difference between these results and the plausibility of each of the scenarios highlights 
the importance of providing a range of results instead of reporting a single rate of return. Any 
single figure will hide half the story and will be very misleading for people whose life 
situation differs from the assumptions of the modeller.  
The base case assumption is for PT work, which will be accurate either when a student is able 
to continue with part time work as they study or (perhaps more importantly) in the situation 
where a person who drops out of school is only able to find part time work during the time 
they would otherwise be studying. So if a single answer must be given, then the average rate 
of return for one year of study (the first time such a number has been calculated for 
Cambodia) is 10.3% for men and 9.9% for women.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  genders	  here	  (and	  throughout	  this	  chapter)	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  negative	  coefficient	  
for	  the	  female	  dummy	  variable	  found	  in	  the	  education	  models.	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But perhaps the more important lesson from these results is that an additional year of study 
can make economic sense for some students (either those who are able to work while 
studying, or those who would not be able to work anyway) while being a bad investment for 
others (who have an alternative job offer which is not available if they study). Telling 
students a single number without factoring in their circumstance may do them a disservice by 
providing inaccurate signals.  
 
7.2.1 Sensitivity analysis: education premiums 
The preferred model estimated an education premium of 6.6% for every year of study. As 
outlined in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 there is a range of other estimates of the education premium 
based on different data or different models (or both).  
Of the 20 estimates in those tables, twelve are within the relatively small range of 6.3% to 
7.2%, including five of the models using CSES data, as well as the non-parametric estimate, 
and most of the models that include appropriate control variables.  
From among the five low estimates, two come from 1997 CSES data, and appear to be 
outliers in the context of the later 2004 and 2007 CSES results. The most interesting of the 
low estimates comes from the Poisson regression, which uses appropriate control variables 
and reports an education premium of 5%. Of the three high estimates, one of those is for the 
basic mincer model with no control variables (8.6%), and another is not actually an education 
premium but rather is the inferred high school premium in a non-linear model (9.2%). The 
most convincing high estimate comes from using a version of the L&S model on 2010 CSES 
data which gives an education premium of 8.3%.  
One standard deviation around the estimate gives a range from 5.5% to 7.8%. The range used 
for the below sensitivity is from 5% to 9%.  
Tables 7-6 and 7-7 still provide several options for the cost of tuition (from $50 to $200), but 
for all alternatives it is now assumed that the student is able to work part-time, or that in the 
counter-factual they are only working part time.  
 
 
	   124	  
TABLE 7-6: IRR SENSITIVITY: DIFFERENT PREMIUMS (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Premium = 5% 8.2% 7.6% 6.7% 
Premium = 6% 9.9% 9.2% 8.2% 
Premium = 6.6% 11.0% 10.3% 9.1% 
Premium = 7% 11.6% 10.8% 9.6% 
Premium = 8% 13.2% 12.3% 10.9% 
Premium = 9% 14.8% 13.8% 12.2% 
 
TABLE 7-7: IRR SENSITIVITY: DIFFERENT PREMIUMS (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Premium = 5% 8.0% 7.4% 6.3% 
Premium = 6% 9.7% 8.9% 7.7% 
Premium = 6.6% 10.8% 9.9% 8.6% 
Premium = 7% 11.4% 10.5% 9.0% 
Premium = 8% 13.0% 11.9% 10.3% 
Premium = 9% 14.5% 13.3% 11.5% 
 
Minor variations in the education premium do not have a large impact on the reported rate of 
return. If we consider the return (for men) over the premium range of 6-7% then the rate of 
return is between 9.2% and 10.8%. Using the lowest estimate (premium of 5% from the 
Poisson regression) gives a rate of return of 7.6% for men and 7.4% for women.  
 
7.2.2 Sensitivity analysis: Productivity growth 
As discussed in section 7.1, incorporating productivity growth into the analysis can be 
problematic since it involves assumptions about the trajectory of the economy up to 50 years 
into the future. Excluding a productivity assumption is not an option, since the lack of an 
adjustment is implicitly an assumption of zero growth. 
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The base case used an assumption of 2% average growth, and this sub-section will consider 
the consequence of productivity growth ranging between 0% and 5%.  
 
TABLE 7-8: IRR SENSITIVITY: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Productivity = 0% 10.3% 9.3% 7.9% 
Productivity = 1% 10.6% 9.8% 8.5% 
Productivity = 2% 11.0% 10.3% 9.1% 
Productivity = 3% 11.5% 10.8% 9.7% 
Productivity = 4% 12.0% 11.4% 10.4% 
Productivity = 5% 12.6% 12.1% 11.2% 
 
 
TABLE 7-9: IRR SENSITIVITY: PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Productivity = 0% 10.0% 8.9% 7.3% 
Productivity = 1% 10.4% 9.4% 7.9% 
Productivity = 2% 10.8% 9.9% 8.6% 
Productivity = 3% 11.3% 10.5% 9.3% 
Productivity = 4% 11.9% 11.2% 10.0% 
Productivity = 5% 12.5% 11.8% 10.7% 
 
 
Varying the assumptions about productivity growth does not drastically alter the rate of 
return on education. If productivity growth is half of the expected rate (1%) then the return on 
education is still 9.8% for men and 9.4% for women, while if growth continues at a rate 
similar to recent years (5%) then the return on education could be 12.1% for men and 11.8% 
for women. These results are sufficiently close to the original estimates that we can be 
confident that the original results are not being driven by long-term assumptions about 
productivity growth.   
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7.2.3 Sensitivity analysis: Control variables 
The remaining assumptions relate to the control variables in the original model, including 
locality (urban or rural), the student’s school grades (out of 100) and their parents’ income. 
The base case was for somebody from the city with grades of 50/100 and parents’ income of 
$100 per month. In this sub-section we will vary those assumptions.  
None of these control variables has a large impact on the results. As expected, the return on 
education for people in rural areas in marginally lower since the education premium is being 
applied to a lower base; though change is small (-0.3% for men and -0.2% for women).  
Interestingly, varying the school grades has nearly no impact on the rate of return. In a way, 
this too is to be expected since the education premium is meant to be measuring the value of 
the extra skills gained while studying, abstracted from any innate ability that a person may 
possess. Grades varying within a common range (from 30 to 70) had nearly no impact, while 
even the extreme positions (with grades 0 and 100) made very little difference.  
 
TABLE 7-10: IRR SENSITIVITY: CONTROL VARIABLES (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Base case 11.0% 10.3% 9.1% 
Location = rural 10.8% 10.0% 8.7% 
 
Grades = 0/100 10.9% 10.0% 8.8% 
Grades = 30/100 10.9% 10.2% 9.0% 
Grades = 70/100 11.0% 10.3% 9.2% 
Grades = 100/100 11.1% 10.4% 9.3% 
 
Parents’ income = $0 10.9% 10.1% 8.9% 
Parents’ income = $500/m 11.2% 10.6% 9.6% 
Parents’ income = $1000/m 11.3% 10.9% 10.1% 
Parents’ income = $5000/m 11.7% 11.5% 11.1% 
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TABLE 7-11: IRR SENSITIVITY: CONTROL VARIABLES (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Base case 10.8% 9.9% 8.6% 
Location = rural 10.6% 9.7% 8.2% 
 
Grades = 0/100 10.6% 9.7% 8.2% 
Grades = 30/100 10.7% 9.8% 8.5% 
Grades = 70/100 10.8% 10.0% 8.7% 
Grades = 100/100 10.9% 10.1% 8.9% 
 
Parents’ income = $0 10.7% 9.8% 8.4% 
Parents’ income = $500/m 11.0% 10.3% 9.2% 
Parents’ income = $1000/m 11.2% 10.6% 9.7% 
Parents’ income = $5000/m 11.6% 11.4% 11.0% 
 
Varying the parents’ income had more of an impact on the results, though again the change 
was not large. A man whose parents have no income can expect a return on education of 
10.1% while the same person with parents who earn $1000 per month (which is a good 
income in Cambodia) can expect a return of 10.9%, and even a child of parents who earn 
$5000 per month can only expect a marginally higher return of 11.5%.  
A large difference between the return on education based on grades or parents’ income might 
present some difficult moral questions. If the return on education is 20% for people with rich 
parents but only 5% for people with poor parents, then what is the best investment for 
society? Thankfully the above results suggest that we do not face that moral dilemma, and the 
return on education is broadly similar for people from all different backgrounds.  
 
7.2.4 Sensitivity analysis: year of study 
To estimate the rate of return on education it is necessary to choose a representative situation, 
and the situation used for the above analysis is for a person deciding whether or not to 
continue with their high school study. We now look at other scenarios. 
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In this variation, the hypothetical student is the same in every way except that they have 
already graduated from high school and they are making decisions about whether or not to 
complete one more year of tertiary study. Recall that we are using a linear education premium 
(6.6%) for all of these examples, so any difference is not created by a difference in the 
effectiveness of education between levels (that comparison will be done in the next section).   
Also, this analysis makes the unrealistic assumption that the tuition fees remain constant, so 
any difference is not created by differences in the cost of education. For a more complete 
analysis of the rate of return on university study see section 7.3 below.  
 
 TABLE 7-12: IRR SENSITIVITY: LEVEL OF EDUCATION (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Base case (high school) 11.0% 10.3% 9.1% 
First year university 11.0% 10.4% 9.4% 
First year postgrad 11.1% 10.3% 9.3% 
 
 
TABLE 7-13: IRR SENSITIVITY: LEVEL OF EDUCATION (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
Base case (high school) 10.8% 9.9% 8.6% 
First year university 10.9% 10.1% 8.8% 
First year postgrad 10.8% 10.1% 8.9% 
 
 
The first row shows the base case for reference. The second row shows the situation for 
somebody who has just graduated school and considering whether to begin work or attend 
university while working part time, and the third row is for somebody who has just graduated 
university and is considering whether to begin work or start postgraduate study while 
working part time.  
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All scenarios give similar results, and in some cases the results are identical. The similarity is 
to be expected since all scenarios are considering the impact of the same education premium. 
The remaining differences can be explained by (1) slight changes in the starting wage based 
on assumed previous education, and (2) the change in the length of the working life based on 
the different ages associated with the different education levels.  
 
7.2.5 Sensitivity analysis: Retirement and mature age students 
The final parameter that can be varied relates to the length of a person’s working life. In the 
base case, working age is assumed to be from 18 until 60, though there is provision for 
people working before they are 18 (depending on their study situation).  
There are several ways that this assumption may not be accurate. Perhaps the most obvious is 
that different industries (and different people) have different retirement ages, and it is 
possible that the retirement age could be quite different in 50 years time. It is worth noting 
that the most common retirement age in Cambodia has historically been 55, though a growing 
number of people are choosing to work beyond that point. Another issue that can impact on 
the length of a person’s working life is death. While death is probably a sufficient 
disincentive in itself, as if to rub salt into the wounds it can also turn a profitable investment 
in education into a poor investment.  
A final issue that can impact on the length of the relevant work life is the possibility that a 
student may start their study later in life. While most university students in Cambodia come 
straight from high school (or after a one year delay) there is also a cohort of students who 
return to study after an extended break.  
Several different scenarios are modelled below in tables 7-14 and 7-15, with the base case 
including 43 years of active adulthood (from age 18-60 inclusive) but sensitivity analysis 
considering some longer and shorter options.   
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 TABLE 7-14: IRR SENSITIVITY: LENGTH OF WORK LIFE (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
23 year adult work life (40) 8.9% 8.0% 6.5% 
33 year adult work life (50) 10.5% 9.7% 8.4% 
38 year adult work life (55) 10.8% 10.0% 8.8% 
43 year adult work life (60) 11.0% 10.3% 9.1% 
48 year adult work life (65) 11.1% 10.4% 9.3% 
53 year adult work life (70) 11.2% 10.5% 9.4% 
 
TABLE 7-15: IRR SENSITIVITY: LENGTH OF WORK LIFE (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $100 $200 
23 year adult work life (40) 8.7% 7.6% 5.8% 
33 year adult work life (50) 10.2% 9.3% 7.8% 
38 year adult work life (55) 10.6% 9.7% 8.3% 
43 year adult work life (60) 10.8% 9.9% 8.6% 
48 year adult work life (65) 10.9% 10.1% 8.8% 
53 year adult work life (70) 11.0% 10.2% 8.9% 
 
 
The number in brackets represents the age of retirement (or death) for a person who joins the 
workforce at age 18. Extending the working life beyond 43 years does little to change the rate 
of return, with an extra 10 years only increasing the male rate of return from 10.3% to 10.5%. 
A shorter working life has a more noticeable impact, but changes of fewer than 10 years still 
produce only a modest change in return. For those looking to learn new skills in their mid-
late 30s or somebody whose working career is cut in half, the return drops to 8% for men and 
7.6% for women.   
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7.3 – Rate of return for each education level 
  
The previous section used the average education premium to calculate the average rate of 
return on education. Previous chapters also estimated the education premium for each level of 
education, and this section will use that information to calculate the rate of return for each 
different level of education -- specifically the return on finishing primary school, finishing 
secondary school, and finishing university.  
While the annualised education premiums can be reported in different ways, the premium 
shown in the first column of Table 7-16 uses the conventional approach (see section 5.5 for 
discussion). The final two columns show the rates of return for men and women for each 
level of education.  
 
TABLE 7-16: PREMIUMS AND RETURNS FOR EACH LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
 Annual premium*  Rate of return (men) Rate of return (women) 
Finish primary 1.7% 16.4% 14.1% 
Finish secondary 5.9% 15.5% 14.3% 
Finish university 20.6% 14.1% 13.5% 
* Using the Kennedy transformation, measures the premium over a “no education” base.  
 
It is noteworthy that while the premiums show a convex relationship between education and 
wages (increasing returns), the rate of return is almost linear and marginally concave for men 
(decreasing returns). This finding goes to the heart of an ongoing debate within the literature 
on education economics about whether it is best to invest in early education or university. 
The early literature reported decreasing marginal returns on education while the more recent 
literature has found increasing returns. It may be that these competing papers are not in 
conflict, but rather are presenting their conclusions differently. Certainly, by reporting only 
the annualised education premiums, many recent papers have exaggerated the convexity of 
the education-wage relationship.  
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The contrast between the premium and rate of return can be explained by several factors. 
Most important is the difference in the price of education, with primary school being 
nominally free and effectively still very cheap (base case = $75/year), secondary school being 
marginally more expensive ($150/year), and university being more expensive again 
($300/year). Secondly, with regards to primary school education the base case scenario does 
not assume that people in that age bracket (10-14) will be working productively, while older 
children and university students are considered capable of at least occasional part-time work. 
Third, the calculation for each different education level involves slightly different timing for 
the student’s time in the workforce, though the assumed retirement age stays constant.  
Following the approach used in section 7.2, more detail is provided below with variations in 
the assumptions regarding the price of education and the work choices of the students, 
starting with the rates of return for primary school in tables 7-17 and 7-18 below.  
 
 TABLE 7-17: RATE OF RETURN FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $75 $100 
Both start PT work at age 14 20.9% 16.4% 13.7% 
No working until age 18 17.4% 14.2% 12.1% 
Start PT work at age 12* 7.1% 6.6% 6.1% 
* Only for non-students.  
 
 
TABLE 7-18: RATE OF RETURN FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $50 $75 $100 
Both start PT work at age 14 18.1% 14.1% 11.8% 
No working until age 18 15.4% 12.4% 10.6% 
Start PT work at age 12* 6.8% 6.2% 5.7% 
* Only for non-students.  
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The cost of primary school has a noticeable impact on the rate of return. For a male student, 
the return from a $50 school is 20.9%, which drops to 13.7% if they attend a $100 school. It 
should be noted that the above estimates do not factor in any potential difference in quality 
between schools, as that data was not available.  
The base case assumes that children do not begin work before 14 years of age, and then they 
find part time work at age 14, and then full time work at age 18. The second row shows the 
results if there is no period of part-time work for people aged between 14 and 18. The third 
row shows the results if a non-student begins part-time work at age 12 instead of going to 
school. 
The final scenario shows a significantly lower rate of return on schooling. If a person aged 12 
has the option of beginning part-time work or continuing with school, then the rate of return 
for schooling drops to 6.6% for men and 6.2% for women.  
This relatively low return presents a potentially difficult moral question that goes beyond the 
scope of this chapter. It should be remembered that while the rate of return might be 
relatively low, an additional benefit from primary school that has not been factored in to this 
analysis is the “option value” that it provides. A primary school graduate has the option of 
entering the workforce or continuing on with further study, while a non-graduate does not 
have the option of further study.  
The rates of return for secondary school are shown in tables 7-19 and 7-20 below. 
 
 TABLE 7-19: RATE OF RETURN FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $100 $150 $200 
PT work at age 16* 17.4% 15.5% 14.1% 
PT work at age 14* 11.0% 10.3% 9.7% 
No work before age 18 36.9% 28.4% 23.5% 
* Only for non-students.  
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TABLE 7-20: RATE OF RETURN FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $100 $150 $200 
PT work at age 16* 16.3% 14.3% 12.8% 
PT work at age 14* 10.6% 9.8% 9.2% 
No work before age 18 31.7% 24.2% 19.9% 
* Only for non-students.  
 
Once again, the assumptions regarding tuition fees and work choices can have significant 
consequences for the rate of return. In particular, while the base case assumes that non-
students will start part-time work from 16 years of age, if we assume no working before the 
age of 18 then the rate of return increases dramatically, from 15.5% to 28.4% for men and 
14.3% to 24.2% for women.  
The large variation in the results associated with alternative plausible scenarios highlights the 
difficulty in reporting and comparing rates of return. Though it is worth noting that even the 
lowest rate of return is 9.7% for men and 9.2% for women, which compares favourably with 
the return on most other investments.  
Secondary school is generally more expensive than primary school in Cambodia, which is the 
reason that the male return on primary school (16.4%) is higher than the male return on 
secondary school (15.5%). Comparing Tables 7-17 and 7-19 shows the respective rates of 
return under the assumption that both levels of schooling have the same cost of $100 per 
year. Under this (unrealistic) assumption, the male return on primary school drops to 13.7%, 
which is now less than the male return on secondary school of 16.3%. In both cases the 
returns are sufficiently similar to allow a general characterisation that the rates of return are 
roughly linear.  
The rates of return for university are shown in Tables 7-21 and 7-22 below. 
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 TABLE 7-21: RATE OF RETURN FOR UNIVERSITY (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $200 $300 $500 
PT work half university 15.0% 14.1% 12.7% 
PT work all university 19.0% 17.5% 15.3% 
No work during university 12.9% 12.3% 11.2% 
 
 
TABLE 7-22: RATE OF RETURN FOR UNIVERSITY (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $200 $300 $500 
PT work half university 14.5% 13.5% 11.9% 
PT work all university 18.2% 16.5% 14.1% 
No work during university 12.6% 11.8% 10.6% 
 
The results for the university premium are somewhat less variable than the rates of return for 
primary and secondary school. Changes in the cost of university have a relatively small 
impact, where a price increase from $300/year to $500/year means the rate of return drops 
from 14.1% to 12.7% for men. Even if the tuition fees are increased to $1000 per year (not 
shown in the tables) the return only drops to 10.2% for men and 9.2% for women.  
Changing the assumptions about the work choices of university students does impact the rate 
of return, but not as dramatically as was the case for primary and secondary school. For a 
student who does not work throughout their four-year degree, the rate of return drops to 
12.3% for men and 11.8% for women. All of these results compare favourably with the 
average return from other investments.   
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7.4 – Present value of a Cambodian university degree   
 
This section will take a closer look at the situation faced by a hypothetical high school 
graduate who is considering whether or not to attend university, and presents them with 
several financial indicators that could help to guide that decision.  
To put this issue in perspective, the estimated starting wage for an urban male with 50/100 
school grades and parents’ income of $100 is just under $100/month ($0.45 per hour), while a 
woman or person living rurally could expect about 25% less. In contrast, the same person 
with a university degree is estimated to have a starting wage of just over $150/month ($0.72 
per hour), which is a 59% improvement.  
 
7.4.1 Sensitivity analysis for university rate of return 
For an extended discussion about the sensitivity of the results to various assumptions, see 
section 7.2 above. This sub-section will only consider a few key variations, reported 
separately for men and women. The scenarios presented in Table 7-23 and Table 7-24 assume 
that a university student will work part-time for two years of their degree. 
For the most part, the university rate of return is not very sensitive to a range of reasonable 
(and unreasonable) different assumptions. Two variations worth noting relate to socio-
economic status and the assumed productivity growth. 
For students from an average family background, the expected return on university ranges 
between the fairly narrow band of 13.9%-15.1% for men and 13.3%-14.6% for women. 
However, for children of the very rich (by Cambodian standards) the expected return jumps 
to 16.3% for men and 16.1% for women. The implication is that children of rich parents have 
more incentive to attend university, and are therefore more likely to receive higher wages 
themselves.  
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TABLE 7-23: UNIVERSITY IRR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (men) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $200 $300 $500 
Base case 15.0% 14.1% 12.7% 
Location = rural 14.5% 13.5% 11.9% 
 
Grades = 0/100 14.6% 13.6% 12.1% 
Grades = 100/100 15.2% 14.5% 13.2% 
 
Parents’ income = $0 14.8% 13.9% 12.5% 
Parents’ income = $1000/m 15.7% 15.1% 14.0% 
Parents’ income = $5000/m 16.5% 16.3% 15.8% 
 
Productivity = 0% 12.8% 11.9% 10.5% 
Productivity = 3% 16.1% 15.2% 13.8% 
Productivity = 5% 18.3% 17.4% 16.0% 
 
Retirement = 40  13.5% 12.4% 10.7% 
Retirement = 50 14.7% 13.8% 12.2% 
Retirement = 70 15.1% 14.2% 12.8% 
 
 
The other variation of significance is the assumed productivity growth in the economy. If we 
replace the base case assumption of 2% with zero then the rate of return drops by about two 
percentage points (11.9% for men and 11.3% for women); and if productivity growth is 5% 
then the rate of return increases by about three percentage points (17.4% for men and 16.8% 
for women). This is interesting insomuch as people’s prediction about future economic 
growth may influence whether they see university as a good or bad investment for them, with 
more optimistic people more likely to go to university.  
While the above variations are worth mentioning, the most noteworthy conclusion from the 
sensitivity analysis is that the base case results are robust to a wide range of alternative 
assumptions, which should increase confidence in the accuracy of the results.  
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TABLE 7-24: UNIVERSITY IRR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (women) 
IRR Tuition fees 
 $200 $300 $500 
Base case 14.5% 13.5% 11.9% 
Location = rural 14.0% 12.8% 11.1% 
 
Grades = 0/100 14.0% 12.9% 11.2% 
Grades = 100/100 14.8% 13.9% 12.4% 
 
Parents’ income = $0 14.3% 13.3% 11.6% 
Parents’ income = $1000/m 15.4% 14.6% 13.4% 
Parents’ income = $5000/m 16.4% 16.1% 15.5% 
 
Productivity = 0% 12.3% 11.3% 9.7% 
Productivity = 3% 15.6% 14.6% 13.0% 
Productivity = 5% 17.8% 16.8% 15.2% 
 
Retirement = 40  12.9% 11.7% 9.7% 
Retirement = 50 14.2% 13.1% 11.4% 
Retirement = 70 14.6% 13.6% 12.1% 
 
 
7.4.2 Benefit and cost of university 
The economic benefit of education is generally reported as an education premium, or a rate of 
return on education, or both. Borrowing from the field of finance, another approach that can 
be used to evaluate the profitability of any investment (including education) is to calculate the 
present value of the benefit and the present value of the costs, and then compare those two 
numbers. To calculate a present value it is necessary to use a discount rate to convert future 
dollars into present day equivalent dollars. For this analysis the base case will use a discount 
rate of 5%29, and will then also provide a sensitivity analysis around the discount rate.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  To	  give	  some	  context	  about	  discount	  rates,	  in	  a	  review	  of	  147	  studies,	  by	  far	  the	  most	  popular	  option	  was	  
5%	  (Smith	  &	  Gravelle,	  2001),	  the	  Asia	  Development	  Bank	  suggests	  3-­‐7%	  (Zhuang,	  Liang,	  Lin	  &	  DeGuzman,	  
2007),	  the	  Productivity	  Commission	  recommends	  3-­‐10%	  (Harrison,	  2010),	  and	  in	  America	  the	  CBO	  uses	  2%	  
(Congressional	  Budget	  Office,	  2015)	  while	  the	  OMB	  use	  7%	  (Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget,	  1992).	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The sum of the present values of the benefit and costs gives the “net present value” (NPV). 
The present value of the benefit divided by the present value of the cost gives the benefit-cost 
ratio (BCR). If the benefits of education exceed the costs then the NPV will be positive and 
the BCR will be greater than one. 
 
 TABLE 7-25: IRR, NPV, BCR FOR UNIVERSITY DEGREE (men) 
 Tuition fees 
 $200 $300 $500 
Rate of return (IRR) 15.0% 14.1% 12.7% 
Present value benefit $15,829 $15,829 $15,829 
Present value cost $4,198 $4,570 $5,315 
Net present value (NPV) $11,632 $11,259 $10,515 
Benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 3.77 3.46 2.98 
 
 
TABLE 7-26: IRR, NPV, BCR FOR UNIVERSITY DEGREE (women) 
 Tuition fees 
 $200 $300 $500 
Rate of return (IRR) 14.5% 13.5% 11.9% 
Present value benefit $12,434 $12,434 $12,434 
Present value cost $3,457 $3,829 $4,574 
Net present value (NPV) $8,977 $8,604 $7,860 
Benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 2.22 3.25 2.72 
 
 
The gross present value benefit of higher lifetime wages associated with a university degree 
is $15,829 for men and $12,434 for women. In the base case scenario (tuition fee = 
$300/year) the present value cost of university (including wages forgone) is $4,570 for men 
and $3,829 for women. Note that the cost is higher for men because it is assumed that their 
forgone wages would also have been higher.  
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From those numbers we can calculate a net present value from a university degree of $11,259 
for men (benefit-cost ratio of 3.5) and $8,604 for women (benefit-cost ratio of 3.3), based on 
a 5% discount rate. To show the importance of the discount rate assumption, Tables 7-27 and 
7-28 provide the results (assuming tuition fees of $300/year) when using a low discount (2%) 
and a high discount rate (10%). 
 
 TABLE 7-27: IRR, NPV, BCR FOR UNIVERSITY DEGREE, VARIABLE 
DISCOUNT RATES (men) 
 Discount rate 
 2% 5% 10% 
Rate of return (IRR) 14.1% 14.1% 14.1% 
Present value benefit $30,207 $15,829 $6,899 
Present value cost $4,739 $4,570 $4,320 
Net present value (NPV) $25,468 $11,259 $2,578 
Benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 6.37 3.46 1.60 
 
 
TABLE 7-28: IRR, NPV, BCR FOR UNIVERSITY DEGREE, VARIABLE 
DISCOUNT RATES (women) 
 Discount rate 
 2% 5% 10% 
Rate of return (IRR) 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 
Present value benefit $23,727 $12,434 $5,419 
Present value cost $3,972 $3,829 $3,618 
Net present value (NPV) $19,755 $8,604 $1,801 
Benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 5.97 3.25 1.50 
 
 
A lower discount rate results in a much higher reported benefit, since a lower discount rate 
gives more weight to the consequences far into the future when the hypothetical university 
graduate will still be earning a wage premium. In contrast, a high discount rate decreases the 
reported benefit as it decreases the importance of future wage advantages. 
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In all instances, the net present value is positive (so the benefit-cost ratio is above one) but 
with a 10% discount rate the benefit from a university degree has dropped to only $2,578 for 
men (BCR = 1.6) and $1,801 for women (BCR = 1.5). While not reported, the net present 
value is still positive with a 10% discount rate and tuition fees of $500 per year. With a high 
discount rate, high tuition fees, and zero productivity growth, the net present value is close to 
zero (just above for men and just below for women).  
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Chapter 8: Personal equity finance 
 
Personal equity is a financial measure of the productive value of a person. When a student 
invests in their education the goal is (normally) to make themselves more productive, and 
therefore to increase the value of their personal equity.  
Specifically, personal equity represents the present value of future income. An average 
working life will last for 40-50 years with wages (and non-wage income) normally paid 
weekly, fortnightly or monthly during that time. Just as with any income stream, it is possible 
to calculate the present value of that income by applying a risk-appropriate discount rate. 
While personal equity has always existed implicitly, for most of history there has been no 
awareness of its existence and the potential implications that come from treating personal 
equity as a financial asset. This chapter will look at the consequences that personal equity 
finance has in the field of corporate finance, and especially how the existence of personal 
equity takes corporate finance beyond the corporate world and makes it available for 
everybody, giving ordinary people more options in how they can raise money. The chapter 
after this will take the concept one step further and look at some applications of personal 
equity trading.    
In this chapter, section 8.1 will look at the case for personal equity and section 8.2 will 
consider some problems (and potential solutions). Having established the theory, section 8.3 
looks at a variety of examples of personal equity and similar schemes, including some 
examples that implicitly or indirectly relate to personal equity. Finally, section 8.4 estimates 
the value of a personal equity in Cambodia and also the value of a hypothetical personal 
equity contract in Cambodia, which relates back to the estimates made in Chapter 7 and the 
activities of the Human Capital Project.   
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8.1 – In defence of personal equity  
 
The inescapable logic of trade is that voluntary and informed exchange will result in win-win 
outcomes, since both parties to the trade receive something that they value more highly than 
the thing they gave up. This simple idea is one of the most powerful (and widely 
misunderstood) rules of human action.  
Missing markets lead to lost opportunities for trade and therefore misallocation of resources. 
When new opportunities for trade are opened up, as long as they are informed and voluntary, 
then those new trades have the power to make the world a better place. For most of history, 
trading in personal equity has been a missing market, though that is slowly changing.  
 
8.1.1 The “discovery” of personal equity 
Personal equity has always existed. Like atoms or emus, personal equity was “discovered” 
and not “invented”. Before the concept was first explored in 1945, it was already true that 
people had expected future income, and it was already true that expected future income could 
converted to a present value by discounting for time and risk. Further, it could be argued that 
personal equity swaps already had an important role in society (as discussed in section 8.3). 
Nonetheless, before the discovery of personal equity it was not possible to put it to use as a 
financial asset.   
The idea of personal equity finance can be traced back to Friedman and Kuznets (1945) and 
then Friedman (1955) 30, and in both cases was suggested almost as an afterthought in 
publications that were focused on other issues. In recent years the idea of personal equity has 
caught the attention of several economists, including Palacios (2002), Christiansen and 
Nielsen (2002), Clark (2006), and Yu and Salyards (2008). Similar ideas have been promoted 
with increasing regularity outside of peer review (Humphreys, 2005; Wang, 2008; Potts, 
2008; Furst, 2009), and even in science-fiction (Kollin & Kollin, 2008). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Full	  quote:	  “The	  counterpart	  for	  education	  would	  be	  to	  ‘buy’	  a	  share	  in	  an	  individual's	  earning	  prospects:	  to	  
advance	  him	  the	  funds	  needed	  to	  finance	  his	  training	  on	  condition	  that	  he	  agree	  to	  pay	  the	  lender	  a	  specified	  
fraction	  of	  his	  future	  earnings.”	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The idea, as eloquently described by Nerlove in 1975, was “that individuals sell ‘shares’ in 
their future income streams in order to finance investment in themselves”.  
As the name suggests, personal equity can be treated as a type of equity, and therefore as a 
financial asset. By recognising personal equity as a financial asset, ordinary people are able to 
access equity finance in a way that was previously not possible. Specifically, people are able 
to trade some shares of their personal equity (a percentage of their future income) in 
exchange for money today. The most obvious application for personal equity finance is that it 
allows young people to raise money for important early-life investments, and especially for 
their own education.  
Without the recognition of personal equity as a financial asset, many people are locked out of 
equity markets. When a business needs to raise money they have the option of raising money 
through debt (borrowing money) or equity (selling shares in a profitable asset), but many 
people do not have a profitable asset with shares to sell. These asset-poor people are 
restricted to only using debt finance (e.g. personal loans, credit cards) if they want to raise 
money. 
Not everybody has access to traditional equity finance, but everybody is born with ownership 
of their own personal equity, and that creates opportunities for everybody to have access to 
equity finance. With the recognition of personal equity as a financial asset, for the first time it 
has become possible that the corporate finance question of “debt or equity finance” is 
relevant not just for business, but also for everybody else.  
Just as with normal debt and normal equity, the important difference between personal debt 
and personal equity is the issue of risk and return. When people are limited only to the option 
of personal debt, they have no choice but to keep the risk themselves. With personal equity it 
becomes possible for an investor to share in the risk of investing in human capital, which 
means relatively less risk faced by the student. Instead of lending money to a student and 
receiving a fixed repayment uncorrelated with the value of the human capital, an investor can 
buy shares in personal equity and be exposed to the potential gains if the student achieves 
success in life and the potential losses if the student fails to get a well paying job. Variations 
on the theme can include a minimum threshold (so the investor is buying a share in the 
income over a certain threshold) or that payments may only last for a fixed number of years 
(the shares only pay dividends over a fixed time period).  
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While the most obvious use of personal equity finance is to invest in human capital, the 
money raised by selling shares in personal equity could potentially be used for anything, 
including investing in other financial or physical assets, or consumption.  
The idea of personal equity has provocatively been called “shares in people” (Clark, 2006), 
though it is more accurately “shares in people’s future income” since personal equity is 
strictly limited to future income, and at a philosophical level human self-ownership is 
generally accepted as axiomatic. There is a difference between a person and a person’s 
income stream. Whatever it is called, the idea of buying (or selling) shares in a person’s 
future income stream is still a relatively unconventional idea and uncommon practice. Yet the 
consequences are potentially far-reaching.  
 
8.1.2 Income-contingent loans (ICLs) 
After Friedman raised the idea of personal equity, the conversation quickly became focused 
on the related idea of income-contingent loans (ICLs) instead of personal equity, the most 
famous example of which remains the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) 
system in Australia.  
With ICLs, the recipient receives a loan, but only has to make their repayments if and when 
they have an income above a certain threshold. This approach has elements of both debt and 
personal equity. It is similar to debt in that the amount owed is fixed, but unlike debt the 
timing of repayments is dependent on the debtor’s income. Since there is a time value of 
money, the changes in the timing of repayments will impact on the present value of the loan. 
If the debtor earns a high income and so pays their debt quickly, then the present value of the 
loan is relatively high; but if the debtor earns a low income then they may repay the debt 
slowly (or not at all) and the present value of the loan is relatively low. Since the present 
value of the loan depends on the income of the recipient, ICLs are similar to personal equity. 
Functionally, the main difference between ICLs and personal equity is that ICLs cannot have 
a value higher than the total about of the debt outstanding (plus interest) while the value of 
personal equity is limited only by the potential income of the graduate.  
Income-contingent loans differ from normal debt in that they shift some risk onto the lender, 
and therefore they will have a higher interest rate than normal loans to compensate for the 
higher risk, ceteris paribus. To avoid high interest rates, one option is for a third party (often 
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the government) to subsidise the interest rate on ICLs, which is the approach taken with the 
Australian HECS system.  
 
8.1.3 Better access to education for low-income students 
The most obvious benefit from personal equity (and ICLs) is that it provides a way for 
students to pay for their education. Some students may not have access to debt because they 
lack the appropriate collateral and/or credit rating. This is a commonly cited failure of the 
education market that is often used as a justification for government intervention (Chapman, 
2006). Other students may prefer personal equity to debt because they want to avoid the 
future risk of having debt while earning no (or low) income. Personal equity provides a way 
to ensure that students can access education irrespective of their current financial situation 
and without the risk of a debt trap, and has the potential to resolve the above-mentioned 
market failure (Palacios, 2004).  
The issue of access is particularly important for developing countries. Education in 
developing countries often has a higher rate of return than education in developed countries, 
but the benefit can only be captured by those people who can access that education, and in 
developing countries that access may sometimes be restricted due to low incomes. Yang 
(2011) expresses a common concern that private provision of education excludes poor 
households. The fears of Yang may be exaggerated: the empirical evidence provided by 
Tooley (2007) suggests that private budget schools are widespread in developing countries 
(e.g. covering 65% of Hyderabad in India, and 75% of Lagos State in Nigeria), affordable to 
even poverty-line families (monthly fees of $1.74 for unregistered private schools or $2.28 
for registered private schools), higher quality than nearby government schools (more 
dedicated teachers, better student results), often make a profit, and yet still provide 
scholarship places to orphans, children of widowed mothers, and others in need.  
Evidence from Cambodia suggests that a significant majority of low-income families are able 
to afford at least primary school education. Mishra (2011) notes the sharp increase in net 
enrolment ratios between 1997 and 2007, with primary enrolment increasing from 54% to 
81%, lower secondary school enrolment increasing from 8% to 24%, and upper secondary 
school enrolment increasing from 4% to 16%. Using slightly updated data, the Cambodian 
National Institute of Statistics (NIS, 2009) puts primary enrolment at 82% and lower 
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secondary enrolment up to 29%. At the same time, the literacy rate in Cambodia has 
increased from 67% in 1998 to 78% in 2008 (World Bank, 2011), and is up to 88% for youth 
aged 15-24 (UNESCO, 2011). 
Nonetheless, Cambodia’s university enrolment remains relatively low (see the discussion in 
Chapter 3), which may indicate that many families in Cambodia still struggle to afford the 
tuition fees and opportunity costs associated with university study. This is true even though 
many universities offer full or partial scholarships to students with high grades, and some 
universities have annual tuition fees as low as $150 per year, with subsidised 
accommodation.  
The most obvious solution for low-income students wanting to go to university is to borrow 
the money from a bank or informal money-lender. However, many low-income students are 
unable to borrow to pay for university due to lack of collateral, which makes the interest rates 
on loans prohibitively expensive. Chapman (2006) describes the market failure in the 
following way:  
“It is well known that higher education financing involves ... an unwillingness of 
banks to provide loans because of the absence of collateral. It follows that without 
government intervention there will be both socially sub-optimal and regressive 
outcomes with respect to the provision of higher education.” (p1)  
Not only will this outcome be bad for the student, who is unable to go to university and 
improve their future income, but also from the perspective of economic efficiency the 
outcome will be sub-optimal if it prevents a high-value investment in education. While the 
problem is very real, Chapman is too quick to insist on a government solution.  
Personal equity finance and projects such as HCP provide a non-government solution for this 
problem by compensating lenders/investors for the risk by offering them higher potential 
rewards in the case of high student incomes. This is the same solution that is used with 
investments in risky physical capital, where a risky business may struggle to find debtors but 
may be able to find investors who will tolerate the downside risk so long as they are also 
exposed to the upside potential (so-called “venture capital”). Seen in this light, the problem is 
not so much a failure of the market, but a lack of the right market. 
 
	   148	  
8.1.4 Less risk for students 
In addition to money-lenders being unwilling to provide debt to low-income families, there is 
the additional issue that low-income families may be unwilling to take on the risks of debt, or 
that they may take on the risks and be ultimately caught in a “debt trap”. A debt trap can 
occur if a student takes out a loan to pay for tuition, but is then unable to find a well-paying 
job and so cannot repay their interest obligations.  
Once again, this produces both a direct problem for the student, who risks a debt trap, and 
also the potential for an economically inefficient outcome if risk-averse students refrain from 
investing in high-value education because of idiosyncratic risk.  
The issue of debt traps in developing countries has been of increasing concern in the 
development literature, especially since the rise of micro-finance as a development tool 
following the initial success of the Grameen Bank (Yunnus, 1999). The effectiveness of 
micro-finance on poverty has been the focus of several studies, with conflicting results. Imai, 
Arun and Annim (2010) as well as Karlan and Zinlan (2009) and Mamun (2010) found a 
benefit, while Banerjee et al. (2009) and Khan (2011) had more ambiguous results. One of 
the concerns in this literature relates to threat of borrowers falling into a debt trap: where they 
face the full risk that their investment may not ultimately increase their productivity, but they 
still must make loan repayments.   
Personal equity resolves this problem by reallocating the risk of negative returns on to the 
investor, who is often more able or more willing to accept the risk, and thereby removing the 
threat of students being caught in a debt trap.  
 
8.1.5 New investment opportunities 
The above two points focused on ways that personal equity finance helps the recipients of the 
funds, but of course a voluntary trade will only occur if both sides of the agreement believe 
that they have benefited. From the perspective of investors and portfolio managers, being 
able to invest in personal equity means having access to a promising new type of financial 
asset that (1) has substantial and reliable growth potential, (2) includes a variety of different 
risk profiles to match nearly any preference, and (3) has the potential to be the largest single 
asset class in the world.  
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As an asset class, “human capital” has been estimated to make up between 60% and 80% of 
total wealth (Baxter & Jermann, 1997; Lettau & Ludvigson, 2001; Lustig & Van 
Nieuwerburgh, 2006; Chen et al., 2008). Using a dynamic equilibrium production model, 
Palacios (2010) estimates that human capital makes up 83.3% of total wealth, which is 
similar to the fraction of wages to consumption. The potential size of the personal equity 
sector is staggering. Of course, the vast majority of personal equity will likely stay belonging 
to the person who did the training and learnt the skills (especially in the early years, while the 
concept is still mostly unknown) but if just a fraction of 1% of the human capital stock 
eventually becomes available to investors, the personal equity industry would be worth many 
trillions of dollars.  
The rationale for buying personal equity is the same rationale that exists for any investment. 
The differences between personal equity and physical equity, as well as the variety of risk 
profiles within personal equity (depending on the age, location, career, etc.) provides 
investors with opportunities to diversity their portfolio, and so achieve a higher risk-adjusted 
rate of return (Yu & Salyards, 2008). The knock on benefits are the same as with any 
productivity improvement, as the higher investment returns encourage greater levels of 
investment, increasing the total capital stock in the economy, boosting the level of economic 
output, and arguably leading to higher economic growth rates31.  
The potential benefits are significant, but the story is incomplete. The truth is that for many 
investors the benefit they would get from adding personal equity to their portfolio does not 
exceed the transaction costs they face. Today, the personal equity industry barely exists. In 
the nascent stages of personal equity finance, there are only a limited number of investors 
who are willing and able to take the risk.  
The first movers are likely to be those people motivated by charity (arranging personal equity 
finance in order to improve access to education), the intellectual curious, financial innovators 
who are hoping to be ahead of the curve, and some regular investors who have included a 
hefty risk premium to justify their time. The transaction costs and other risks currently 
associated with personal equity finance (considered in section 8.2) have limited the number 
of investors willing to get involved, and has decreased the net benefit for the first-movers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  I	  say	  “arguably”	  because	  there	  remains	  debate	  about	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  long-­‐term	  economic	  growth,	  
though	  many	  endogenous	  growth	  models	  include	  investment	  and/or	  human	  capital	  as	  causes	  of	  growth.	  See	  
section	  2.2	  for	  further	  discussion.	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There is still great potential for investors in personal equity, but they will only be realised if 
and when the transaction costs can be reduced. The discussion in section 9.1 will come back 
to the issue of transaction costs. That section will consider the consequences of introducing a 
secondary market in personal equity, which will have the effect of both reducing transaction 
costs and the risk premium, and therefore allowing more investors to take advantage of the 
benefits described above.  
 
8.1.6 Increased private investment in education  
As noted in sub-section 8.1.3 above, the historical inadequacy of inter-temporal markets for 
students is believed to have caused an underinvestment in education, subsequently reducing 
economic efficiency, and leaving above-market rates of return on education that are not 
realised. In many developed countries, the governments responded by providing large 
subsidies (including direct subsidies and subsidised loans), but in developing countries the 
governments have been less able (or less willing) to boost education spending. In both cases, 
there has been a search for new sources of education funding.  
The most common use of personal equity finance is to pay the costs of attending university. 
In that situation, personal equity investment has an immediate and direct benefit on the 
education sector, without the student facing a barrier to study and without any additional 
burden on the taxpayer. From the perspective of the education sector, more personal equity 
funding is unambiguously a good thing.  
Even with high transaction costs, the modest level of personal equity investment that is 
possible can provide much needed funds for the education system. When a secondary market 
in personal equities becomes viable, one of the outcomes will be lower transaction costs and a 
lower risk premium (see sub-section 9.1.2), causing a higher level of personal equity 
investment. Either way, the introduction of personal equity finance creates opportunities for 
both developed and developing countries. 
• The most obvious beneficiaries are in developing countries, where the new private 
funding can help to address the current underinvestment in education, with the biggest 
winners being the individual students in developing countries who are now able to 
attend university, as discussed in sub-section 8.1.3 above.  
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• For developed countries, the new private funding could either be used to increase the 
total amount of education spending, or could be used to replace the government 
education spending, which could then be redirected to other priorities.  
 
The fact that personal equity finance offers increased funding for education, without any cost 
to the government or immediate cost to the student, is perhaps the most politically relevant 
benefit. As noted both by Palacios (2002) and Bray (1998), given the growing costs of 
government health and pension programs in the developed world, and the relatively higher 
incomes of university graduates, there is a strong argument for students to contribute more 
towards their own education. Personal equity finance is one possible solution, along with the 
graduate tax (basically a government-run personal equity system), private loans, and income-
contingent loans.  
 
8.1.7 Income smoothing  
While personal equity is more commonly associated with funding education, it can also be 
used as a tool to help achieve other social goals, including social insurance and income 
smoothing. By engaging in a strategic personal equity swaps with a diversity of people, or 
directly buying personal equity, it would be possible to partially hedge against the risk of 
unemployment, diversify income sources to reduce income fluctuations, and create an 
alternative income stream in retirement.  
As a potential new tool for lifetime income management, personal equity should be of 
interest to researchers studying retirement incomes and/or social security.  
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8.2 – Problems with personal equity 
 
Personal equity is not without its detractors. The case against personal equity usually comes 
down to either the moral argument that it shouldn’t exist because it’s inherently 
objectionable, or practical arguments that it won’t exist because of intractable coordination 
problems. While the moral argument is difficult to sustain, the practical arguments require 
careful consideration.  
 
8.2.1 Moral objection to personal equity 
Ever since the idea of personal equity was first raised, people have suggested that owning a 
share of a future income stream is equivalent in some way to slavery. Even Milton Friedman, 
who first suggested and supported the idea, described personal equity contracts by saying 
“they are economically equivalent to the purchase of a share in an individual’s earning 
capacity and thus to partial slavery” (Friedman, 1955).  
The comparison to slavery does not hold up to scrutiny. There is a vital distinction between 
personal equity and slavery when it comes to the issue of control. The defining feature of 
slavery (and the reason it is found morally objectionable) is that slaves do not make their own 
decisions. Under slavery, the owner decides what the slave will do and the slave is expected 
to obey or be punished. In contrast, the concept of personal equity as described by economists 
does not give the personal equity owner any control, and the person who receives personal 
equity remains free to make their own decisions. This point is stressed by Palacios (2004), 
who dedicates several pages to drawing out the distinction.  
If personal equity were to come with voting rights then the comparison to slavery would be 
more valid. In their science fiction book The Unincorporated Man, Kolin and Kolin (2010) 
present a society where the owners of personal equity have voting rights, most people own 
less than 50% of their own personal equity, and so ethical issues about human ownership and 
freedom are relevant. While the book presents an interesting thought experiment, the personal 
equity finance suggested by economists does not involve voting rights, so the two situations 
are fundamentally different.  
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Instead of slavery, some better analogies for personal equity could include a certain type of 
marriage (where two people agree to share what they earn with each other) or income tax 
(where the government takes a percentage of what people earn). While some anarchists may 
claim that the income tax is a form of slavery, few people would agree that marriage and tax 
are morally the same as slavery32. Sub-section 8.3.6 will consider the economics of slavery.  
 
8.2.2 Problem of adverse selection 
Personal equity (like all equity) faces the potential problem of “adverse selection” under 
asymmetric information. Adverse selection describes the situation where one party to a 
transaction has hidden information, and is able to use that information to their advantage. A 
typical example is a person buying health insurance with the hidden information that they 
have an expensive illness, or (famously) a car owner trying to sell their car with the hidden 
information that the car is unreliable (Akerlof, 1970).  
In the case of personal equity finance, adverse selection may exist when the investor and 
recipient have different information about the expected return for the recipient, and so they 
may come to different conclusions about the appropriate terms of the agreement. For 
example, if a student has hidden information that they are likely to have low (or no) income 
after graduation, and yet they are still able to get personal equity finance on favourable terms, 
then they are likely to self-select into personal equity finance, to the detriment of the 
investors.  
Due to adverse selection, the person who has less information (such as the investor in the 
above example) will demand a risk premium. If the risk premium prevents what would 
otherwise have been a mutually beneficial agreement, then the adverse selection is 
responsible for that lost opportunity. For example, a student who has no relevant hidden 
information might want to get personal equity finance, but if there is a large risk premium 
(caused by the possibility of adverse selection) then they may choose not get that finance. 
The contract would have been mutually beneficial, but the investor’s legitimate concern 
about hidden information prevents an agreement from being reached, even when there is no 
hidden information.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Even	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  anarchist	  argument	  that	  income	  tax	  is	  partial	  slavery,	  the	  reason	  they	  are	  similar	  is	  
that	  they	  are	  both	  involuntary;	  but	  personal	  equity	  finance	  is	  voluntary,	  and	  therefore	  different	  to	  both.	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There are several strategies available for reducing adverse selection caused by information 
asymmetries, including: 
• Most obviously, it may be possible to remove the information asymmetry by 
searching for additional information; 
• Signalling by the information-rich party to ensure that mutually beneficial trades still 
take place (Spence, 1973); and 
• Screening by the under-informed party to try and force the information-rich party to 
reveal their information (Stiglitz, 1975). 
Regarding personal equity finance for students, one option is for investors to look at 
information from a student’s past in order to judge their potential. In some cases, personal 
equity providers are using statistical models that factor in a student’s academic and career 
achievements to predict their future income, and then using that information to calculate a 
unique price for each student’s personal equity (Gu, 2013).  
Even with the best preparation, the potential for adverse selection remains a legitimate 
concern for personal equity providers, though to put this into context it is an issue faced by all 
types of equity, and also with debt to a lesser degree33. With personal equity, the risk of 
adverse selection is compounded by the relatively small size of the personal equity industry. 
In the early years of the industry we can expect that some personal equity investors are likely 
to include a significant risk premium, which would price some people out of the market. 
Nonetheless, a partially function personal equity market at least benefits the people who are 
able to find mutually beneficial agreements.  
 
8.2.3 Problem of moral hazard 
Another problem that personal equity (like all equity) must face is “moral hazard”. While 
adverse selection is caused by hidden information before an agreement, moral hazard relates 
to hidden (or uncontrollable) actions after an agreement has been reached.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Adverse selection & moral hazard aren’t relevant to a lender with riskless debt, but riskless debt doesn’t exist 
in reality. With normal debt, the borrower may become insolent and not pay, so the lender does face some of the 
risk. In other words, below the point of borrower solvency, normal debt has the risk features of equity (exposure 
to risk), and therefore adverse selection & moral hazard remain relevant for debt (albeit a smaller issue). 
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A moral hazard problem34 is caused by the combination of three elements: (1) reason for a 
relationship between principal and agent; (2) principal and agent having conflicting 
objectives; and (3) the principal not able to know (or control) all the actions of the agent. 
Examples include the owner of a bicycle (agent) not using an expensive bike lock because 
their insurance company (principal) has agreed to pay if the bike is stolen, or an employee 
(agent) shirking work because their boss (principal) is unable to check their actions. Investing 
in equity also raises moral hazard concerns. If a business owner is also the manager then 
there is no conflicting objective, but if the managing director (agent) is not the owner then 
they may spend too much on the expense account since the shareholders (principal) are not 
able to judge the necessity of the claim.  
Regarding the moral hazard of personal equity, the two significant factors that demand 
consideration are the absence of control and the alignment of incentives. 
Owners of equity in a business may not be able to control all the actions of the managing 
director, but the board of directors (representing owners) still has a large amount of power, 
including the ability to hire and fire the managing director. In the case of equity investment, 
moral hazard is only relevant in those situations where managers have hidden information 
that the board is unable to judge. The situation with personal equity is quite different, since 
the owners of personal equity have no control over the actions of the person they funded. The 
personal equity investor owns the equivalent of “preference shares”, which have similar risk 
and reward as ordinary shares, but without any control.  
A situation where the principal has no control over an agent would normally lead to severe 
moral hazard, but in the case of personal equity the investors are saved (at least partly) due to 
the partial alignment of principal and agent incentives. 
The nature of personal equity finance means that the investor (principal) and the student 
(agent) already have similar objectives in that they both would like to see the student 
graduate university, get a good job, and achieve financial success. In fact, a large body of 
work relating to contract theory (Laffont & Martimort, 2002) and executive compensation  
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990) has explored the use of equity stock options for executive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Moral hazard exists when an agent can avoid some costs of an action. Not all moral hazard is a problem, but 
benign moral hazard is not currently relevant, so the text describes the three inputs for moral hazard problems. 
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managers to better align their incentives with shareholders35, but in the case of personal 
equity these incentives are already aligned.  
Of course, the principal-agent incentives in personal equity aren’t perfectly aligned. Personal 
equity investors will want the recipients to concentrate solely on maximising their income, 
while the recipients of personal equity finance will also put a value on their leisure time and 
work preferences, and like any other contract there is always the risk that they could lie. 
Nonetheless, in most situations (and especially in developing countries) it is likely that 
personal equity recipients will put a high value on achieving financial success.   
The moral hazard problem that results from personal equity has a direct analogy with public 
finance. With personal equity, the investor has no control over the decisions of the personal 
equity recipient, who will make a decision about their leisure-work trade-off, and their 
decision will be influenced by the fact that they do not get to keep their full wage since a 
certain percentage will instead go to the investor. The situation is identical to the relationship 
between the government (equivalent to the investor) and taxpayer (equivalent to the 
recipient). This similarity proves helpful, since the analysis of the moral hazard problem can 
be done by following well-established approach of dynamic tax analysis.  
The main theme of dynamic tax analysis is trying to work out how much people change their 
behaviour in response to various tax rates (or personal equity payment rates). The behavioural 
responses can be divided into five types:  
(1) working more or fewer hours, which is measured by the elasticity of labour supply;  
(2) avoidance mechanisms, rearranging income in a way to reduce the payments;  
(3) evasion mechanisms, such as illegally hiding or lying about income;  
(4) moving between jurisdictions to escape or minimise payments; and  
(5) changing careers to focus on non-pecuniary rewards 
(Feldstein, 1995).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Ironically, the use of stock options for managers has created a new type of moral hazard. The options succeed 
in creating an incentive to grow the value of the business, but since options are a one-sided bet (they pay when 
the stock value increases, but are irrelevant if the stock price decreases), managers became indifferent between a 
small loss and a large loss. The new moral hazard creates an incentive to take too many risky investments.  
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The most important variable in dynamic tax analysis is the “elasticity of taxable income” 
(ETI), which is a combination of the above behavioural changes, and measures the total 
change in a person’s taxable income in response to a change in tax rates (or personal equity 
payment rate) 36. The literature relating to the ETI is large and growing (Feldstein, 1995; 
Gietz, 2004; Reynolds, 2012; Saez, Slemrod & Gietz, 2012) and many of the lessons from tax 
analysis can be applied in the case of personal equity payments. 
If the ETI is close to zero, then the worker does not change their behaviour very much. A 
small change in behaviour is a good thing for two reasons. First, a small behavioural change 
means that the moral hazard (or the tax) has only creates a small efficiency loss; and second, 
a small behavioural change is good news for the personal equity investor since that is how 
they will get the highest possible return.  
The size of the behavioural change varies depending on the situation. For example, dealing 
with low-income workers and dealing with low levels of tax generally result in a small (or 
maybe even no) change in behaviour. For low-income workers, they generally do not have 
many opportunities for hiding or rearranging their income, or changing countries, and their 
hourly income might be so low that they actually work more just because they need the 
money. Though regarding the issue of evasion, Chapman (2006) and Papp and Takats (2008) 
have highlighted the potential problem of people from developing countries generally being 
able to hide their income. 
Moral hazard can be minimised by ensuring that the recipient continues to have a strong 
incentive to earn income, through careful monitoring and enforcement, and by otherwise 
increasing the incentives of the payer to keep to their contract. To maintain a strong incentive 
to earn, it is likely that personal equity contracts would ask for a relatively modest percentage 
payment, and would include a clause that restricted the recipient from selling more than a 
pre-agreed share of their personal equity. To the degree that there is still a non-negligible 
moral hazard risk, this will result in a higher risk premium.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  To be precise, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) measures the percentage change in taxable income (z) as 
a proportion of the percentage change of after-tax income (1-τ). The complete formula is ETI =  %Δz / %Δ(1-τ). 
	  
	   158	  
8.2.4 Problem of enforcing long-term contracts  
One of the necessary preconditions for personal equity finance is the ability to enforce long-
term contracts, despite the possibility that one party may have a strong incentive to cheat or 
steal. The previous section mentioned the idea of cheating and stealing as being examples of 
evasion caused by moral hazard; though the focus in this sub-section is not on the crime, but 
rather the criminal system.  
In developed countries, this risk of evasion is generally addressed through an established and 
respected legal system that protects property and enforces contracts, but many developing 
countries lack such a system. This is why Palacios (2004) argued that personal equity finance 
might not be possible in developing countries.  
The common focus on the formal legal system can sometimes overlook the capacity for 
institutions to emerge naturally to solve social problems. While formal legal systems may be 
a preferable option, it is possible to have property right and respected contracts even in the 
absence of a formal legal system. Property and contracts are the two foundational institutions 
of the market economy, which embody the rules of “do not steal” and “do not cheat”, and 
these institutions have emerged in many different times and places around the world, often 
without any formal legal systems (Ricketts, 2008). Some of the more dramatic examples 
include the sustainable anarchist communities of medieval Iceland (Friedman, 1973), early 
USA (Anderson & Hill, 1979; Rothbard, 2005), South-East Asian hill tribes (Scott, 2009), 
and plenty of other case studies (D’Amico, 2007). Other examples of property rights and 
contracts being mostly respected without government include the rules of pirates in the 
Caribbean (Leeson, 2014) and currently the illegal online drug trade, where anecdotal 
evidence indicates over 95% of trades are successfully completed37. Less dramatically, 
Ostrom (2008, 2010) identifies many examples of rules naturally emerging to resolve 
coordination problems. 
Broadly speaking, there are five explanations for how market institutions (property and 
contracts) have emerged naturally, and have often been sustained without the need for 
government protection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  The	  most	  famous	  example	  of	  an	  online	  anarchist	  marketplace	  selling	  illegal	  drugs	  was	  “Silk	  Road”	  (McMillen,	  
2012)	  which	  operated	  for	  several	  years	  using	  The	  Onion	  Router	  (TOR)	  and	  Bitcoin	  to	  provide	  anonymity.	  A	  non-­‐
scientific	  online	  poll	  conducted	  at	  the	  Silk	  Road	  forum	  (since	  deleted	  by	  the	  FBI)	  showed	  96%	  of	  transactions	  
were	  conducted	  honestly.	  This	  thesis	  was	  originally	  going	  to	  include	  a	  more	  scientific	  and	  random	  survey	  to	  
determine	  the	  securing	  of	  property	  rights	  within	  online	  anarchy,	  but	  ethical	  approval	  was	  denied.	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i. Group enforcement  
Most of the rules we follow in life come from groups that we engage with voluntarily, 
including our families (voluntary after childhood), unions, businesses, sports teams, social 
clubs, and many others (Frijters, 2013). Group membership often brings significant 
economic, social and security benefits, which means the group can wield power due to the 
ultimate threat of exclusion, and therefore groups can enact rules that are generally 
accepted. For example, “families have enforcement mechanisms such as the threat of 
disinheritance, withholding of affection, or expulsion” (Herring & Chatusripitak, 2000, 
p13). The power of group enforcement can be expanded to a wider community in the 
right circumstance (Leeson, 2014). In addition, engagement with voluntary community 
groups gives the additional benefit of promoting social capital, including trust and 
honesty (Norton et al., 1997; Productivity Commission, 2013; Saunders, 2002).  
 
ii. Reputation effect 
When interaction with a community is ongoing, there is an advantage to be gained from 
having a reputation for peace, honesty, and fairness. Using hawk-dove games, several 
studies have concluded that market cooperation can be a stable strategy that yields the 
highest payoffs (Berninghaus et al., 2010; Sugden, 1986) and generally that cooperation 
and honesty are optimal in situations where people can leave (David Friedman, 1996). 
The market value of brands and trademarks provides further evidence for the power of 
reputation.   
 
iii. Self-defence 
The most obvious and direct form of non-government protection is for people to simply 
defend themselves and their immediately community from theft, violence or fraud 
(Shavell, 1991). Even if people are not able or willing to defend themselves, if there is a 
large enough percentage of the public who are willing to defend themselves, that creates a 
disincentive for the potential criminal (Lott, 1998). 
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iv. Security agencies 
Extending the idea of “self-defence”, there are people who are willing to pay for security, 
and security firms willing to provide it for the right price. David Friedman (1973) 
explores this idea in detail, and argues that competitive private security can be sustainable 
and perhaps even preferable to government police. He responds to the claim of imminent 
conflict between security forces by pointing out that the security firms will make more 
profit from peace rather than war, and so private arbitration is more likely.  
 
v. Natural preference for property and contract  
Even in the absence of any enforcement mechanism, there is evidence that people have a 
natural instinct to respect property rights and contracts. For example, some people pay for 
goods and services despite the lack of enforcement (Haan & Kooreman, 2002; Levitt, 
2006; Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2008) and are honest even when they are unlikely to be 
caught (Frank, 1987; Mazar et al., 2007; Fischbacher & Heusi, 2007). In experimental 
games, people are less likely to steal when they see legitimate ownership (List, 2007), and 
change their behaviour in response to their own promises (Vanberg, 2008). There is also 
evidence that people have a natural preference for altruism (Mujcic & Frijters, 2011; 
Holt, 2005), which can sometimes be manifested in a willingness not to steal or cheat. 
There is no certainty that the above methods will be able to ensure respect for contracts (such 
as long term personal equity contracts), but they are some of the mechanisms through which 
market institutions can naturally emerge. By strengthening these mechanisms it may be 
possible to compensate for weak legal systems, so that personal equity finance is possible.  
 
8.2.5 Problem of transaction costs  
Transaction costs exist in every market, but they are generally more pronounced in industries 
that are small or undeveloped. The personal equity industry is both. Institutional economists 
Kasper, Streit and Boettke (2012) define transaction costs as those costs incurred contracting 
through a market instead of within an organisation, and they present three categories: search 
and information costs; negotiation and contracting costs; and monitoring and enforcement 
costs. The personal equity industry faces serious barriers in each category.  
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• Search and information costs are the most significant problem for personal equity. 
Many people are still unaware that personal equity finance is an option, and the 
people aware of the idea don’t know where they could go to find trading partners. 
There is still a lack of information about the preferences of investors and students, and 
the realistic costs associated with different options. In most markets prices play an 
important information role, but at the moment personal equity prices are unreliable, 
and when there are multiple options it is difficult for investors and students to know 
which is the best option for them.  
• Negotiation and contracting costs, which includes developing mutually agreeable 
deals, the logistics involved in conducting the transaction, and any formalities that 
might be required such as a ceremony or signing formal contracts. The lack of 
standardisation or precedent gives little guidance to negotiations. Also, transport and 
logistical costs may be required to bring investors and students together.  
• Monitoring and enforcement costs, which are generally necessary for long-term 
contracts, such as exist with personal equity finance. The discussion in sub-section 
8.2.4 above outlined a number of approaches for improving enforcement, but most of 
those solutions come at a cost. Trying to avoid those costs is one of the reasons that 
people generally prefer to have an established and reliable public legal system.  
In response to these transaction costs, it is common for prospective buyers and sellers to 
agree on various rules or systems in the hope of lowering the transaction costs, though in turn 
those systems may result in administration costs (for the organisation that sets the rules) and 
compliance costs (for those people affected by the rules). Administration and compliance 
costs aren’t unique to personal equity, but these costs can be exaggerated when dealing with 
an unknown product and small industry. 
Another set of transaction costs are created by the government, including taxes and 
regulations. With regards to tax, the cost depends both on the absolute value of the tax and 
also the relative tax treatment of different financial options. The absolute value of the tax is 
relevant because if the tax is too high then the trade may become unprofitable. The relative 
tax treatment can be relevant if personal equity contracts have a tax disadvantage, and 
therefore investors are more likely to invest in other financial assets. The relative tax 
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treatment has been identified by Palacios (2004) as one of the main reasons that personal 
equity finance is not currently more popular.  
The above transaction costs create a price wedge between the consumer price and the 
producer price, where the consumer price is equal to the producer price plus transaction costs. 
If the transaction costs are too high then it will cause the producer price to fall to the point 
where there is limited supply, or else it will cause the consumer price to rise to the point 
where there is little demand. Either outcome will prevent an industry from growing. These 
costs are compounded by transaction cost risks, where market participants need to factor in 
the possibility that transaction costs may increase in the future, perhaps due to new taxes or 
additional regulatory requirements.  
Transaction costs can never be abolished, but they can be reduced. New industries often face 
high transaction costs simply due to the lack of general awareness and because industry 
participants are still learning the best way forward. Over time these transaction costs will 
naturally decline. Another vital element is technology, with new innovations often helping to 
change the information, contracting, or monitoring costs. The quality of institutions plays a 
vital role, with the cheap and effective enforcement of contracts being an important part of 
creating lower transaction costs. Finally, the existence of a secondary market can help to 
reduce transaction costs in several ways, as will be considered in more details in Chapter 9.   
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 8.3 – Personal equity in practice  
 
The use of personal equity is more prevalent than most people realise, though in some 
situations the actors are not aware of the personal equity component of their actions. Personal 
equity contracts were first pursued in sport to help fund athletes with potential, without any 
apparent awareness of the pre-existing theoretical literature. The development of personal 
equity financing was preceded by the growth of income-contingent loans in several 
developed countries, and it wasn’t until the beginning of the 21st century that personal equity 
finance started to emerge.  
While personal equity finance is a relatively recent innovation that is only available in a 
handful of countries, the concept of personal equity can also be used to help explain and 
analyse other human interactions including marriage, community groups, tax, and (more 
controversially) slavery.  
 
8.3.1 Early examples  
The earliest examples of something similar to personal equity did not come from students 
investing in education. In 1960, after returning from the Rome Olympics with a gold medal, 
Cassius Clay (who would later change his name to Muhammad Ali after he converted to 
Sunni Islam) entered into perhaps the first intentional personal equity contract. A group of ten 
businessmen cooperated through the Louisville Sponsoring Group to pay Clay $10,000 and 
cover his travel and training expenses, in exchange for receiving 50% of Clay’s income over 
$4000 for the next six years (Huffman, undated).  
Another early example came in 1997 when David Bowie famously issued “Bowie bonds”, 
where investors bought the rights to his royalties (for 10 years) coming from his first 25 
albums. The Bowie bonds were bought for $55 million (Venkataraghavan, 2011). Also, in 
football the practice of “third-party ownership” is a common and controversial strategy, 
where an investor will pay the costs to train and support a young player in exchange for a 
percentage of their future football income (Geey, 2009). Something similar exists in 
professional poker.  
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8.3.2 Income-contingent loans 
Variations of personal equity and ICLs have been tried around the world over the last 50 
years. One of the first was done by Yale in the 1970s, with one important modification: they 
required all students to continue paying a percentage of their income until the entire 
graduating class had repaid its debt, which exacerbated the moral hazard problem (Bollag, 
2002). For more details on other examples of ICL schemes, see Chapman (2006).   
The most famous and long-lasting experiment with income-contingent loans comes from 
Australia, where HECS38 was introduced in 1989 (Jackson, 2003). All Australian students are 
entitled to a government loan to fund the cost of university, which only has to be repaid when 
the graduate earns over $51,30939. For context, in 2012 the estimated graduate income was 
$55,000 for males and $50,000 for females (ABS, 2013). Graduates repay their debt on a 
sliding scale between 4% and 8% of their total income until their debt is repaid (ATO, 2013). 
As the Australian government chose not to charge any interest (except for inflation 
adjustments), the system implicitly includes a government subsidy, where the present value 
of outstanding HECS debt to the government is significantly lower than the tuition fees that 
the government pays. For example, in a three-year undergraduate finance degree the tuition 
cost is $25,824, which has a present value at the start of the degree of $24,614. However, 
using a hypothetical graduate with a starting income of $55,000 and wage growth of 5% per 
year, the present value of their future HECS payments is only $18,58540. This represents an 
implicit subsidy of 25%, over and above the explicit subsidy.  
Other countries to have introduced income-contingent loan schemes include New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and Chile.  
 
8.3.3 Recent experiments in personal equity  
Compared to income-contingent loans, examples of personal equity are more rare. The first 
reported business to offer personal equity (among other products) was MyRichUncle, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Higher	  Education	  Contribution	  Scheme	  (HECS)	  has	  a	  new	  name,	  but	  most	  people	  still	  refer	  to	  it	  as	  HECS.	  
39	  True	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  August	  2013,	  
http://studyassist.gov.au/sites/studyassist/payingbackmyloan/loan-­‐repayment/pages/loan-­‐repayment	  	  
40	  Author’s	  calculations;	  using	  a	  discount	  rate	  of	  5%.	  	  
	   165	  
operated in America between 2001 and 2009. The most successful example is the company 
Lumni (www.lumni.net), which was started in 2002 by the economist Palacios (The 
Economist, 2010) and has funded over a thousand students. In personal correspondence 
(Mikan, 201041), a representative from Lumni explained that they are a for profit organization 
that raises money from investors to invest in students from Colombia, USA, Mexico, and 
Chile. Their price of personal equity (relationship between Lumni financing and the student’s 
payment schedule) is determined by a research team, which takes individual country factors 
into account.   
In Cambodia, the Human Capital Project (www.humancapitalproject.com.au, HCP) was 
started in 2007 by the current author, and is a non-profit organisation that has offered 
personal equity finance to about 100 low-income students so that they can attend university; 
more details were provided in the introduction to this thesis.  
While Lumni and HCP directly provide personal equity finance, another approach is to 
provide a matching service for investors to find promising students. The most prominent 
example of this approach has been Upstart (www.upstart.com), which began in 2012 and 
already has about 100 “upstarts” (students) in their system. Another example is Pave 
(www.pave.com), which also launched in 2012 and has put together several teams of what 
they call “prospects” and “backers”. The Thrust Fund (www.thrustfund.com) had also tried a 
similar approach in 2009, but with limited success.  
Some schools are looking at personal equity finance as a way to attract students. In San 
Fransisco, a privately run computer college called App Academy now allows their students to 
pay in personal equity, where instead of paying tuition the student would pay 15% of their 
income after graduation for one year (Wohlsen, 2013). The Oregon state government has 
recently announced that they will offer personal equity finance as an option for students 
attending state universities (Perez-Pena, 2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  “Lumni	  is	  a	  for	  profit	  organization,	  the	  funds	  come	  from	  the	  investors	  (either	  companies	  or	  people),	  in	  this	  
moment	  we	  have	  1246	  students,	  58	  have	  graduated,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  financing	  and	  the	  payment	  
schedule	  is	  determined	  by	  our	  Research	  Team	  and	  the	  personal	  equity	  contracts	  are	  different	  in	  each	  country,	  
it	  depends.	  Right	  now,	  we	  are	  in	  Colombia,	  USA,	  Mexico	  and	  Chile,	  and	  yes,	  we	  are	  achieving	  our	  
goals.	  	  Anyway	  it	  a	  very	  new	  business	  area	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  change	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  but	  we	  are	  making	  our	  
best	  effort	  to	  achieve	  and	  make	  bigger	  this	  project.”	  (Mikan,	  2010)	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There are various other examples of people creating their own personal equity contracts. In 
2009, Furst and Gordon each bought a 1% personal equity share in aspiring filmmaker Jon 
Grunn, and more recently in Australia three economists (Professor Jason Potts, Dr Joseph 
Clark, and the current author) engaged in a 1% personal equity swap. In 2010, Kjersten 
Erickson made headlines for offering to sell 6% of her future income for $600,000 
(Hildebrandt, 2010; Cutler, 2010), while another innovative young woman has sold 10% of 
her income for 10 years for $125,000 on an auction website (32Auctions, 2013). In an 
interesting but not legally enforceable experiment that started in 2008, Mike Merrill sold 
voting shares in himself, and has allowed his informal “shareholders” to vote on his sleeping 
patterns and love life (Davis, 2013).  
The idea of personal equity contracts is no longer just a theoretical possibility; it is a lived 
reality for a growing number of people.  
 
8.3.4 Marriage & community as implicit personal equity 
The concept of personal equity can be found in situations far removed from financing human 
capital. Perhaps the most interesting is the implicit personal equity swap (in addition to other 
regulations) that makes up a part of marriage in most cultures. The decisions by courts in 
awarding money after a divorce can be seen as an implicit judgement about the nature of the 
pre-existing personal equity swap. For example, alimony payments in Massachusetts (USA) 
are around 30% of the difference in incomes42, which is equivalent to a ruling that the 
divorced couple has an ongoing 30% personal equity swap as a result of their marriage. This 
concept can be extended to children, since the higher alimony when children are involved 
implies that children (or the child’s guardians) have a legal claim to some percentage of their 
parents’ income. 
Personal equity offers a new paradigm from which to assess the “economics of marriage” as 
well as the “economics of divorce”. Seen through the prism of personal equity, we can assess 
the impact of changing divorce laws (i.e. laws regulating the nullification or cancellation of a 
personal equity swap) on the value of the personal equity element of marriage. For example, 
any laws that dilute the personal equity element of marriage may reduce the overall financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  This	  estimate	  comes	  from	  the	  Massachusetts	  Alimony	  Guidelines	  website,	  hosted	  by	  Skylark	  Law	  &	  
Mediation	  PC,	  http://www.massalimonyformula.com	  (accessed	  16/09/2015)	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benefit of marriage, and to the degree that family decisions are motivated by economic 
considerations it may be possible to predict changes in the rate of marriage and divorce.  
Family is not the only example of implicit personal equity trades. Any community (formal or 
informal) that involves people making a contribution based at least in part on their income 
could be described as having a personal equity component. This could describe the 
relationship within hunter-gatherer societies, and the relationship between extended family 
and villagers in many cultures. Personal equity agreements can offer a form of social 
insurance, risk sharing, and income smoothing (sub-section 8.1.7) and so it should be no 
surprise that some social structures will have evolved over time to take advantage of that 
benefit, even if they did so without thinking in terms of personal equity.   
 
8.3.5 Tax as implicit personal equity  
The purpose of this discussion is not to assess the tax treatment of personal equity (for a 
discussion of tax treatment, see sections 8.2 and 9.2), but rather to consider whether the 
concept of “tax” itself is an example of personal equity.  
Tax has not been introduced or justified on the basis of personal equity, but in the case of 
income tax, the situation is functionally equivalent to the government claiming a personal 
equity stake in the people that it controls. The government has claimed the right to receive a 
certain percentage of people’s income in a way that is similar to a personal equity contract, 
though there are some important differences. It is noteworthy that the moral hazard problem 
created by personal equity (as discussed in sub-section 8.2.3) is equivalent to the efficiency 
cost of tax, and the lessons of dynamic tax analysis are applicable to personal equity 
payments. 
The differences between income tax and personal equity include: (1) the government has 
unilateral control over the parameters of the personal equity arrangement; (2) the government 
was never required to buy the personal equity, which is a logical consequence of the first 
point; and (3) the government is able to control the behaviour of citizens while personal 
equity investors have no control over the people who receive the funding. Whether these 
differences are desirable or detrimental is a political and philosophical question that goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the comparison has the potential to give some context and 
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perspective both for the study of personal equity finance and also perhaps for the study of tax 
issues.  
By taking part ownership of people’s personal equity, in financial terms the government has 
taken a long position on incomes, with their financial performance (measured in tax revenue) 
positively correlated with changes in national income. This gives the government a vested 
interest in maximising national income. Given that governments also have the power to 
control people’s behaviour, it is worth considering if their financial interests have any impact 
on political decisions. The discussion in sub-section 9.1.3 will consider the hypothetical 
possibility of the government being able to take a short financial position on incomes to 
partly offset their current position. 
 
8.3.6 Slavery and personal equity compared  
The contention that personal equity finance is somehow equivalent to slavery was considered 
and rejected in sub-section 8.2.1 where it was noted that slavery is defined by having control 
over another person and that personal equity contracts do not include control over another 
person. Nonetheless, as with the example of marriage and tax, it is possible to conceptualise 
some elements of slavery through the prism of personal equity.  
From the perspective of personal equity, slavery is an outlier in that it involves the transfer of 
100% of personal equity to another person, which would not be feasible in a voluntary 
personal equity industry. Of course, slavery goes one step further and also transfers control 
over behaviour, which raises an entirely different set of moral and economic questions. It is 
worth stressing that none of the other examples of personal equity (with the exception of tax) 
involve the personal equity holder being able to control behaviour. In all non-government 
versions of personal equity, the equity ownership is the equivalent of “preference shares” 
where the investor has no say in the actions of other people.  
The economics of slavery involves two separate considerations – personal equity and loss of 
autonomy. This thesis is only interested in the first topic, so the discussion of autonomy will 
be brief. 
Regarding personal equity, since a slave doesn’t own any of their own personal equity, they 
face the equivalent of 100% income tax and so the moral hazard is extreme. A slave has no 
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financial incentive to be productive, and while the threat of punishment does provide some 
motivation, it has generally proven to be a poor substitute for financial incentives. Indeed, the 
inefficiency of forced labour was one of the reasons that many economists were early 
opponents of slavery, and it was this anti-slavery position that prompted the pro-slavery 
Thomas Carlyle to famously call economics the “dismal science” (Groenewegen, 2001).  
In a normal functioning personal equity market, it would not be feasible for somebody to sell 
100% of their own personal equity. In the unlikely event that somebody did want to do so, the 
expected value for 100% personal equity for anybody is $0 due to the extreme moral hazard. 
Attempting to sell the personal equity in several stages is also impractical since early 
investors would probably have required commitments that the recipient retain a meaningful 
amount of their own personal equity (again, for moral hazard reasons), and even if that issue 
could be avoided somehow, the expected value for the last stages of personal equity would 
approach $0. A person trying to optimise their financial position would be unlikely to sell 
more than 10% or 20%, and even a person trying to maximise the amount of funding they 
could raise immediately (with little concern for the future) would probably get that maximum 
price for selling somewhere between 50% and 70% of their personal equity43.  
The only way that a 100% personal equity transfer (or anything close) would be possible is if 
the person in question also gave up control over their work decisions, which takes the 
discussion out of the field of personal equity finance, and into the more controversial topic of 
individual autonomy. 
The idea that one person should be able to control another person is primarily discussed in the 
context of parents controlling the actions of their child, guardians controlling the actions of 
somebody with severe mental problems, or politicians controlling the actions of the general 
public. While slavery does still exist, the idea of slavery has all but disappeared, except as an 
analogy to describe the actions of parents, guardians, and politicians. The differentiating 
feature is that parents and politicians are generally regarded as controlling people “for their 
own good” while slave-owners are seen to be acting out of self-interest. Whether that 
distinction is philosophically sound is beyond the scope of this thesis, but if we accept that 
the central issue is the welfare of the child or citizen or slave, then the relevant question is 
whether slavery can possibly be good for the slave.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Calculating	  the	  personal	  equity	  trade	  to	  maximize	  the	  price	  can	  be	  done	  by	  using	  the	  same	  approach	  that	  
tax	  analysts	  use	  to	  calculate	  the	  revenue-­‐maximising	  tax	  rate	  (Saez,	  Slemrod	  and	  Giertz,	  2012;	  Reynolds,	  2012),	  
though	  this	  would	  require	  additional	  assumptions	  about	  the	  relevant	  person’s	  elasticity	  of	  reported	  income.	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Few people would claim that slavery is a good outcome for the slave, but is it possible that it 
could sometimes be better than the alternative? In their review of 19th century American 
slavery, Conrad and Meyer (1958) mention some evidence that suggested the life expectancy 
for slaves and white Americans was roughly the same, and they gave the following 
explanation of the unexpected finding:  
“Negroes could have received better care under slavery, because plantation owners 
had an economic interest in keeping Negores alive. Furthermore, the Negro in the 
period after emancipation generally lacked the means to participate equally in the 
new medical advances, in contrast to his position of roughly equal medical care in the 
period before 1860.” (p99) 
The commentary of Barzel (1977) concurs that slave owners tended to keep the slaves fit and 
healthy, but he also points out that the slave-owner would undervalue non-pecuniary interests 
of the slave. The realistic alternatives are not known. For people who accept that good 
outcomes (or even good intentions) can justify controlling another person, it may be possible 
for them to justify some instances of slavery.  
Even so, it is difficult to argue that slavery would be a better choice than other viable options. 
The most convincing case for slavery is for a person to sell 100% personal equity combined 
with control over their actions (presumably with restrictions) in exchange for some sort of 
guaranteed minimum livelihood. That is also a fairly accurate description for living in some 
religious groups, utopian-socialist experiments, or other types of intentional communities that 
have existed for centuries. It is also nearly describes the idea of working in exchange for 
room and board, and it is similar to some marriages or other unequal relationships. These 
options offer the same benefits as the best version of slavery and they already exist44, and the 
reason they are not more popular is that other (better) options also exist.  
In the case of slavery, and also the utopian-socialist communities that have been tried over 
the last 200 years, one of the important lessons is that transferring 100% personal equity to 
another person or group is a poor form of coordination.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Compared to these situations, slavery offers more certainty to the slave owner; but since there is no viable 
way for the slave-owner to pay the associated premium, then that benefit cannot be realistically traded. 	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 8.4 – Value of personal equity in Cambodia  
 
The formula for calculating the present value of any future income flow is captured by the 
generalised formula popularised by Cochrane (2001):  
 
𝑝!! = 1𝑅!   𝐸! 𝑥!!!!                                                                                                                       (9)   
where 𝑝!! is price of asset 𝑖 at time t , !!! is the risk-specific discount rate and 𝐸!(𝑥!!!! ) is the 
expected future return for each risky asset 𝑖. 
The nuances of the pricing formula will depend on the specific details of the personal equity 
fund, including duration, percentage paid, the threshold for payment, buy-out provisions, and 
any other fund-specific details.  
The price will also depend on perceptions of moral hazard, economic forecasts, adverse 
selection and other risks, and the legal and tax status of the security. At it’s most intuitively 
simple; the present value is simply the integral of the discounted risk-adjusted pay-off 
schedule for the fund. For further details on pricing equity, in addition to Cochrane (2001) 
also see Merton (1990), Palacios (2004) and Hull (1989).  
 
8.4.1 Personal equity value at each education level 
While the risk remains uncertain, thanks to the results provided in Chapter 7 we now have 
(for the first time) sufficient information on the rate of return on education to be able to 
provide a rough estimate for the value of personal equity for an average 18 year old, which 
varies according to their level of education, shown in Table 8-1.  
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TABLE 8-1 VALUE OF PERSONAL EQUITY AT EDUCATION LEVEL (male) 
 Value of personal equity (age 18) 
No schooling qualification $25,553 
Primary school education $27,313 
High school education $33,473 
University education $44,733 
 
 
Note that all of the calculations start at age 18, though university students only start earning 
their full time income at age 22 (as well as a part-time income from age 20). Since the 
calculations start at age 18, the cost of primary and secondary school has not been included, 
but the cost of university is included in the above estimate (base case = $300/year tuition fee).   
An interesting conclusion that can be drawn from this is that even somebody with no assets in 
the traditional sense of the word actually has a financial asset with a theoretical value of 
about $25,000 just by virtue of being alive, as long as they expect to be alive and working in 
the future. Though it should be noted that the expected market price for personal equity is not 
the same as the theoretical value as the price would be adjusted for risk, and in fact the 
expected market value for selling 100% personal equity is $0 due to the extreme moral 
hazard.  
 
8.4.2 Personal equity value of an education 
 Following on from the above values we can see the asset value of an education. The 
difference between no formal education and a university degree is almost $20,000 in terms of 
the value of personal equity. For a school graduate considering going to university, that life 
decision will increase the value of their personal equity by $11,260. Breaking up the decision 
of a hypothetical school graduate into its components is shown in Table 8-2.  
As was already calculated in Chapter 7, once we factor in all costs and the timing of 
education, the rate of return from university is 14.1% for a male and 13.5% for a female. All 
things considered this seems like a good value investment.  
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TABLE 8-2 PERSONAL EQUITY DECISION FOR A SCHOOL LEAVER (male) 
 Value of personal equity (age 18) 
High school education $33,473 
 * change due to higher wages + $12,376 
 * change due to tuition fees - $1,117 
University education $44,733 
 
 
We can also consider the personal equity value from the perspective of a third party who buys 
a 10% share of personal equity in the above hypothetical 18 year old. For the below 
calculations, we will consider a personal equity contract in line with the contracts provided 
by the Human Capital Project (HCP) in Cambodia. For those contracts, the “price” of 
personal equity is the amount that HCP pays for the tuition fees, so in the above example the 
price has a present value of $1117.  The personal equity contract is equal to 10% of income 
for 10 years following graduation. Factoring in the four years of university, the contract lasts 
for 14 years, and then the dividends stop. The results for HCP for an average 18 year old 
male are given in Table 8-3 below. 
 
TABLE 8-3 PRICE AND VALUE OF PERSONAL EQUITY FOR HCP (male) 
 Value of personal equity (age 18) 
Price of personal equity  $1,117 
Value of personal equity $1,514 
Net present value of personal equity +$397 
Benefit/cost ratio 1.4 
Internal rate of return 9.8% 
 
 
Based on the education premiums calculated in Chapter 5 and the contract details used by 
HCP, the personal equity contracts provide a return to HCP of nearly 10%. Whether this 
represents good value depends on the estimated risk profile of Cambodian graduate incomes, 
for which we have insufficient information. If the risk-adjusted discount rate is less than 10% 
then HCP is getting value for money, but if the risk-adjusted discount rate is above 10% then 
HCP will be losing value through their personal equity contracts.  
	   174	  
To see how the HCP contracts impact on a hypothetical 18 year old, consider Table 8-4 
below.   
 
TABLE 8-4 DECISION FOR A SCHOOL LEAVER USING HCP (male) 
 Value of personal equity (age 18) 
High school education $33,473 
 * change due to higher wages + $12,376 
 * change due to HCP contract - $1514 
University education $44,336 
 
 
As with the situation shown in Table 8-2 there is a significant benefit to the hypothetical 18 
year old by going to university, with higher wages bringing a benefit of $12,376 (the same as 
the case in Table 8-2) and their HCP liabilities reducing their asset position by $1,514 
(slightly more than the case in Table 8-2) giving a net benefit of $10,863.  
Note the different situation for the student if they pay for university themselves (net benefit = 
$11,260) compared to using HCP finance (net benefit = $10,863). The difference is made up 
by the 9.8% return on investment paid to HCP to compensate for the risk of providing finance 
to the student. In effect, the student is “paying” $397 to HCP for insurance so that if they do 
not achieve a sufficiently high wage in their life they are not saddled with any debt to pay for 
the university fees. 
 
8.4.3 Risk premium for Cambodian personal equity 
The above calculations did not consider risks associated with particular personal equity 
contracts. By using a conventional discount rate, the above analysis implicitly assumes that it 
is possible to avoid idiosyncratic risk. That is an appropriate assumption for most 
investments, where people can remove idiosyncratic risk through diversification, but it may 
not be appropriate with human capital. Consequently the above estimates are likely to be an 
over-estimate the true value of personal equity in Cambodia.  
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Risk analysis of human capital investment is a fairly small niche within education economics. 
Christiansen and Neilson (2002) provided an early treatment of education as a financial asset, 
and they confirmed the trade-off between risk and return on education. More recently, 
Benzoni and Chyruk (2015) outlined an approach for factoring idiosyncratic risks into the 
present value of education, while Brown, Fang and Gomes (2015) took the next step and 
actually calculated the risk-adjusted present value of education. Most estimates for the value 
of an American degree are close to one million dollars, but the analysis by Brown et al. 
(2015) found that factoring in the risk of wage variability halves the present value to about 
half a million dollars.    
In the context of personal equity finance, the investor is directly exposed to the worker’s 
career success, wage variability, and risk of unemployment. Recall that the average monthly 
wage in the Regional Cambodia Education Survey was $104 per month, but the standard 
deviation was $81 (see Table 4-1). Wage profiles often include variations due to promotions, 
change of jobs, extended holiday, early retirement, and various other life events that were not 
included in the Chapter 5 models but could potentially impact the risk assessment. For a risk 
neutral person, wage variability is irrelevant and it would not change the value they put on 
personal equity, but most people are not risk neutral. A risk averse person will be willing to 
pay a risk premium to avoid risk (and will require a risk premium if they have to take on such 
a risk), with the size of the risk premium determined by the size of the risk and their attitude 
to risk45.  
For investments in personal equity contracts, the risks go beyond the asset-specific risks that 
were considered by Brown et al. (2015), and also include the moral hazard risks of 
behavioural change by the worker. The potential behavioural changes were discussed earlier 
in this chapter, and they are roughly equivalent to how people change behaviour in response 
to tax. Of the five behavioural responses mentioned in section 8.2 above, we can be fairly 
confident that four of them will have a negligible impact. For the low-income people in 
Cambodia, it is not realistic to expect a large change in labour supply decisions, and nor are 
they likely to downgrade careers, leave the country, or rearrange their reported income just to 
avoid the 10% HCP payments.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Technically,	  risk	  describes	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  outcome	  is	  unknown	  but	  the	  probability	  distribution	  is	  
known	  (e.g.	  50%	  chance	  of	  “heads”	  when	  flipping	  a	  coin)	  while	  uncertainty	  describes	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  
outcome	  is	  unknown	  and	  the	  probability	  distribution	  is	  also	  unknown.	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The one behavioural response that is potentially problematic is the threat of evasion, where 
the graduate might hide their income, lie about their income, or simply refuse to pay. Since 
Cambodia has a relatively weak legal system, it has been necessary to consider alternative 
mechanisms for encouraging compliance with the personal equity contracts46. Building on 
some of the approaches mentioned in section 8.2, the approach used by HCP has been: 
• Create a group (HCP alumni, international networks, relationship with university 
staff) with group benefits and a threat of exclusion for people who cheat; 
• Using their current group networks: there is a clause in the contract that cheating will 
be punished by pursing the student’s nominated sponsor (generally a parent) and 
blacklisting their high school or village; 
• Reputational effect, where there is a threat that cheating will be punished by naming 
and shaming in the local community, through regional newspapers, and online; 
• Increase their desire to be honest, by explaining that HCP is a non-profit where 
payments go to other poor students, pre-emptively praising students for their 
contributions in front of their family and friends; and 
• Finally, while the legal system may not be strong, the threat of legal action can still 
motivate behaviour since it will inevitably involve costs for all involved.  
Finally, instead of the process used in this section, the better approach for determining the 
present value of personal equity would be to observe the traded price in a secondary market 
for personal equity, however at the moment no such market exists. Chapter 9 will look into 
this idea in more detail.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  This	  situation	  provides	  a	  clear	  demonstration	  of	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  weak	  legal	  systems.	  An unreliable 
legal system increases the risk of non-payment, causing a higher risk premium and therefore a lower current 
value of personal equity. If the risk-adjusted value of personal equity becomes too low, then it will not be 
worthwhile for people to sell their personal equity, and personal equity finance will not be viable.  	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Chapter 9: Secondary markets in personal equity 
 
The last ten years has seen the personal equity industry start to develop, but there are still 
only a handful of established personal equity providers operating in a few countries. For the 
industry to be able to capture all of the benefits that are promised, the next step is the creation 
of a secondary market in personal equity.  
Since there are no personal equity markets at the moment, by necessity this chapter is 
theoretical. Section 9.1 breaks down the idea of personal equity markets into its main parts, 
considering the nature of personal equity funds that would be traded, the impact that would 
have on the personal equity industry, the potential for innovative new financial products such 
as “recession insurance”, and the information that we can learn from interpreting the traded 
price of the personal equity funds. 
After discussing the theoretical benefits of a personal equity market, section 9.2 will consider 
some of the practical issues involved with actually starting a secondary market. While 
Cambodia may have been an appropriate place to start offering personal equity finance, it 
may not yet be an ideal place to start a personal equity market.  
The proposed alternative location for the world’s first personal equity market is Australia, 
which already hosts a liquid and well-established share market, a sophisticated financial 
industry, and (importantly) already has a similar financial product in the form of Australian 
government HECS debt that is currently not being traded. After outlining the steps needed in 
launching a personal equity market, this chapter will conclude by addressing some of the 
likely objections and opportunities.  
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9.1 – Personal equity market in theory   
 
Investors in personal equity finance are slowly building a new industry, and in the process 
they are helping to improve access to education for low-income students, redistribute risk to 
those more able and willing to manage it, and transfer additional private funds into the 
education sector. But creating a new financial asset is only half the story. Once personal 
equity financial assets have been sold, an opportunity exists for them to be resold, and traded 
in a secondary market. While personal equity contracts already exist, at the moment there is 
no significant example of a traded secondary market47, so the discussion in this section is 
theoretical.  
Switching the focus from personal equity finance to personal equity markets means moving 
attention from the student (or other person selling their personal equity) to the investor. The 
earlier discussion of investor benefits admitted that the transaction costs and risk premium are 
currently prohibitive for many, but also noted that a secondary market would help reduce 
those costs and make personal equity a more profitable investment (sub-section 8.1.5). 
Investors and portfolio managers will certainly benefit from personal equity markets, but they 
won’t be the only beneficiaries since the investor money will be directed at students and the 
education industry.  
 
9.1.1 Asset backed securities and personal equity funds 
A secondary market exists whenever an investor sells personal equity to another investor, but 
that would not be an efficient or effective approach for personal equity trading. More 
realistically, a secondary market in personal equity would mean securitization and trading in 
asset-backed securities.  
Securitization involves bundling a group of assets together into a fund, and so long as those 
assets have different risk profiles then the diversified fund can achieve a higher risk-adjusted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Mike	  Merrill	  there	  is	  a	  very	  small	  secondary	  market	  where	  people	  can	  trade	  personal	  equity	  
shares	  online	  at	  www.KmikeyM.com	  (Davis,	  2013).	  Given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  shares,	  the	  case	  of	  Merrill	  is	  
arguably	  more	  a	  social	  experiment	  in	  how	  to	  make	  life	  decisions	  rather	  than	  a	  serious	  financial	  asset.	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rate of return (Sharpe, 1964). In the context of personal equity, the underlying assets are the 
personal equity contracts previously set up between investors and students (as discussed in 
Chapter 8) and when combined together they form a “personal equity backed security”, also 
known as a “personal equity fund”. By investing in a personal equity fund of 1000 random 
students instead of a personal equity contract of one random student, it is possible to invest in 
students while avoiding the individual-specific risk. The above hypothetical investments have 
the same average return (since they are all random students), but the personal equity fund has 
lower risk.     
Asset backed securities have a bad reputation. During the 2008 banking crisis, the price of 
AAA-rated asset backed securities fell so sharply that many investors went bankrupt 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). It is important to understand the risks involved, both to guard against 
those risks, and also to avoid guarding against risks that don’t exist. The fundamental 
problem was that some asset-backed securities (mostly mortgage backed securities) were 
incorrectly priced, and the crash represented an adjustment. It is reasonable to be concerned 
that personal equity funds might also be incorrectly priced at some stage, and that is a risk 
that investors should consider about any investment, but the problem is the pricing and not 
concept the asset-backing.     
Personal equity funds could theoretically include people based on any characteristic, though 
some combinations are more likely than others. The most obvious criteria for students would 
be according to their area of study, university, year of graduation, or some combination of 
those factors. For example, there could be a personal equity fund that included only 
“Cambodian economics graduates in the last 10 years” or “UQ graduates from 2010” or any 
other combination that financial innovators can imagine.  
Other potential options include having personal equity funds based on university grades, or 
postgraduate qualifications, or country/state of origin, or gender. While personal equity funds 
can potentially use any personal details, controversial or offensive criteria are less likely since 
they would alienate some investors. It would still be possible to sell individual personal 
equity contracts on a secondary market, but that would be unlikely due to the extra 
individual-specific risk, and could also raise privacy concerns for the individual in question. 
Another option is to create a single large personal equity fund that includes “all graduates” 
(or even “all people”), though it is likely that investors would prefer to have options, and as 
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discussed below there are spill-over benefits from having a variety of markets organised 
along sensible criteria. 
The establishment of personal equity markets will change the nature of the personal equity 
industry, and the remainder of this section will look at those changes: 
• Lower transaction costs and risk premium leads to more investment in personal 
equity, increasing the benefits outlined in the previous chapter (sub-section 9.1.2); 
• New financial products that give investors more options, including the option of 
buying “recession insurance” (sub-section 9.1.3); and 
• The comparative price of different personal equity funds can reveal information that is 
helpful for students, universities, and public policy makers (sub-section 9.1.4).  
 
9.1.2 Higher liquidity and lower transaction costs 
The most direct consequence of having a secondary market in any asset (including personal 
equity) is that it becomes quicker and easier for people to trade that asset. For assets that do 
not have a secondary market, buying and selling can be a slow process that involves high 
search and information costs. When an asset becomes available on a secondary market (such 
as shares listed on the stock exchange), trade becomes (1) quicker due to higher liquidity and 
also (2) cheaper and easier because of lower transaction costs.  
The liquidity of an asset is a measure of the speed at which people can buy or sell that asset, 
and it is an important determinant of its price. A perfectly liquid asset has no risk premium 
and will trade at a price that gives risk free returns, regardless of the underlying risk of the 
investment. This seemingly counter-intuitive result is because an investor would be able to 
instantly exit the market in the worst case scenario. Of course, in the worst case scenario the 
asset markets become less liquid, since there are fewer people on the “buy” side of the 
market, and once an asset loses its liquidity then the investment risk becomes relevant. In 
reality, there is no such thing as a perfectly liquid market, but the important point is that 
greater liquidity means lower risk faced by an investor (Garleanu & Pedersen, 2007).  
In addition to the benefits that come from greater liquidity, a secondary market can help 
reduce transaction costs in several ways. Most importantly, search and information costs are 
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lower because markets provide a central clearing house for relevant information, the price 
gives a more accurate reflection of underlying conditions, and it is easier to find other people 
interested in trade. Also, negotiation and contracting costs are lower because markets provide 
standardisation for asset details, asset quality, and procedures. Finally, monitoring and 
enforcement costs can be lower thanks to economies of scale, and in some cases markets can 
help strengthen market institutions, that in turn lead to cheaper and more effective 
enforcement (Herring & Chatusripitak, 2000).  
Combining these two points, by reducing risk and decreasing costs, the existence of a 
secondary market increases the risk-adjusted return on capital. This gives a direct benefit to 
the investor, and also leads to more investment, resulting in more capital (including human 
capital). For the most part, these benefits are an amplification of the benefits detailed in 
section 8.1, including:  
• Higher returns for investors, which benefits anybody who has exposure to the markets 
such as owners of managed funds and superannuation accounts; 
• More funds going into education; 
• More efficient markets contribute to allocative efficiency; 
• More opportunities for students to sell their personal equity at a good price, and for 
them to decrease their risk exposure; 
• More access to finance for students without collateral; and 
• If there are positive net externalities from education, those will also increase.  
 
9.1.3 Derivatives and recession insurance  
This benefit is an extension of the issues discussed in sub-section 8.1.7, where it was noted 
that personal equity could be used to help income smoothing or provide income insurance. 
With a personal equity market, there will be more such opportunities, though it can be hard to 
know exactly what options will exist, as financial innovators are constantly developing new 
and unpredictable derivative financial products. 
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One opportunity that personal equity derivatives allow is for an investor to take a “short” 
position on average income (or perhaps just “graduate income”). This can be done by buying 
a put option and/or selling a call option48, and it means that an investor would make money if 
the price of personal equity decreased, which would occur if the expectation of future wages 
becomes more negative. This provides a form of “recession insurance”. During a recession, 
the wage expectations decrease, and so investors with a short position on personal equity 
would be paid.  
While anybody could take out this form of recession insurance, macroeconomists may want 
to consider the opportunity of the government taking such a position. During a recession, 
relatively lower wages mean that income tax revenue is weaker than usual, and the so-called 
automatic stabilisers mean that government budgets are often pushed into deficit, which can 
crowd out net exports and slow the recovery (Humphreys, 2012). By taking a short position 
on personal equity, when there is a recession and wage expectations decline, the short 
position would pay out and the government would receive additional revenue just when the 
budget is moving towards deficit. For maximum effect, the government would want to take 
the short position against foreign investors so that their financial gain did not come at the 
expense of Australian investors.  
Individuals or companies could also take a short position on personal equity as a hedge 
against lower incomes during a recession. This strategy allows for more effective income 
smoothing over the business cycle, and also acts as a counter-cyclical pressure – injecting 
money into the economy during a downturn. 
 
9.1.4 Interpreting the price of personal equity  
A traded personal equity market would also provide valuable information about the expected 
value of different degrees. The market value of a personal equity fund would show the market 
expectations of future incomes for the graduates in that fund. A low personal equity price 
suggests low expected future income; while a relatively higher personal equity price suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Buying	  a	  “put	  option”	  means	  that	  you	  have	  the	  opportunity	  (but	  not	  obligation)	  to	  sell	  equity	  in	  the	  future	  
at	  a	  fixed	  price.	  If	  prices	  go	  down	  in	  the	  future	  then	  an	  investor	  can	  buy	  at	  the	  lower	  price	  at	  immediately	  sell	  
at	  the	  higher	  put	  option	  price	  and	  make	  a	  profit.	  Selling	  a	  “call	  option”	  means	  another	  person	  has	  the	  
opportunity	  (but	  not	  obligation)	  to	  buy	  equity	  from	  you	  in	  the	  future	  at	  a	  fixed	  price.	  If	  prices	  go	  down	  in	  the	  
future	  then	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  call	  option	  will	  not	  use	  their	  option.	  However,	  the	  seller	  of	  the	  option	  is	  still	  paid	  
and	  so	  makes	  a	  profit.	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relatively higher expected future income. For example, if the market price for dentists were to 
increase, then the market would be indicating an expectation of higher future incomes for 
dentists, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, if the market price for graduates of Griffith University 
was higher than the market price for James Cook University, then the market is signalling 
that it expects Griffith graduates to get higher future incomes compared with James Cook 
graduates, ceteris paribus.  
At the moment, estimates of future graduate incomes come primarily from Mincer models 
that regress log-income with education, experience and often a range of other variables from 
current graduates (as discussed in the earlier chapters). Many of these regressions do not give 
disaggregated results and so provide only generic information about a hypothetical average 
graduate. More importantly, regressions can only look at historical performance and do not 
look forward at expected income. Finally, there remain some significant problems with the 
standard Mincer methodology, and even a more refined methodology is limited by only 
looking at a relatively small sample. Traded markets will make use of all the information 
provided by standard historical analysis as well as many other sources of information, and are 
likely to provide a more accurate, and far more detailed, indicator of future income. For more 
on the predictive powers of markets, see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004, 2006), Hanson et al. 
(2004), Leigh and Wolfers (2007), and Snowberg et al. (2012). 
Prices from a traded market in personal equity funds would give information on the expected 
relative incomes for different degrees and for different universities. By comparing expected 
future income from a certain degree with current tuition fees for that same degree, students 
would have a better idea of the value for money, allowing them to make more informed 
decisions. This information could also be valuable to universities, regulators, and policy 
makers in trying to make the best plans for the future.  
There are two groups who are likely to object to such transparency. Since it will be easier for 
students to identify which courses and which universities provide a relatively low benefit, 
people associated with those low-benefit courses and low-benefit universities would likely 
prefer that such information remain obscured. Any explicit attempt to block transparency 
would be difficult to defend. Even if transparency was successfully blocked, it is not possible 
to entirely stifle information about different courses. Estimates and expectations will always 
exist about the relative merits of different courses; the only difference is that with personal 
equity market prices, people will have more accurate information. 
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Currently there is an implicit subsidy that goes from income-successful courses to income-
unsuccessful courses, and the information gained from personal equity prices will make those 
subsidies explicit. Whether those subsidies continue or not is a political question. If a low-
price course is considered to have significant social merit, then a government or university 
can continue to subsidise that course.  
While universities with low priced personal equity funds will not enjoy their low ranking, 
there already exist several university rankings based on significantly more subjective criteria. 
Indeed, universities and governments will benefit from the increased information about 
university degrees. Changes in the market price of personal equity funds over time provides 
information on changing expectations about future incomes, which can allow universities and 
governments to adjust policies to prepare for such changes. For example, if the market 
expected a shortage of nurses in five years time then the expected future income of nurses 
would increase and so the price of the nurses’ personal equity funds would increase. The 
universities, government and/or other financers might respond by increasing the incentives 
for people to study nursing.  
Further, more accurate information about the economic value of specific degrees could allow 
universities and/or governments to introduce more accurate pricing for different degrees 
(Palacios, 2002), which in turn could encourage more accurate decision making and 
potentially more effective competition.  
To the degree that more accurate information about the value of degrees will encourage better 
decision making, this will result in a more efficient allocation of resources (both money and 
time) towards those areas that have the highest long-term returns (Clark, 2006). So not only 
will there be more human capital, but people will be able to make better decisions based on 
better quality information. This also means that any potential positive education externality 
will also be increased (Yu & Salyards, 2008).  
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9.2 – Personal equity markets in practice  
 
The previous section discussed the role of secondary markets in reducing transaction costs 
and risk in an industry, but establishing such markets also involves significant cost and risk 
and will only be successful in the right circumstances. There is a long list of potential markets 
with potential benefits that have remained theoretical due to insurmountable barriers making 
the market unviable in practice. The right environment for the creation of a new market 
requires the coming together of sellers with appropriate products, motivated buyers, relevant 
skills and capacity, and supportive institutions that encourages coordination. The 
macroeconomic environment also plays a role, with a larger and richer population making 
markets more viable.  
Personal equity markets are most likely to evolve in countries that already have a large base 
of financially sophisticated investors, a large supply of capital to ensure liquidity, and 
experience with trading complex financial instruments, all of which suggest that it is more 
likely to occur in a developed country (Fredholm & Taghavi-Awal, 2006). The missing 
ingredient is the financial asset to trade, since there are relatively few personal equity 
contracts available with which to form personal equity funds.  
Just as important as the market participants are the institutions that will need to be in place to 
ensure a well functioning market, including appropriate accounting standards, legal 
protection, a stable political system, and informal institutions such as honesty and trust. 
Talking about constructing new financial markets, Herring and Chatusripitak describe the 
institutional requirements as “an appropriate legal framework, strong accounting and 
disclosure standards, and efficient and reliable clearing and settlement arrangements” 
supported by “analysts and ratings agencies who can help investors” (2010, p23). In 
particular, in many countries a personal equity market would be at a disadvantage compared 
with other similar investments in terms of legal status and tax treatment. To make personal 
equity markets more practical, governments around the world should ensure that personal 
equity funds face the same legal and tax treatment that applies to comparable financial assets 
(Palacios, 2002).  
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Non-discriminatory tax and legal treatment would pave the way for the organic development 
of a personal equity market over time, though at the moment there are simply not enough 
personal equity contracts to form a viable and liquid secondary market.  
 
9.2.1 Personal equity market in Cambodia 
This thesis has focused on Cambodian education and Cambodian personal equity, so it is 
appropriate to first consider the possibility of a Cambodian personal equity market. The one 
small advantage that Cambodia has is the existence of at least some personal equity contracts 
as a result of the Human Capital Project, though in practice the personal equity industry in 
Cambodia is too small to be relevant.  
When it comes to the market elements, institutions, or macroeconomic conditions, Cambodia 
makes for a poor option to host a personal equity market.  
Cambodia lacks a sophisticated financial system, with the Cambodian Securities Exchange 
(CSX) having only launched in 2011 and including two low performing stocks with almost 
no liquidity (Investment Frontier, 2014). There is insufficient domestic demand for a regular 
equity market, let alone the addition of a world-first niche market in personal equity. Even 
more problematic than the lack of available capital is the lack of relevant skills and capacity 
to help build a proper market. Put simply, Cambodia lacks the basic market elements 
necessary to host a functional and liquid personal equity market. 
The institutional environment compounds that situation further, with a notoriously unreliable 
legal system, inadequate accounting and reporting standards, and a troubling political risk 
premium. In his review of financial markets in developing countries, Volz (2009) warns that 
“innovative financial products, as great their potential benefits might be, should simply not be 
allowed if they are too complex for regulators to appraise their risk” and that is almost 
certainly the case in Cambodia. While informal institutions can sometimes provide the 
necessary structures and incentives, that is not realistic in this instance and there may not be 
sufficient levels of trust and binding social capital needed to help reduce the typical 
administration and compliance costs (Norton et al., 1997).  
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Finally, while a Cambodian personal equity market might not be a realistic short-term vision, 
it is worth noting that Cambodian personal equity could potentially be traded on other 
markets, if the right circumstances presented themselves.  
 
9.2.2 Personal equity market in Australia 
The Australian government is in the unique position of being able to immediately create a 
large and liquid market by leveraging off their existing HECS debt. This can be done with no 
change in education policy, so that from the perspective of students and universities the 
HECS system could remain unchanged. 
As of 2012, outstanding HECS debt was just over $26.3 billion (Norton, 2013). From the 
perspective of students that is seen as a liability, but from the government’s perspective it is a 
significant financial asset. Despite the face value of over $26 billion, the actual market value 
might be closer to $15 billion. The government doesn’t report the market value of their HECS 
debt, but the combination of over $6 billion in bad debt and the opportunity cost of the zero 
real interest rate loan means the present value of HECS is perhaps half the stated amount49. 
Nonetheless, whether the HECS debt is worth $15 billion or $30 billion, it still represents a 
large financial asset for the commonwealth government50.  
Selling off their HECS receivable would achieve very little, since it would simply exchange 
one financial asset for another (though with different risk) without achieving any of the 
benefits discussed in section 9.1 above. Instead, the government could use their HECS 
financial asset as a base from which to create personal equity contracts that they can sell onto 
the market, and thereby instantly create the world’s first personal equity market.  
There is also a strategic reason to have the government involved in creating personal equity 
markets. One of the obstacles that have undermined the growth of the personal equity 
industry has been incomplete legal protections and an uncompetitive tax structure. By having 
the government create the market, it will be in their interest and within their power to ensure 
that the personal equity market does not suffer from legal or tax disadvantages compared with 
other equivalent investments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  This means the government’s higher education subsidy is significantly higher than the official estimates.  	  
50	  This	  is	  also	  true	  for	  the	  USA,	  where	  outstanding	  student	  loans	  make	  up	  39%	  of	  their	  federal	  government	  
financial	  assets,	  which	  is	  the	  largest	  asset	  group	  (Short,	  2013).	  The	  present	  value	  is	  certainly	  lower.	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To convert their HECS debt into a personal equity market, the first step is for the government 
to consider what types of personal equity funds will be created. While the discussion in sub-
section 9.1.1 explained that many options are possible, realistically we might expect the 
government to bundle personal equity funds according to the student’s university, field of 
study, or year of graduation (or some combination of the three).  
The rest of the process is outlined in the seven steps below: 
(1) Decide on the defining characteristics for the first round of personal equity funds (for 
sake of argument, the HECS obligations could be bundled according to faculty); 
(2) Estimate discount rates, which should factor in underlying risk (variability in future 
incomes), moral hazard, adverse selection, and any fund-specific risks;  
(3) For each fund, find HECS data and wage profile estimates for the relevant graduates; 
(4) Using equation 9 from section 8.4, calculate the present value of the fund’s HECS 
liabilities, based on amount owing, expected graduate wage profile, and the discount 
rate estimated in step 251;  
(5) Specify the parameters of the personal equity fund to be created, including how long 
the fund will pay dividends (if limited), whether there is any minimum or maximum 
wage threshold, buy-out provisions, or any other price-relevant rules; 
(6) Using equation 9 from section 8.4, given the parameters determined in step 5 and the 
discount rate estimated in step 2, and tax rates, determine what percentage of personal 
equity is needed to create a present value the same as calculated in step 452; 
(7) Have an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for the personal equity funds, selling shares in 
each fund into a tradable secondary market; and 
(8) Once the funds are being publicly traded, market participants would be free to re-
bundle the personal equity funds according to their own preferences.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Calculating	  the	  HECS	  value	  is	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  it	  is	  for	  normal	  debt,	  since	  HECS	  is	  a	  debt-­‐equity	  hybrid.	  The	  
graduate	  always	  pays	  the	  same	  real	  amount	  of	  money	  to	  the	  government	  (if	  they	  pay),	  but	  the	  present	  value	  
depends	  on	  when	  the	  graduate	  pays;	  higher	  income	  means	  paying	  earlier,	  means	  higher	  present	  value,	  
52	  The	  formula	  for	  calculating	  the	  present	  value	  was	  shown	  as	  equation	  (9)	  in	  section	  8.4,	  and	  can	  be	  simplified	  
down	  to	  p	  =	  mx,	  where	  the	  present	  value	  price	  (p)	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  asset-­‐specific	  discount	  rate	  (m)	  and	  
the	  expected	  future	  income	  flows	  (x).	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Of course, there is no rush to sell personal equity funds that are matched against all of the 
HECS debt. Pilot schemes can be tried with only a limited number of personal equity funds, 
and the government only needs to sell enough equity to ensure that the market is sufficiently 
liquid to provide accurate prices.  
Generally speaking there are six types of benefits that come from the introduction of a 
personal equity market, but in the case of Australia two of those are redundant. Personal 
equity markets can help to improve access to university and help students to reduce their risk, 
but neither of these are a concern for Australia. That still leaves four benefits that can be 
expected from a personal equity market in Australia.  
 
(1) A personal equity market reduces the costs of investing in three ways: (i) easy access 
to the personal equity market helps to reduce transaction costs (ii) the liquidity of the 
market reduces the risk faced by investors; and (iii) the unique nature of these 
investment opportunities increases portfolio diversification, which increases the risk-
adjusted return. These benefits are captured directly by owners of managed funds or 
superannuation accounts, and they also flow through as increased investment, capital 
accumulation, and economic growth.  
(2) Increased investment combined with access to the personal equity markets provide the 
mechanism for investors to increase the amount of money directed towards higher 
education in Australia. Once the personal equity market exists, it is not restricted to 
simply trading the personal equity sold by the government, but can also help connect 
investors directly with students or potential students, thereby increasing the amount of 
money available for students (or even non-students) in Australia. 
(3) The derivatives that would be created on the back of the personal equity market 
provide a wider range of opportunities for investors, and in particular there is the 
option for the government, industry and individuals to take out “recession insurance”, 
by taking a hedge against economic downturns by taking a foreign-counterparty short 
position on Australian graduates. Such a policy would pay out when there was an 
economic downturn, ensuring revenue to the owner of the policy at a time when 
others may be suffering from the recession. 
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(4) The price of a traded personal equity fund gives information about expected future 
wages for the graduates in that fund. By comparing the prices across universities, 
areas of study, and over time, it is possible to draw conclusions about the relative 
value of different degrees, and that information can help people to make better 
decisions. For Australia, the value of better education decisions could be worth a total 
of $2.9 billion as a discounted present value.  
 
The $2.9 billion estimate is very speculative. There doesn’t exist a robust methodology for 
estimating the benefit of better information and any result should be treated with caution. The 
proxy method used here is to consider the financial benefit from some students responding to 
better information by choosing more profitable careers.  Research by Daly et al. (2015) shows 
different private rates of return for different areas of study. Based on evidence that students 
care roughly equally about higher incomes and intrinsic learning53, this estimate assumes that 
better information encourages the low-income cohort to shift half way to the average rate of 
return. That represents an increase in the simple average of 1.6% for men and 1.2% for 
women, and applying those change to the $11.4 billion of private university spending (The 
Grattan Institute, 2012) gives an estimate of $160 million annual benefit. Using a 5% 
discount rate that equates to a total discounted present value of $2.9 billion (0.2% of GDP). 
 
9.2.3 Concerns about an Australian personal equity market 
An immediate reaction to this idea is to worry about the impact on the HECS system for 
students or for universities, so it is important to repeat that the ideas presented above do not 
require any change to the HECS system as seen by students or universities. The university 
would still receive the exact same amount from the government and the student would face 
the exact same HECS liability to pay in the future. From their perspective, nothing has 
changed. What has changed is the government’s mix of financial assets, and that is another 
area of potential concern. While their total amount of financial assets remains unchanged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  The Sodexo University Lifestyle Survey (2012) and The American Freshman (2012) both give evidence that 
students care roughly equally about higher incomes and intrinsic learning, The main stated reason for going to 
university is actually “getting a job” with “higher incomes” and “interest in topic” just behind. 
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(they are simply swapping one financial asset for another), the government are now exposed 
to a different risk profile. There are two reasons for the change in risk profile.  
First, since the government will still receive HECS payments from students, but will now pay 
out personal equity dividends to investors, the government is exposed to the risk of the 
differential between HECS receipts and personal equity payments. The government will 
“win” (receive more than status quo) if personal equity values decrease, and they will “lose” 
(pay more than status quo) if personal equity values increase. This is in effect taking a short 
position on graduate incomes. As discussed in sub-section 9.1.3, this effectively means the 
government is taking out “recession insurance” and could potentially be seen as feature of 
this reform instead of a flaw. However, if the government did not want to change their risk 
profile, they can unwind their short position by offsetting it with a long position.  
The government can take a long position without buying back the personal equity funds 
through the use of derivatives; they can buy call options and/or sell put options (also known 
as a “credit default swap”) to re-arrange their exposure to graduate incomes until they had 
their desired risk exposure54. These trades would mean that the government was increasing its 
upside exposure in the case of higher than expected graduate incomes, but also increasing its 
downside exposure in the case of lower than expected graduate incomes. For more 
information on the pricing of financial derivatives, see Clark (2013)55. Using the above 
financial tools, the government could effectively recreate their original risk profile and 
neutralise any concerns about changes in their financial position.  
A second change in the financial risk position of the government depends on what the 
government does with the proceeds of the sale of shares in personal equity funds. If the 
government chose to re-invest that money in a more diversified portfolio of financial assets 
then that would increase the government’s risk-adjusted rate of return and would provide a 
clear benefit to the government. However, speculating on the financial decisions of the 
government is beyond the scope of this paper, and probably beyond the scope of most 
fortune-tellers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Note	  that	  buying	  a	  call	  option	  and	  selling	  a	  put	  option	  at	  the	  same	  strike	  price	  is	  equivalent	  to	  buying	  a	  
“future”	  (an	  agreement	  to	  buy	  an	  asset	  in	  the	  future	  for	  a	  currently	  agreed	  price).	  	  
55	  As	  a	  side	  note,	  if	  a	  private	  investor	  wanted	  to	  buy	  an	  ICL	  instead	  of	  personal	  equity	  they	  can	  do	  this	  by	  
buying	  personal	  equity,	  and	  selling	  a	  call	  option	  on	  that	  personal	  equity.	  In	  finance,	  this	  strategy	  is	  sometimes	  
called	  “renting	  out	  your	  equity”	  so	  that	  if	  the	  price	  goes	  up	  you	  have	  cashed	  out,	  but	  if	  the	  price	  stays	  the	  
same	  or	  goes	  down	  then	  you	  continue	  to	  receive	  “rent”	  (payment	  for	  the	  call	  options)	  for	  your	  equity.	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There are two other possible concerns: the change might be too small to matter; or the change 
could be too large to consider. The change can appear small because there is no need to 
change the HECS system as it currently operates and the government is doing little more than 
changing the structure of their financial assets, which is something they do regularly without 
any fanfare. This is all true, but the virtue of creating a personal equity market is not about 
directly changing government policy or finance. The benefit comes from creating new market 
that does not currently exist anywhere in the world, and a market that might lead to important 
benefits for investors, students, universities, governments, and economic efficiency.  
The opposite complaint is that such a reform is too radical since it allows greater 
transparency and has the potential to change the government’s financial risk profile. Some 
people may also be instinctively opposed to financial markets, while others will be worried 
about the consequences of transparency that flows from a public market. Compared to other 
economic reforms in Australia’s history, an increase in transparency and change in the 
government’s risk profile (that can be reversed in any case) appear fairly minor.  
The introduction of a personal equity market can be done without impacting universities, 
students, or even the government’s financial risk profile. If this chapter is correct in 
suggesting that such a market is achievable, then the main consequences are those benefits 
that will flow from having a large and liquid personal equity market.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 
The growth of the education industry in Cambodia has helped change the nation, but until 
now there has not been a proper estimate for the Cambodian rate of return on education. 
Based on the Regional Cambodia Education Survey done in 2012, the rate of return for 
education in Cambodia is 10.3% for men and 9.9% for women, and the rate of return for 
university education in Cambodia is 14.1% for men and 13.5% for women. These results are 
broadly in line with estimates for other countries.  
As discussed below, many of the knowledge gaps regarding Cambodian education have now 
been addressed, including corrections to previous estimates and new information on the value 
of Cambodia’s human capital.   
 
10.1 Cambodia’s education premium 
The rate of return is not the same thing as the education premium. The rate of return is the 
ongoing benefit as a percentage of the cost, while the education premium is a measure of the 
wage increase associated with additional education (without factoring in the tuition fees). The 
premium is the more widely reported number. The results from this thesis are that an 
additional year of education is associated with a 6.6% wage premium, and an additional year 
of university study is associated with a premium of 15.9% or 20.6%, depending on the 
preferred method of reporting.  This is not the first time that the education premium has been 
calculated for Cambodia, but it is the first time that the university premium has been reported 
correctly.   
In a previous estimate by Lall and Sakallariou (2010), the average education premium was 
found to be similar to the average in this thesis. Unfortunately, their paper incorrectly 
interpreted the coefficients of dummy variables in a log-linear model, and that error 
significantly impacted their estimate for the university premium. Chapter 3 of this thesis 
provides adjusted estimates for university premiums based on their model data, and finds that 
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where Lall and Sakallariou reported university premiums of 11.3% for men and 12% for 
women (2007 data) the actual premiums were 26.6% and 28.7% respectively. Chapter 3 also 
includes an update to Lall and Sakallariou’s study, by applying their model to an updated 
version of their data set, with similar (though slightly higher) premiums found. Both of those 
results (adjusted and updated) are superseded by the estimates in Chapters 5 and 6, based on 
newer data and more comprehensive models.  
The comparative university premium from the data in this thesis is 20.6%, though Chapter 5 
includes an argument that the conventional approach for reporting university premiums is 
flawed. The conventional approach takes advantages of the properties of log-linear models, 
and determines the premium by making a few adjustments to the dummy variable 
coefficients. The consequence of this is that the university premium measures the higher 
wages in comparison to a counter-factual of zero education. A more helpful measure would 
be to report the higher wages in comparison to the counter-factual of having finished school, 
since that is the reality for a person deciding whether or not to study at university. This thesis 
provides the premium in conventional form (20.6%) for sake of comparison, but suggests that 
15.9% is the more accurate measure. 
While the 6.6% and 15.9% premiums are the findings of the preferred model, in Chapter 6 a 
series of alternative models are considered that give slightly different results. In particular, 
two new models are suggested that allow for heterogeneity in the experience premium, so 
that the level of wage growth can vary between different education levels. The results of that 
model suggest that much of the impact of education occurs through a higher rate of wage 
growth rather than a direct wage premium. Consequently, models that impose a homogeneous 
experience premium (which includes most models in education economics) will exaggerate 
university education premiums and underestimate their experience premiums, which has the 
effect of bringing forward the benefit of education and artificially increasing the estimated 
rate of return for university.  
 
10.2 Rate of return on education in Cambodia 
The results from Chapters 3, 5 and 6 were focused on the education premium, which 
measures the direct financial benefit from education. In many cases, the more useful measure 
is the rate of return, since it measures the benefits against the costs. This thesis provides the 
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first properly calculated estimate for the Cambodia rate of return on education. It is 
theoretically possible for the education premium and rate of return to be the same, but the 
necessary conditions are not met in the case of Cambodia (or most countries), and when the 
rate of return is calculated we find some important differences.  
The education premium suggested a convex relationship between education and wages, with 
higher premiums for higher education; in contrast the rate of return is roughly constant for 
different levels of education, with the rate of return actually slightly lower for university than 
for school. The main reason for this is that university is more expensive than school. These 
results highlight one reason for an ongoing controversy in the education economics literature, 
where many early papers found decreasing returns (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1994) but a 
collection of more recent papers have found increasing returns (e.g. Kifle, 2007). In some 
cases, the different conclusions are simply due to reporting a different indicator -- with 
evidence on the education premium more likely to show a convex relationship between 
education and wages (increasing returns), while evidence for the rate of return on education 
often gives a different result (decreasing returns).  
For university education, the rate of return is 14.1% for men and 13.5% for women, and these 
results are fairly robust (not sensitive) to most parameter variations, though the assumptions 
about student labour and child labour can make a big difference. In addition to the rate of 
return, the impact of education can be reported in other ways. Using a 5% discount rate, 
Chapter 7 goes on to show that the benefit from graduating university translates into a net 
present value of $11,529 for men and $8604 for women; and a benefit-cost ratio of 3.46 for 
men and 3.25 for women.  
 
10.3 Personal equity finance 
Information collected in the Regional Cambodia Education Survey (CES) 2012, estimated in 
Chapter 5, and calculated in Chapter 7 was subsequently used to calculate the value of 
personal equity. An interesting insight from Chapter 8 is that an average 18 year old male 
Cambodian with no education and no conventional wealth has personal equity with a 
theoretical value of about US $25,000 simply by virtue of being alive and planning to work in 
the future.   
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It should be noted that the market price for personal equity will not be the same as the 
theoretical value, since the market price will factor in the risks associated with the future 
reported wage profile. The total risk includes the underlying risk related to employment and 
career paths, along with the risk that the issuer of personal equity may try to disregard their 
contractual obligations, and the moral hazard risk that the issuer may change their labour 
supply because their reward for working has diminished.  
For the moment ignoring risk, a hypothetical male school leaver who goes to university will 
increase the value of their personal equity by $12,376 while only facing $1117 as the cost of 
university. The return on university education represents a good value investment, but some 
people are not able to take this opportunity because their family cannot raise the money.  
There is a large segment of Cambodian society that does not yet have a realistic way to 
access university education. Human Capital Project (HCP) offers a way for anybody in 
Cambodia to afford university. For people with no disposable income, no collateral, and no 
desire to take on risk, HCP offers to pay the university costs in exchange for 10% of their 
personal equity for a fixed amount of time up to 10 years. Based on the parameters of the 
HCP contract, a hypothetical male school leaver who uses HCP’s personal equity finance 
would increase the value of their personal equity by $12,376 and will make personal equity 
payments in the future that have a present value of $1514.  
The same situation can be assessed from the perspective of the investor. Based on the same 
parameters as given above (10% personal equity for 10 years) the investor expects to receive 
future payments that have a present value of $1514 in exchange for them paying the 
university costs that have a present value of $1117. In total, the investor receives a 9.8% rate 
of return on their 10% personal equity investment. Whether a 9.8% return is good value 
depends on the assumptions made about risks and the amount of liquidity in the personal 
equity market. These are still unknown variables. 
The risk premium attached to personal equity (like all equity) depends on the amount of 
liquidity, which would be helped by the existence of a personal equity market. At the moment 
there is no secondary market for personal equity anywhere in the world, but such a market 
would have potentially significant consequences. The benefits from a secondary market are 
not just for the students who need to access finance and investors who want to diversity their 
portfolio -- there are benefits that spill over to other students, universities and policy makers, 
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who are now able to see the traded price of the personal equity and draw conclusions about 
the expected future benefits from specific education choices.  
A personal equity market will be more successful in a country that already has sophisticated 
financial markets, a large supply of capital, a trusted and effective legal system, and 
appropriate accounting standards. These requirements make it unlikely that personal equity 
markets will emerge in developing countries. Chapter 9 proposed an innovative policy 
solution in Australia that offers the potential of personal equity markets without the need for 
a change in policy or the government’s financial position.  
 
10.4 Summary and main lessons 
This chapter started by quoting the rate of return on education, but that is only one outcome 
among many in this thesis. A list of key conclusions from this thesis is listed below, covering 
education economics and personal equity finance, with one comment on institutional 
economics.  
• The best previous estimate for the annualised university premium in Cambodia was 
11%, but that was based on an incorrect interpretation of the data and the actual 
premium was about 27%.  
• Using the most robust education model ever used for Cambodia, the average 
education premium is 6.6% and the annualised university premium is 20.6%, with the 
premium being convex. 
• The conventional approach for reporting the annualised university premium is 
misleading since it uses “no education” as the baseline; using the more accurate 
“finished school” as a baseline gives an annualised university premium of 15.9% 
(instead of 20.6%), which is the appropriate metric for people considering university.  
• When models allow for heterogeneous experience premiums the result is higher 
experience premiums for university students and a lower education premium; models 
that impose homogeneous experience premiums (i.e. most models) will overestimate 
the direct education premium, and overestimate the return on university education.  
	   198	  
• Evidence from Cambodia supports the strong experience hypothesis (SEH) that the 
apparent convexity in education premiums is actually caused by ignoring 
heterogeneous experience premiums. The weak experience hypothesis (WEH) makes 
the more modest claim that the convexity of education premiums is real but 
exaggerated by models that ignore heterogeneous experience premiums.  
• The average rate of return on education in Cambodia is 10.3% for men and 9.9% for 
women; and the rate of return on university in Cambodia is 14.1% for men and 13.5% 
for women. While the education premium is convex, the rate of return is close to 
linear. 
• The net present value of university education is over US $11,259 for men and $8604 
for women; the benefit-cost ratio is 3.46 for men and 3.25 for women. 
• An average uneducated Cambodian (male, age 18) with no education and no 
conventional wealth, owns his own personal equity with a theoretical value of about 
US $25,000. The personal equity value for a high school graduate is $33,473 and for 
university graduate is $44,733.  
• Providing HCP finance to a student to go to university will give them a benefit of 
approximately $11,000 (for men) or $8000 (for women) and will earn a rate of return 
of 9.8% for HCP (benefit-cost ratio of 1.4).  
• Long term contracts (such as personal equity finance used by HCP) can be sustained 
despite weak legal protection through the use of group power (implicit threat of 
removing or reducing group benefits), reputation effects (advertising dishonesty), and 
appealing to innate preferences for honesty, altruism, cooperation, and peace. 
• Personal equity can be used to analyse marriage and some community groups, provide 
unemployment or retirement income, and purchase “recession insurance” by taking a 
short position on wages. 
• The Australian government could create a liquid secondary market in personal equity 
without changing education policy and having full control of their risk profile, which 
would improve information, increase investment returns and investment in education, 
and increase financing choices for students, without any discernable costs or risks.  
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10.5 Future research 
When this thesis was first imagined there were four broad areas of investigation. The final 
product concentrated on two of those areas (education economics and personal equity 
finance), but only made the briefest references to the other areas, which are the economics of 
non-profit production, and the analysis of emergent market institution. While Chapter 8 did 
include a brief discussion of non-state strategies for enforcing rules, that discussion was all 
too brief and is worthy of much more thorough consideration.  
One fascinating issue that did not make it into the final version of this thesis is a 
consideration of the similarities and differences between profit production systems and non-
profit production systems. Returning to the central topics of this thesis, a future research 
agenda could follow several possible paths.  
• The survey results in Cambodia proved sufficient information to estimate the 
education premium, but not sufficient to allow detailed comparison between 
provinces, areas of study, and universities. Future updates to the Cambodia Education 
Survey would allow regular improvements and refinement of our understanding of the 
Cambodian education system.  
• The reporting within education economics remains a point of contention, where 
different interpretations and reporting styles are distorting the underlying information 
and giving conflicting signals. This is much more than the possibility of 
misinterpreting dummy variable coefficients in log-linear regression, but rather 
highlights the need for some clarity in distinguishing between the education premium 
and rate of return, the role of child labour assumptions in the rate of return estimates, 
and especially a rejection of the conventional method for reporting the annualised 
university premium. Since public policy is often justified with reference to the 
findings of education economics, this is a research agenda with the potential have real 
world consequences. 
• One of the most obvious research agendas to come out of this thesis is to further 
investigate the utility of the two new heterogeneous experience models presented, by 
using those models with data from other countries, and further testing the veracity of 
the strong and weak versions of the experience hypothesis.  
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• Continuing from the above point, if the experience hypothesis is correct, then there is 
need for a new theoretical framework for understanding the transmission mechanism 
between education and income. The new theory would need to explain the link 
between education and variations in the experience premium. 
• One research agenda that follows from the discussion of personal equity is the use of 
personal equity as an analytical tool for understanding various types of human 
interaction, specifically including marriage but also extending to some types of 
community groups and tribal societies.  
• Two new uses for personal equity finance were mentioned in this thesis, including 
personal equity as an alternative source for unemployment or retirement income, and 
taking a short position on personal equity as a form of “recession insurance” that 
could potentially be useful both for people in the private sector as well as government.  
• More conventionally, the ongoing research agenda into personal equity finance as a 
way to improve access to education, increase investment in education, and resolve the 
previously prevalent failure in the capital markets is likely to continue expanding, and 
personal equity providers such as Lumni and the Human Capital Project will soon be 
at the stage where they can provide data for proper analysis.  
• Finally, the idea at the end of the thesis of introducing a secondary market in personal 
equity to provide improved information about education can be pursued in a number 
of directions -- better understanding the potential risks from trading in the personal 
equity market; refining the appropriate (and inappropriate) uses of the price data; and 
at the level of implementing the reform through the maze of real world political 
compromise.   
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Appendix: Regional Cambodia Education Survey 2012  
	  
	  
The 2012 Regional Cambodia Education Survey (originally called the Cambodian Higher 
Education Survey) was conducted in Battambang and Kampong Cham from March to July 
2012. The documents used in the two cities were the same except for the contact information 
on the cover sheet.  
For Battambang, the local contact was Kim Peseth, Director of the American Corner library 
of the local branch of the University of Management and Economics. For Kampong Cham, 
the local contact was Srun Sarak who is the Executive Director of the local branch of the 
University of Management and Economics.  
The pages below include a full copy of the Battambang survey (in English) and the two 
versions of the cover sheet (in Khmer), on university letterhead.  
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Cambodian Higher  Educat ion Survey  (BB vers ion)  
Measur ing the  re turn on educat ion ,  by  Univers i ty  & degree  
Apri l -Ju ly  2012 
 
Before proceeding, please read the below consent form, and the attached information 
sheet (which is for you to keep).  
Consent form 
As a participant in this research, your acceptance is required as confirmation of your 
informed consent to participating in this survey. By completing this survey, you 
agree that you have read and understood the “Participant Information Sheet” for 
this research project. You agree to participate in this investigation through this 
survey and understand that you may withdraw at any time. 
You and your position will not be identified in the project. Potential identifying 
information will be used ONLY for the purpose of providing you with a summary of 
results. All responses will be coded and will contribute to the pooled data of the 
research team, so no individual responses will be made available. 
This survey is part of the PhD research for John Humphreys, from the University of 
Queensland, Australia.  
“This study adheres to the Guidelines of the ethical review process of The University 
of Queensland. Whilst you are free to discuss your participation in this study with 
project staff (contactable on 010 476480 and further details below), if you would like 
to speak to an officer of the University not involved in the study, you may contact 
the Chair of the Ethics Committee on +61 7 3365 6564.” 
Project staff: 
John Humphreys (lead researcher); 
john.humphreys99@gmail.com  
Phone: 010 476480 
Kim Peseth (American Corner Director) 
pesethkim@ymail.com 
Phone: 017 898599 
Jason Potts (academic supervisor) 
j.potts@uq.edu.au 
Phone: +61 401 651142  
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2012 Cambodian Higher Education Survey –Participant Information Sheet 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
This survey is an essential part of ongoing research to more accurately determine the 
benefit from University education in Cambodia. The results from this survey will 
help researchers, University staff and the government to better understand the role 
of higher education as a driver of higher incomes, economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  
This survey is being conducted in Battambang and Kampong Cham provinces in the 
Kingdom of Cambodia. You will be asked to answer set questions without outside 
observations and your responses will remain anonymous. The survey is expected to 
take about 20 minutes to complete. 
This survey requests information about your personal history, your education 
history, and your work history. Although we ask for specific figures, in some cases 
these may not be known with a high degree of accuracy. Therefore, in most cases 
your best estimate is what we require. 
Participants are under no obligation to participate and may withdraw at any time. 
Individual responses will be kept entirely confidential, and the results will only be 
reported as aggregates. The information will be stored in a secure environment and 
access to the data will be made available only to the members of the research team, 
and will be used only for the purposes of this research.  
Please return this survey by 21 July 2012 using one of the below methods: 
 
By email: john.humphreys99@gmail.com 
By mail or in person: University of Management and Economics, PO Box 303, #74 
Preak Preas Sdach Sangkat, Battambang City, Battambang Province, Cambodia. 
 
 
If you have any queries on the survey, please do not hesitate to contact John 
Humphreys on john.humphreys99@gmail.com or 010-476480 or Kim Peseth on 
pesethkim@ymail.com or 017-898599 
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Part	  1	   Personal	  details	  
These questions are to give us information about your personal details and background. 
 
Personal	  and	  family	  details	  chart	  includes	  questions	  1.1	  through	  1.10.	  Please	  use	  the	  answer	  guide	  at	  
the	  bottom	  of	  the	  chart.	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Part	  2	   Address	  
These questions tell us about where you lived at school and currently. We do not need the exact 
address, just the village, town, and province. If you have not moved address, you can simply write 
“same”.  
	  
2.1	  –	  Address	  while	  at	  School?	  (village,	  province)	  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________	  
Did	  you	  live	  with	  your	  parents?	  	  	   Yes	  /	  No	  __________________________________________	  
How	  long	  did	  it	  take	  you	  to	  get	  to	  school	  (minutes)?	  _______________________________________	  
	  
2.2	  –	  Address	  while	  at	  University?	  (village,	  province)	  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________	  
Did	  you	  live	  with	  your	  parents?	  	  	   Yes	  /	  No	  __________________________________________	  
How	  long	  did	  it	  take	  you	  to	  get	  to	  University	  (minutes)?	  ____________________________________	  
 
	  
2.3	  –	  Current	  address?	  (village,	  province)	  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________	  
Do	  you	  live	  with	  your	  parents?	  	   	   Yes	  /	  No	  __________________________________________	  
	  
2.4	  –	  Have	  you	  ever	  lived	  or	  worked	  overseas?	  If	  “yes”,	  please	  give	  details.	  
__________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
2.5	  –	  Does	  anybody	  in	  your	  family	  live	  in	  Phnom	  Penh?	  (Yes/No)	  __________________________	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Part	  3	   Education	  history	  
These questions are to give us more information about your education background. 
 
3.1 – In what year did you stop going to school? __________________________ 
3.2 – What was your average grade at school? (letter & number)  ________________________ 
3.3 – Did you miss class regularly? Yes/No _____________________________ 
3.4 – If “yes” to Q3.3, was the reason (1) poor health; (2) helping family with 
housework/farm; (3) working in a job; or (4) other? _____________________________ 
3.5 – What is your level of English? (1) none (2) basic (3) some (4) good (5) advanced _____ 
3.6 – Did you attend University? Yes/No ___________________________________ 
 
If “yes” to 3.6 please answer 3.7. If “no” to 3.6, please go to 3.14.  
 
3.7 – Which University? ____________________________________________________________ 
3.8 – Did you graduate with a degree? Yes/No ____________________________________ 
3.9 – What was your area of study? (1) business (2) agriculture (3) English, (4) other ______ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.10 – What year did you start University? __________________________________________ 
3.11 – What year did you graduate? ______________________________________________ 
3.12 – How many subjects did you repeat during University? _________________________ 
3.13 – What was your average grade at University? (letter & number)   __________________ 
 
If “no” to 3.6 
3.14 – Why did you not go to University? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.15 – If you wanted to go to University, what subject did you want to study? (1) business, 
(2) agriculture, (3) English, (4) other) _____________________________________________ 
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Part	  4	   Work	  history	  
These questions are to give us information about your work background. 
 
4.1 – What is your current occupation? _________________________________________ 
4.2 – How many years have you worked at your current place of employment? _______ 
4.3 – Do you work for (a) government; (b) non-profit;  (c) business or (d) other___________ 
4.4 – How much do you currently earn per month (after tax)? ______________________ 
4.5 – How much income tax do you pay per month? ______________________________ 
4.6 – On average, how many days do you work per month? ________________________ 
4.7 – On average, how many hours do you work per day? _________________________ 
4.8 – Is your current job the job that you want? If “no”, please explain the job you want. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
4.9 – How many years have you spent in the professional workforce? _____________ 
4.10 – How much do you expect to earn per month in 5 years time? _________________ 
 
4.11 – What was your income profile since you started working? Please estimate 
income/month for the following years: 
Year	   Income/month	   	   Year	   Income/month	  
2011	   	   	   2003	   	  
2010	   	   	   2002	   	  
2009	   	   	   2001	   	  
2008	   	   	   2000	   	  
2007	   	   	   1999	   	  
2006	   	   	   1998	   	  
2005	   	   	   1997	   	  
2004	   	   	   1996	   	  
 
Only answer if you went to University: 
4.12 – If you had not gone to University, what do you estimate would be your current 
income per month? _________________________________________________________ 
Only answer if you did not go to University: 
4.13 – If you had gone to University, what do you estimate would be your current income 
per month? _____________________________________________________________________ 
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